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A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO SACRED SITES CASES:
ASSERTING A PLACE FOR INDIANS AS NONOWNERS
Kristen A. Carpenter
Although the Free Exercise Clause prohibits governmental interference with
religion, American Indians have been unsuccessful in challenging government
actions that harm tribal sacred sites located on federal public lands. The First
Amendment dimensions of these cases have been well studied by scholars, but this
Article contends that it is also important to analyze them through a property law
lens. Indeed, the Supreme Court has treated the federal government's ownership
of public lands as a basis for denying Indian religious freedoms claims. This Article
contends that such holdings rely on an "ownership model" of property law wherein
the rights of the owner trump all other interests and values. As scholars have
argued, however, the ownership model represents a view of property law that is
neither descriptively accurate nor normatively attractive. In theory and practice,
property law also recognizes the rights of nonowners in furtherance of human
values and social relations.
Accordingly, this Article contends that, even as nonowners, Indians may have
enforceable property rights to use, and maintain the physical integrity of, sacred sites.
Examining sacred sites problems through common law, federal Indian law, public
lands law, and human rights law, the Article identifies and analyzes property rights
arguments that may be available to Indian litigants even where the government is the
undisputed owner of the land. While this approach will not secure Indian religious
freedoms in every case, the Article concludes that Indian nations should consider
property rights arguments as part of a multipronged legal strategy in sacred sites cases.
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INTRODUCTION
I realized that it was understood by all our people that this location was
our connection to the Great Spirit. All my people know it's there.
The Government has tried for many years and by many different
methods to take this away from us. But this is one thing they cannot
take from us. By knowing who you are, this is the power of our people.
When we go to Tellico, even for a visit, the realization that this is our
connection to our own ancestors and to the Great Spirit, comes all
back to us, and it's like going home. Each of us comes back a better
person, a better Cherokee, for having gone there. If the Tellico Dam is
completed all this will be lost to us forever.
-Richard Crowe, Eastern Band of Cherokees'
For practitioners of religions throughout the world, certain places are
sacred. Well-known examples include Mecca, Jerusalem, and Mt. Calvary,
places where religious adherents come to pray, sacrifice, heal, and contemplate.2
1. See BRIAN EDWARD BROWN, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE LAND: NATIVE AMERICANS
AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SACRED LAND 15-16 (1999) (quoting Cherokee
plaintiff Richard Crowe, Eastern Band of Cherokees).
2. See Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of
Public Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1450 n.14 (1985).
These are locations in the physical world where humans revere, recognize, and
experience the supernatural, and try to understand its meaning in their lives.
Indigenous peoples, too, have sacred places that are essential to their religions
and cultures. For them, the sacred is often part of the natural landscape.'
Tribal cultures, from the time of their creation, have been formed, shaped, and
renewed in relationship with mountains, mesas, lakes, rivers, and other places
that are imbued with the spirituality, history, knowledge, and identity of the
people. Today, at numerous sacred sites in the United States, American
Indians conduct ceremonies that revitalize their communities and keep their
world in balance.
This Article is about a special problem that American Indians face in
practicing their religious and cultural activities at sacred sites-many Indian
sacred sites are now located on lands owned by the federal government and
the government has the legal power to destroy them. In the major case of
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
4 for instance, the United
States Forest Service decided to build a road and harvest timber on sacred
lands where tribal people conducted ceremonies. Northern California
Indians challenged the project, but the Supreme Court held that the federal
government's project did not violate the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause, even though the construction and logging would "virtually destroy
the Indians'... religion."'
Lyng presents a formidable bar to the legal protection of American
Indian religious freedoms. It effectively denies the availability of First
Amendment relief in many, if not most, cases in which religious activities
take place on public lands.6 While the free exercise implications of this case
have been well-studied by scholars,7 this Article contends that a deeper
3. See generally ANDREW GULLIFORD, SACRED OBJECTS AND SACRED PLACES: PRESERVING
TRIBAL TRADITIONS (2000); SACRED LANDS OF INDIAN AMERICA (Jake Page ed., 2001).
4. 485 U.S. 439, 442-43 (1988).
5. Id. at 447-51.
6. For post-Lyng cases, see, for example, United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 405
(8th Cir. 1988), holding that the Forest Service did not violate the First Amendment when it
denied a group of Sioux Indians a special use permit that would have allowed them to occupy
national forest land that they believed was sacred. See also Charlton H. Bonham, Devils Tower,
Rainbow Bridge, and the Uphill Battle Facing Native American Religion on Public Lands, 20 LAW &
INEQ. 157, 165 (2002) ("The decision in Lyng effectively marked the end of Native American
attempts to employ the Free Exercise Clause to protect Native American religious sites on pub-
lic lands.").
7. E.g., S. Alan Ray, Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association: Government Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483,
490-510 (1989); see also Ira Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise
of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 944-46 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1486 (1990);
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understanding of property law is also essential to understanding Lyng. Indeed,
the Supreme Court treated Lyng as a case about both religion and property.
First, the Court held the federal activity did not transgress the Free Exercise
Clause because it would not "coerce" the Indians into violating their beliefs.'
Second, the Court held: "Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of
the area, ... those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use
what is, after all, its land."9
This second prong of Lyng is a property law holding-it provides that
the federal government's rights as an owner trump any interests that the
Indians have in using their sacred sites. Despite this very robust, or even
extreme, formulation of the government's ownership rights, this holding has
gone largely unchallenged. To the extent scholars have discussed property
law in sacred sites cases,'0 they typically have lamented the fact that property
rights prevail over religious freedoms" or have accepted the inability of
Western legal systems to protect Indian property interests. 2
Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,125-26 (1992)
[hereinafter McConnell, Religious Freedom]; Peggy Healy, Casenote, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association: A Form-Over-Effect Standard for the Free Exercise Clause, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L J.
171 (1988); J. Brett Pritchard, Note, Conduct and Belief in the Free Exercise Clause: Developments and
Deviatons in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 76 CORNELL L REV. 268
(1990); Kathryn C. Wyatt, Note, The Supreme Court, Lyng, and the Lone Wolf Principle, 65 C-I.-KENT
L REV. 623,625 (1989).
8. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51.
9. Id. at 453.
10. This is not to minimize the significance of Professor Brian Edward Brown's book,
Religion, Law, and the Land. As a professor of religious studies, Brown offers a nuanced
discussion (often missing from legal analysis) of the "sacred" and closely examines how each of
the major Indian sacred sites cases treats "land as property." See BROWN, supra note 1, at 5, 7.
For helpful legal commentary on property in sacred sites cases, see Allison M. Dussias, Ghost
Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-
Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 823-33 (1997), arguing
that "federal courts have subordinated the free exercise rights of Native American plaintiffs to
property rights."
11. E.g., BROWN, supra note 1, at 7; Dussias, supra note 10, at 823-33; see also Note,
Neutral Rules of General Applicability: Incidental Burdens on Religion, Speech, and Property, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 1713, 1713 (2002) (arguing the "[Supreme] Court has elevated property rights above First
Amendment rights in the incidental burdens context").
12. See Marcia Yablon, Note, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory Responses to
American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE L.J. 1623, 1638, 1634-38 (2004)
(asserting that "Lyng was right," in part, because of the "limited ability of western property law to
protect American Indian land rights").
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This Article" takes a different approach. 4  It argues that Indian nations
can use property law to challenge the absolutist version of ownership espoused
by the Court in Lyng.'" Indian nations can assert that even as nonowners, they
may have enforceable rights at sacred sites located on federal public lands. And
they can argue that despite the government's status as the owner, it may have
enforceable obligations at sacred sites. The Supreme Court does not appear to
have seriously entertained these possibilities in Lyng, perhaps because the
parties argued the case primarily in free exercise terms. 6 When property
arguments did appear in the briefs, they were made as generalized or ancillary
points, without detailed analysis. 7 Looking forward to future cases in which
Indians seek to use, or protect the physical integrity of, sacred sites on public
13. This Article is one of several in a multipart research project that examines the role of
property law in American Indian sacred sites cases. In this present Article, I am primarily
interested in using property law to support the rights of Indians as "nonowners." Follow-up
projects will consider the feasibility of Indian nations' recovering ownership of sacred sites for
themselves and the role of property in developing stronger federal policy in favor of accommo-
dating Indians' sacred site usage.
14. Several scholars have called for common law property claims in sacred sites cases.
See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 7, at 973 (generally arguing that government conduct at sacred sites
should be held "burdensome" if it violates a common law right and specifically advocating a
"prescriptive easement" approach to Lyng); Kevin J. Worthen, Protecting the Sacred Sites of Indigenous
People in U.S. Courts: Reconciling Native American Religion and the Right to Exclude, 13 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 239, 241-56 (2000) (arguing for the expansion of the "right to exclude" such that Indians could
exclude others from sacred sites); see also John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Individual Aboriginal Rights, 9 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 323,363-64 (2004) (evaluating individual aboriginal title claims in sacred sites cases).
15. See, e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF
PROPERTY 6-9 (2000) (critiquing the "ownership model" of property law); see also MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 18-46 (1991)
(critiquing an absolute view of property owners' rights).
16. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No. 86-1013), 1987 WL 880342 ("This case concerns the limitations imposed
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment upon the federal government's authority to
manage the public lands."); Brief for the Indian Respondents at 2, Lyng (No. 86-1013), 1987 WL
880352 ("Indian respondents ... seek to protect from governmental interference their fundamental
right to freely practice their traditional religion."); see also Brief for Respondent, Lyng (No. 86-1013),
1987 WL 880350; Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Lyng (No. 86-1013), 1987 WL 880360.
17. For example, the federal government argued that the Indians "claim the destruction of
conditions necessary for effective religious practice by virtue of something the government has
done in managing its own procedures or property .... What respondents assert is essentially a
constitutionally compelled easement entitling them to limit the uses of a substantial area of
publicly-owned lands." See Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 11, Lyng (No. 86-1013). But neither
the government, nor the Indian parties, made any detailed argument about the existence of an
easement. Property language also appeared in questions of federal authority over land
management. But the government made only the general argument that any accommodation of
Indian religion was discretionary because the "United States 'no less than a private owner of
property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated."' Brief for the Petitioners at 38, Lyng (No. 86-1013) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
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lands, this Article aims to identify and analyze potential property rights
arguments that may be available to Indian litigants even where the
government is the undisputed owner of the land."
Admittedly, this approach is counterintuitive in a couple of ways. First,
courts have often failed to recognize Indian property rights, perhaps in part
because the very idea of property has often seemed antithetical to indigenous
values regarding land or because courts have used property law to legitimate
the dispossession of American Indian lands. 9 Second, a rights argument may
appear to diverge from the current trend of exhorting Indians to seek negoti-
ated accommodations of their religious interests, especially through the fed-
eral administrative process.2" But the law's inability to recognize Indian
property rights has been overstated,2 and relying on the hope of admin-
istrative accommodation alone leaves Indian religious freedoms vulnerable to
fluctuating federal policy.22 Thus, the assertion of property rights at sacred
sites is both possible and important in bolstering Indian claims in sacred sites
cases. Basing claims on property law does not ensure victory; parties still have
18. There are, of course, other possible approaches, also informed by property law, to the
problem. Another approach would be to argue for the reversal of Lyng on grounds that the rights of
owners should not include the right to destroy the religious sites and practices of American Indians.
Cf. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371-72,374-75 (N.J. 1971). In Shack, the court stated:
[U]nder our State law the ownership of real property does not include the right to bar
access to governmental services available to migrant workers ....
Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, and are
limited by it....
[These workers' rights of] privacy ... dignity[,] and association[] ... are too
fundamental to be denied on the basis of an interest in real property and too fragile to be
left to the unequal bargaining strength of the parties.
Id.; see also supra note 13 (describing follow up projects).
19. See generally Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1,
40-51 (1991). See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN
LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 313-17 (1990).
20. See, e.g., Yablon, supra note 12, at 1629 ("In foreclosing judicial protection, the Lyng
Court shut off one method of protecting sacred sites, but suggested another, more feasible method
in its place-agency accommodation."); see also MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE
CULTURE?, at xi, 144-72 (2003) (calling for "pragmatic compromise" in indigenous cultural
property disputes, including sacred sites cases). See generally Bonham, supra note 6, at 163-74.
21. See, e.g., Stacy L. Leeds, The Burning of Blackacre: A Step Toward Reclaiming Tribal
Property Law, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 493 (2001). Leeds wrote:
The common misconception suggesting [Cherokees did not own and value property] is merely
an imperialistic mechanism aimed at soothing the collective white conscience. If individual
Cherokees and other Indian tribes do not own or covet real property, then it is not as egre-
gious if their property is taken from them outright or exchanged for inferior lands or cash.
Id.
22. See infra notes 482-489 and accompanying text (describing that while the Clinton
Administration took substantial steps to accommodate Indians' use of sacred sites, the Bush
Administration has taken an opposite tact).
to persuade courts and navigate jurisdictional variations. Stated most optimis-
tically, however, property law may help create affirmative Indian rights to use
sacred sites on public lands, something even the First Amendment seems
incapable of doing."3
Part I of the Article provides some background on the topic of sacred sites.
Part II traces a line of federal cases, culminating in Lyng, that denied Indian
religious freedom claims by treating the federal government like a property
owner with near absolute rights to exploit its lands, even when such exploita-
tion would destroy Indian religious sites and practices. Part III argues that the
Lyng property holding was flawed, at least on a theoretical level, because
property law does not offer absolute protection to any owner. Rather, owners'
rights are often limited by duties and the rights of nonowners. Part IV
identifies and evaluates several categories of enforceable rights and duties that
Indian nations and people may be able to assert even as nonowners in future
sacred sites cases. Finally, Part V responds to potential critiques of a property
rights approach to sacred sites cases.
I. SACRED SITES
The term "sacred site" encompasses many different places with cultural
and religious meaning for American Indians. Vine Deloria identifies several
categories of sacred sites.24 Included in the first category are places where an
historical event occurred, such as Wounded Knee, South Dakota, where
Lakota religious practitioners were massacred by the United States cavalry.
Such sites "instill a sense of social cohesion in the people," reminding them of
23. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) ("[Tlhe
Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not
in terms of what the individual can exact from the government."); see also Morton J. Horwitz,
Conceptualizing the Right of Access to Technology, 79 WASH. L. REV. 105, 106 (2004) ("IThe
prevailing view of the U.S. Constitution is that its pronouncements are largely negative and
meant only to prevent government from overstepping its bounds, not positive, thereby creating
constitutional duties in the government to maximize the welfare of the citizenry.").
24. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD iS RED 275-78 (Fulcrum Publ'g 2003) (1973); see also
GULLIFORD, supra note 3, at 70-91 (setting forth a "typology" of sacred sites and sacred landscapes
including: (1) religious sites associated with oral tradition and origin stories, (2) trails and
pilgrimage routes, (3) traditional gathering areas, (4) offering areas--alters and shrines, (5) vision
quest and other individual-use sites, (6) group ceremonial sites-sweat lodges, dances, and sings,
(7) ancestral habitation sites, (8) petroglyph and pictographs--ceremonial rock art, (9) individual
burials and massacre sites, and (10) observatories and calendar sites); cf. THOMAS F. KING,
"SACRED SITES" PROTECTION: BE CAREFUL WHAT You ASK FOR (2002) (arguing the term
"sacred sites" fails to encompass all of the land and resources that are spiritually significant to
Indian peoples), at http://www.sacredland.org/resources/bibliography/thomas-king.html.
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events shared by the tribal community over generations." A second category
includes sites with "a deeper, more profound sense of the sacred," because
"something mysteriously religious... has happened or been made manifest"
there.26 An example is Buffalo Gap in the Black Hills, where the buffalo
emerged in the spring to initiate the ceremonial year of the Lakota and other
Plains peoples. In the third category are "places of overwhelming holiness
where the Higher Powers, on their own initiative, have revealed Themselves to
human beings."27 These places where "the highest spirits dwell" include Bear
Butte on the Plains, Taos Pueblo's Blue Lake, and the High Country of the
Lyng case." At these locations, "[pleople have been commanded to perform
ceremonies.., so that the earth and all its forms of life might survive and
prosper."29 According to Deloria, there also exists a final category of sacred sites
yet to be revealed by higher spiritual powers. The possibility of such revelations
reminds human beings that the deities are alive."
Other scholars emphasize the values that emerge from indigenous peoples'
experiences with sacred sites.31 They observe that indigenous peoples have "an
understanding of the relatedness, or affiliation, of the human and nonhuman
worlds."32 This relatedness gives rise to "moral responsibilities and obligations"
to and for the natural world.33 Further, indigenous peoples have a common and
central concept of "respect" for the "inherent... value which something has
insofar as it inheres in, or belongs to, the natural world. 34 It is important not
to overgeneralize, but these values--of relatedness, moral obligation, and
respect-often guide indigenous approaches to resource management,
economic development, and religious practice.35
Sacred sites are integral aspects of tribal worldviews and identities; they
figure in contemporary self-determination as well as political, cultural, and
economic survival.36 They are holy, irreplaceable places without which many
25. DELORIA, supra note 24, at 276.
26. Id. at 276-77.
27. Id. at 275-79.
28. Id. at 279.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 281.
31. See, e.g., Laurie Anne Whitt et al., Belonging to Land: Indigenous Knowledge Systems and
the Natural World, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 701, 722 (2001).
32. Id. at 704-05.
33. Id. at 705.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 732-43.
36. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 16.
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tribal religions cannot exist." At some sacred sites, entire tribes, societies, or
families gather for ceremonies and rituals, while at others, a solitary medicine
person or a teenager may be present. Even a ceremony conducted by one indi-
vidual can benefit the entire tribe by restoring the community's balance and
relationship with the natural world. In some instances, tribal practitioners may
be charged to perform activities on behalf of all of humankind and even the
entire earth.38
II. OWNERSHIP IN SACRED SITES CASES
One might wonder why a discussion of places with such religious and
cultural import has any place in a law review article. Sacred site legal issues
grow out of the fact that many sacred sites are now owned by the govern-
ment, which acquired them from Indian nations either by purchase or con-
quest. 9 Quite often, the federal government's management of its lands
threatens the sacred quality they hold to indigenous peoples-and the parties
wind up in lawsuits.
A. Cases in the Lower Federal Courts
Sacred site cases typically concern the federal government's manage-
ment of sacred sites located on federal public lands. 4' These lands include
national parks and forests, monuments, and historic sites, owned by the
federal government and managed through agencies such as the National Park
Service and United States Forest Service.4 The development of natural
resources on these lands, such as timber harvesting and energy projects, has
long threatened the physical and spiritual integrity of the sites, as well as
37. For tribal views on the sacred sites in Lyng, see SARA NEUSTADTL, MOVING
MOUNTAINS 179-207 (1987), and Abby Abinanti, A Letter to Justice O'Connor, 1 INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES' J.L. CULTURE & RESIST. 1 (2004).
38. See, e.g., DELORIA, supra note 24, at 271-85.
39. See Bob Armstrong, Our Federal Public Lands, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3, 4 (1997)
("The 265 million acres of public lands today (an area larger than France and Germany
combined) are the remaining legacy of the 1.8 billion acres of public domain acquired through
treaty, purchase, or conquest by the federal government on behalf of all Americans.").
40. While most of the major cases concern federally owned lands, there are exceptions. See,
e.g., Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (management of a sacred site at a state park); United
States v. Platt, 730 F. Supp. 318 (D. Ariz. 1990) (tribal access to sacred path located on private
property). For an account of sacred site accommodation on lands owned by a city, see Robert
Retherford, A Local Development Agreement on Access to Sacred Lands, 75 U. COLO. L REV. 963 (2004).
For the most part, this Article concerns sacred sites on federally owned lands.
41. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, MODERN PUBLIC LAND
LAW 1-14 (2d ed. 2001).
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Indians' abilities to practice their religions.42 In the 19 70s-1980s, a number
of Indian nations and individuals brought lawsuits challenging federal man-
agement of development projects on public lands, arguing that the projects
would infringe on the Indians' freedom of religion in violation of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This subpart discusses the function
of government ownership in these cases.
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,43 Cherokees challenged the
federally funded development of Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River
Valley. Beginning in 1967, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal
agency, began acquiring privately owned land along the river as part of a
Roosevelt New Deal development project." The TVA aimed to flood the
Valley and build a dam and reservoir for navigation, flood control, electric
power generation, defense, recreation, and other purposes, including "the
proper use of marginal lands." 5 Controversial from the start, the hundred
million dollar plus project had been the subject of numerous lawsuits brought
by environmental groups and others over the course of a decade. But
powerful interests in Congress were determined that the project would be fin-
ished, and in 1979, Representative John Duncan attached a rider to an
appropriations bill providing, "Notwithstanding... [the Endangered Species
Act] or any other law, the corporation is authorized and directed to complete
construction, and maintain the Tellico Dam." 6 The bill passed and was
supposed to ensure the completion of the dam come hell or high water (so to
speak). As the Sixth Circuit understood: 'No law is to stand in the way of
the completion and operation of the dam." 7 Only an issue of constitutional
magnitude could possibly stop the project." The Cherokees believed they
had such a constitutional claim.
42. See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU: CONFLICT AND ENDURANCE
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (1999).
43. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
44. See generally Joe W. McCaleb, Stewardship of Public Lands and Cultural Resources in the
Tennessee Valley: A Critique of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1-2 (1999).
McCaleb states:
Congress gave TVA unprecedented powers of eminent domain to acquire lands for dams,
reservoirs, power production, navigation projects, public recreation, and industrial
development for "the economic and social well being of the people." Congress also
restricted how and for what purposes TVA could dispose of land after being acquired in
the name of the United States of America.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 2.
46. BROWN, supra note 1, at 11-12 (detailing the "treacherous" political history of the
TVA project and the "deceitful ... maneuvering" of key political players).
47. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1161.
48. Id.
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The Tennessee River Valley was located within the traditional territory
of the Cherokee Nation and was, in many ways, the center of Cherokee life.
As plaintiff Richard Crowe stated, "This is where WE begun." 9 Burial sites
were located there, as was the ancestral town of Chota. Indeed, the entire
Valley was imbued with Cherokee spirituality. When the Valley was in bal-
ance, so too were the Cherokee people." Although the federal government
had forcefully relocated much of the Cherokee Nation to Indian Territory in
the 1830s, the Valley retained its significance to remaining Eastern Band
Cherokees and to some of the relocated Oklahoma Cherokees as well. They
described: "It is difficult to translate into Anglo-American concepts the
meaning of a sacred place to American Indians. It is not merely the symbol
of something sacred or merely a place to bring forth memories of past persons
or events. It is itself sacred, itself the source of sacred power."
t In the
Cherokee worldview: "[The sacred character of the river valley was not
derivative from any human activity within it. Rather, the river valley itself
was the primordial reality investing life-enhancing energy, which sustained a
meaningful existence for the human community it nurtured.
5 2 Some
Cherokees believed the destruction of the Tennessee River Valley would
mean the end of the Cherokees as a people."
Not surprisingly, then, Cherokees protested the project from its inception.
In 1965, they presented a petition to Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas
describing their opposition, and in 1966, they made a statement to Congress
decrying the "final desecration of their ancient homeland if Tellico Dam is
built." 4 In 1972 and 1974, they joined lawsuits brought by the Environmental
Defense Fund opposing the project. These efforts were unsuccessful, but
when the Cherokees filed their First Amendment lawsuit in 1979, the TVA
had not yet inundated the Tennessee River Valley. Brought by individual
medicine people, the Eastern Band of Cherokees, and the United Keetoowah
49. Id. at 1162.
50. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 15.
51. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 15. The affidavit of Cherokee plaintiffs Lloyd Sequoyah, Emmaline Driver,
Willie Walkingstick, and Lloyd C. Owle provided:
When this place is destroyed, the Cherokee people cease to exist as a people.... The white
man has taken nearly everything away from us, our heritage, culture, traditions, and our way
of life that is our religion.., and I'm afraid of what will become of us and our children if we
allow the TVA to cover our sacred land with water.... [Als the water backs over the once
Cherokee land, our people will feel a great pain. The earth will cry ... as water covers this
beautiful, fruitful valley, members of our tribe will be in silence.
54. Id. at 26.
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Band of Cherokees, the lawsuit claimed the project would violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and other laws.5" More specifically,
their complaint argued that the flooding would destroy "sacred sites, medicine
gathering sites, holy places and cemeteries,... disturb the sacred balance of
the land .. . [and cause] irreversible loss to the[irl culture and history. 56 As a
remedy, the parties requested injunctive relief against the impoundment.57
The federal district court quickly dispensed of most of the Cherokees'
arguments. On the First Amendment issues, the court held that the Free
Exercise Clause required a showing of government "coercion" of actions con-
trary to religious beliefs. Impoundment of the Tellico Reservoir, in the
court's view, had "no coercive effect" on the Cherokees' religious beliefs or
practices "other than preventing access to certain land."58 Thus, the only
issue was whether the government violated the Free Exercise Clause by
denying the Cherokees access to land that was "sacred and necessary" to their
religion. 9 The court observed that the federal government "uses the land it
owns" for many purposes that "require limiting or denying public access to
the property."'  This case was no different in the court's view because the
Cherokees had no independent "legal right of access" to the land.6 Where
"[t]he free exercise clause is not a license in itself to enter property, government-
owned or otherwise," the Cherokees had not stated a claim.62
The Sixth Circuit took a different approach when it heard Sequoyah on
appeal. It disagreed with the district court's treatment of the Cherokees' lack of
ownership as dispositive, and instead held that ownership was only one factor
to be evaluated in context. In this case, the court held that the Cherokees'
lack of any property interest63 "should not be conclusive in view of the history
of the Cherokee expulsion from Southern Appalachia followed by the 'Trail of
Tears' to Oklahoma and the unique nature of the plaintiffs' religion."'
55. Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 610-11 (E.D. Tenn. 1979)
(alleging violations of the First, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments; the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C § 1996; the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470-470x-6;
and state statutes), aff'd, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cit. 1980).
56. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160.
57. Id.





63. The court seems to have equated lack of "ownership" with "lack of any property
interest" even though the question of whether the Cherokees might have retained a lesser
property interest, such as an easement, was not discussed in the opinion.
64. Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159,1164 (6th Cit. 1980).
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Despite this potentially expansive recognition of the historical circum-
stances surrounding the Cherokees' loss of the property, the Sixth Circuit had
doubts about the land's religious significance. At least some contemporary
Cherokees hadn't known the exact location of Chota until TVA started
excavating, and for the one hundred years prior to the TVA acquisitions,
other private parties had owned the property. While the land may have had
cultural or historical value, the court held, it was not sufficiently "central" to
the Cherokees' religion to sustain their free exercise claim.65 The court did
not question the sincerity of Cherokee beliefs or practices but opined that
"most people to a greater or lesser extent" revere the places where their
ancestors were buried.66 According to the court, the Cherokees' attachment to
the Valley was more a matter of "personal preference"67 than it was a "convic-
tion shared by an organized group. ''6
A dissenting judge would have remanded on the centrality issue, noting
the Cherokees may neither have clearly understood, nor had an opportunity
to brief, the centrality standard. He argued that when the district court held
that the Government's ownership precluded the Cherokees' free exercise
claim, the court had failed to "develop or find any facts concerning the role
that this particular location plays in the Cherokee religion."'69 But the major-
ity disagreed, holding the Cherokees could not establish that the Valley was
central to their religion.0
A federally owned sacred site was also at the heart of Badoni v.
Higginson,7" in which Navajo religious practitioners and others challenged the
federal government's management of Rainbow Bridge National Monument.
The Navajos argued that the flooding of Lake Powell was drowning their gods
and that tourists were disturbing prayer offerings, defacing canyon walls, and
intruding on ceremonies with their noise. In their view, the federal land
managers were thus violating the Navajos' First Amendment rights to "the
free and uninhibited exercise of their religious beliefs and practices."72 They
requested that the district court order the Bureau of Reclamation, the
National Park Service, and other federal entities "to take appropriate steps to
operate Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir in such a manner that the important
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1163.
67. Id. at 1163-64.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1165 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1164-65.
71. 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977), aff d, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
72. Id. at 643.
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religious and cultural interests of plaintiffs will not be harmed or degraded."73
They also requested "rules and regulations to prevent further destruction and
desecration of the Rainbow Bridge area by tourists."74  Such steps, the
Navajos hoped, would include prohibitions on alcohol consumption at the
monument and closures during ceremonies."
Although the Navajo plaintiffs brought their suit under the Free
Exercise Clause, the court first analyzed the relative property rights of the
parties and determined that the Navajos had none. 6 Indeed, the court was
quick to point out that the Navajos did not even allege any property interest
in Rainbow Bridge National Monument.77 The district court acknowledged
that the Monument indisputably was situated within the boundaries of Navajo
Reservation, but the court asserted that it had "never actually been a part" of
the reservation."8 According to the court, the Monument was established by
a proclamation of President William H. Taft and has since been owned by the
federal government and managed by the National Park Service.79 The court
mentioned that "various uses of the area have fluctuated over the years," but
it concluded that none of these uses "purported to affect the monument."80
On the question of who owned this property-located within the Navajo's
traditional territory-before it became a National monument in 1910, the
court concluded, without further factual support: "[Any aboriginal
proprietary interest that the Navajos may have held in this land would have
been extinguished by the entry of the white man in earlier years.""
73. Id. at 644.
74. Id.
75. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 52.
76. Badoni, 455 F. Supp. at 644.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Navajos did not contest this point, although there may be historical evidence
suggesting the land was once inside the Navajo Reservation. See BROWN, supra note 1, at 44-45
(explaining that the Treaty of 1868 established the Navajo Reservation; 1884 federal action
added the "Paiute Strip," including Rainbow Bridge to the reservation; 1892 federal government
reclaimed Paiute Strip; and several subsequent transfers culminated in the government's 1958
acquisition of Navajo lands necessary for Glen Canyon Dam and its reservoir, Lake Powell).
79. See Lloyd Burton & David Ruppert, Bear's Lodge or Devils Tower: Inter-cultural
Relations, Legal Pluralism, and the Management of Sacred Sites on Public Lands, 8 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 201, 232 (1999) (critiquing judicial decisions that "ignore the nineteenth century
history of forcible removal of indigenous peoples from.., sacred landscapes").
80. Badoni, 455 F. Supp. at 644.
81. Id. (emphasis added); cf. Joseph William Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of
History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481, 482 (1994) (criticizing the views that
"Indian title can be extinguished by the 'increasing weight of history' and that "the longer tribal
rights are ignored, the greater the reason for construing the federal government's failure to protect
Indian interests as an affirmative intent to extinguish Indian title").
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In the district court's view, the parties' property rights were "determi-
native" of the First Amendment issue. 2 The court held that without any
"property interest in the land," the Navajos' claim "does not come within a
country mile of any cognizable legal theory upon which relief can be granted." 3
Recognition of Navajo religious freedoms in the absence of Navajo property
rights would, in the court's view, disturb the property rights of others. And
particularly where the disturbed "other" was the government, such a holding
would lead to "unauthorized and very troublesome results" akin to the
pandemonium that would result if an individual successfully claimed the
Lincoln Memorial was a sacred shrine requiring the exclusion of all visitors.'
Even if the Navajos had a cognizable claim under the Free Exercise
Clause, the court determined that the government's interest in the dam and
reservoir as a major water and power project would outweigh the Navajos'
religious freedoms. Counting up medicine men who had visited the site, and
finding their numbers small, the court held that the ceremonies occurring
there were not sufficiently "organized" or "intimately related to the daily liv-
ing" of the group to merit First Amendment protection." Testimony that
attempted to explain how Navajo practices and shrines at Rainbow Bridge
were of "central importance" to Navajo people, who suffered "severe emo-
tional and spiritual distress" from the desecration of their gods incarnate, was
unavailing.
When the Navajos appealed, the Tenth Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit
in Sequoyah, did not treat the ownership factor as determinative.8 ' Rather,
the court held that property rights were only "a factor" in weighing free exer-
cise and compelling interests. And, importantly, the Tenth Circuit recognized
that ownership rights are not limitless, stating: "The government must man-
age its property in a manner that does not offend the Constitution."8 Despite
the fact of federal ownership, the court explained it must still "look to the
nature of the government action and the quality of plaintiffs' positions" on
the First Amendment issue.89 Ownership did not, at least in theory, give the
federal government the right to violate the Free Exercise Clause.
The Navajos still lost. Unlike the district court, the Tenth Circuit rec-
ognized the "central importance" of the sacred sites to the tribal religion, but
82. Badoni, 455 F. Supp. at 644.
83. Id. (quoting the defendant's language and agreeing that plaintiffs have "no cognizable claim").
84. Id. at 645.
85. Id. at 646.
86. Id. at 643-44.
87. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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it agreed with the lower court that the government had compelling interests
in maintaining the water level at Lake Powell.' ° These included maintaining
the dam and reservoir as a multistate water storage and power generation
project for irrigation, for mineral and natural resource development, and for
water provision to municipal and industrial interests.9 Although the court
refused to decide the case explicitly on the fact of federal ownership, it still
ultimately chose to protect the federal government's right to use its property
for development purposes over the Navajos' religious interests. Because it
found the government interest "compelling," the court decided it unnecessary
to reach the issue of whether the government action infringed on the
Navajos' free exercise of religion.92
Leading up to Lyng, one additional free exercise claim arose involving
federally owned lands,93 and because it closely followed the above precedents,
it can be discussed briefly. In Wilson v. Block,94 the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
lower court's rejection of tribal attempts to stop private interests from
expanding and developing the government-owned Snow Bowl ski area on the
San Francisco Peaks in the Coconino National Forest near Flagstaff, Arizona.
The Hopis argued that the San Francisco Peaks were the home of their
kachinas and that the newly proposed expansion of the ski area would destroy
"the natural conditions necessary for the performance of ceremonies and the
collection of religious objects."95  Applying Sequoyah, the D.C. Circuit
described the case as a "conflict between the government's property rights
and duties of public management, and a plaintiffs constitutional right freely
to practice his religion."96 If the Hopis wanted to "restrict government land
use in the name of religious freedom," they would have to "demonstrate that
the government's proposed land use would impair a religious practice that
could not be performed at any other site." Despite the Hopis' testimony
about the relationship between the place and their practices, the court found
that they failed to meet this standard.
90. Id. at 177.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 177 & n.4.
93. For a case involving state parklands, see Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 791 (D.S.D.
1982), affd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), where the court rejected Free Exercise
Clause claims involving construction projects and restrictions on access to the sacred Bear Butte
located on a state park, in part because the Lakotas had "no property interest in Bear Butte or in
the State Park."
94. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cit. 1983).
95. Id. at 742.
96. Id. at 744.
97. Id.
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B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Lyng
The Lyng case concerned an area of land in California that the Yurok,
Karuk, and Tolowa called "Medicine Rocks" or the "High Country." Dating
back to the early nineteenth century, if not before, tribal people visited the
area to "use 'prayer seats' located at Doctor Rock, Chimney Rock, and Peak 8
to seek religious guidance or personal 'power' through 'engaging in emotional
and spiritual exchange with the creator."'98 In addition, some participants in
the White Deerskin and Jump Dances visited the High Country "to purify
themselves and to make 'preparatory medicine' before the ceremonial
dances.' As a federal study attested, these activities had broad meaning and
effect:
The religious power these individuals acquire in the high country lends
meaning to these tribal ceremonies, thereby enhancing the spiritual
welfare of the entire tribal community. Medicine women in the tribes
travel to the high country to pray, to obtain spiritual power, and to
gather medicines. They then return to the tribe to administer to the
sick the healing power gained in the high country through ceremonies
such as the Brush and Kick Dances.'°
These ceremonies and dances provided the "World Renewal" essential to the
tribes' religious belief system.101
California Indians lost most of their traditional lands through a series of
federal legislative and executive acts during the California Gold Rush.102 By
the time of the Lyng litigation, the High Country was owned by the United
States and managed by the United States Forest Service. The High Country,
including Chimney Rock, was located within the northeastern portion of
Forest Service lands called the "Blue Creek Unit." This 67,500 acre roadless
area contained about 31,000 acres of virgin Douglas Fir forest. It adjoined
other roadless areas and encompassed Blue Creek, a tributary to the Klamath
River and an important spawning habitat for several species of salmon.
In the 1970s the Forest Service proposed a major timber harvesting
project that would harvest over 733 million board feet of timber over the
98. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 591 (N.D. Cal.
1983), affd, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 591 n.4.
102. See, e.g., Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in
California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1405, 1408-09 (1997). See generally Bruce S. Flushman
& Joe Barbieri, Aboriginal Title: The Special Case of Caifornia, 17 PAc. L.J. 391 (1986).
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course of eighty years. Moreover, the project would require the construction
of 200 miles of logging roads in the areas adjacent to the Chimney Rock area.
In particular, a section road (the "G-C road") would "dissect" the High
Country, separating the sacred Chimney Rock from the sacred Peak 8 and
Doctor Rocks. 3 The Forest Service estimated that, in furtherance of the
project, around seventy-six logging and ninety-two other vehicles would
travel through the Chimney Rock area every day.
Through all stages of the Lyng case, it was uncontested that the High
Country was the only place where the Indians could conduct the practices at
issue, and these practices were the heart of their religion and culture. The
district court found: "For the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa peoples, the high
country constitutes the center of the spiritual world."1" Thus, "[diegradation
of the high country and impairment of... [the] training [of young tribal
members] would carry a 'very real threat of undermining the tribal communi-
ties and religious practices as they exist today.' 105
Aware of the area's sensitivity, the Forest Service commissioned studies
on both the environmental and cultural impacts. The resulting "Theodoratus
Report" recommended that the G-0 Road not be completed because it
"would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an
integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest
California Indian peoples."'" The Forest Service rejected this recommen-
dation. Instead, its final plan created "one-half mile protective zones" around
particular sites but allowed for the harvesting "of significant amounts of tim-
ber" from the sacred area."07 Much of the project had been completed by the
time of the Lyng litigation, but the Forest Service had not yet built the six-
mile section of road.
The plaintiffs in the case included individual Indian religious practitio-
ners, the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, as well as envi-
ronmental groups and others, who sued the secretaries of the Forest Service and
Agriculture. The Indian plaintiffs alleged that the completion of the road would
violate the Free Exercise Clause by degrading the sacred qualities of the High
Country and impeding its use for religious purposes. More specifically, the
103. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 592.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 594. In the early stages the first-listed defendant was R. Max Peterson, Chief of
the United States Forest Service, while in later stages it was Richard E. Lyng, Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture. The case has become famous as "Lyng." Thus, the body of the Article
refers to the case at all stages as "Lyng" for purposes of simplicity while citing the official name in
the footnotes.
106. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
107. Id. at 443.
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plaintiffs argued that the visibility of the road, the noise associated with it, and
the resulting environmental damage would all "erode the religious significance
of the areas" and "impair the success of religious and medicinal" activities.'
8
Unlike the courts in Sequoyah and Badoni, the district court in Lyng
reached the question of whether the government action would infringe on
the Indians' religion. Distinguishing Sequoyah, the district court observed
that here the Indians had demonstrated the area was indispensable and cen-
tral to their religion, and that the government use would seriously interfere
with their religious exercise. The court noted that the Forest Service's "own
study concluded that 'intrusions on the sanctity of the Blue Creek high coun-
try are... potentially destructive of the very core of Northwest Indian reli-
gious beliefs and practices."' 9 Citing the Supreme Court's major free exercise
cases, the court concluded that the Forest Service's actions in the High
Country would substantially infringe on the Indians' religion. Moreover, the
government interests in the six-mile road project were not demonstrably
"compelling.""0. Having failed the Free Exercise Clause test, the govern-
ment's plan to build a road through the sacred High Country was struck down
as violative of the First Amendment."'
Notably absent from the district court's opinion was any contention that
the government's ownership of Blue Creek Unit precluded the Indians' claim
under the Free Exercise Clause. By contrast, the court emphasized that the
Indians' lack of a property interest in the High Country did "not release [the
governmental] defendants from the constitutional responsibilities the First
Amendment imposes on them.""' 2 Indeed, the district court was highly
focused on the "public" nature of the property and the public's interest in it.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v. Verner,"' the district
court wrote: "[T]he government must attempt to accommodate the legitimate
108. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 592.
109. Id. at 594-95.
110. Id. at 596. According to the court, the available timber in the Blue Creek Unit was
too small to affect timber supplies, and the timber industry would not suffer significantly without
the project. Even if the government could demonstrate a compelling public interest, the court
held that there were "means less restrictive of [the Indians'] First Amendment rights" than the
government's proposed management plan for Blue Creek Unit.
111. Id. at 595-96. The district court also decided claims under the Establishment Clause
and numerous federal statutes.
112. Id. at 594 & n.8. The court allowed that the Constitution did not convey absolute use
rights, explaining for example, that there would be no First Amendment right to "assemble in a
busy traffic intersection. . . or on a public sidewalk thronging with pedestrians." Id. But the court
was concerned with striking a balance between public safety and the freedom of religion, not on
the owner's absolute rights to exploit the property.
113. 374 U.S. 398 (1962).
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religious interests of the public when doing so threatens no public interest,
even when those religious interests involve use of public property."'1 4 The
implication was that to burden religion in a public place, the government
would need a compelling public interest, such as public safety. While the dis-
trict court did not discount the possibility that the road and timber projects
might also benefit the public, the evidence about the minimal projected
benefits of the G-O project suggested they were insufficient to justify the
extreme burden on religion. Thus focusing on the public's interest in public
lands, the opinion did not even describe the government as an "owner."
Interestingly, the only other discussion of property in the district court
opinion concerned Indian property rights. The Hoopa tribe claimed that the
government's activities would violate their reserved water and fishing rights,
as well as the government's trust responsibility to protect those rights."5
Finding the project would "significantly decrease the quantity of anadromous
fish" in the sections of the Klamath River flowing through the Hoopa
Reservation, the court agreed that the project would violate the federal gov-
ernment's trust duties to the tribe."6
The Ninth Circuit heard the Lyng case twice, first on appeal" 7 and then on
rehearing."8 Both times, the panel affirmed the district court's holding that the
road construction and timber project would impermissibly burden the Tolowa,
Yurok, and Karok peoples' religious freedoms."'9 Judge Canby reviewed and
upheld the district court's findings that the G-O Road would substantially
infringe the Indians' religion. On the compelling governmental interest prong,
he went somewhat further than the district court, observing that the
government "makes little attempt to demonstrate that compelling inter-
ests.., require the completion of the paved G-O Road or the logging of the
high country."'' 0 Although forest management would be "made easier by the
road,'' statewide employment rates would not change and improvement in rec-
reational access would be modest. The evidence did not show the compelling
interest needed to justify the infringement of the Indian religious freedoms.'22
114. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 594 n.8. In the district court's view this was particularly true when,
as in the Forest Service's proposed project for the High Country, the government "threatens religious
conduct per se" as opposed to "merely inconveniencing that conduct through the imposition of restric-
tions reasonable as to time, place, or manner." Id.
115. Id. at 605.
116. Id.
117. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cit. 1985).
118. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986).
119. 764 F.2d at 585-86; 795 F.2d at 692-94.
120. 795 F.2d at 695.
121. Id.
122. Id.
1080 52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1061 (2005)
The Ninth Circuit followed the district court in evaluating and deciding
the claims on the merits; neither court considered whether the government's
ownership should trump the Indians' religious freedoms claims. The Ninth
Circuit did vacate the portion of the district court opinion having to do with
the Hoopa water and fishing rights and federal trust duties on the ground that
the Hoopa Valley Tribe was not a party to the case. For the most part, the
parties' property rights were thus a non-issue in the case.
Only a dissenting opinion in the Ninth Circuit opinion on rehearing
began to suggest a property rights analysis. Dissenting Judge Beezer's view of
the case was that "[tihe Indian plaintiffs are attempting to use the free exer-
cise clause to bar the development of public lands." ' Judge Beezer's concerns
hinged, in part, on his understanding of the government's rights as an owner.
He was "not convinced that the district court has thus far given proper
respect to the government's ownership rights in public lands."'24 While the
district court had focused on the G-O Road's potential benefit to the public,
Judge Beezer disagreed, stating, "the issue is not whether the public has a
compelling interest, but whether the government has a compelling interest."'2s
He acknowledged that "the government has many obligations that are not shared
by private land owners," but still felt that "the government retains a substantial,
perhaps even compelling, interest in using its land to achieve economic
benefits."' 126 For this reason, he would have remanded, requesting the district
court to reconsider the threat of development to the Indians' religion in light of
"the strength of the government's interest in developing the high country."'27
Thus, in the early stages of Lyng, a federal district court and two panels
of the Ninth Circuit held that building a road through, and harvesting
timber in, the Indians' sacred site would substantially infringe the Indians'
freedom of religion. These courts further held that the government had
failed to show a compelling interest in the project. Only one dissenting
opinion suggested that the government's interests as a property owner were
even relevant to the case.
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it reversed the lower courts
in a two-pronged decision. In the first prong of Lyng, the Court dealt with
123. Id. at 699 (Beezer, J., dissenting in part). While allowing that Indians generally had
standing to bring First Amendment claims, Beezer's tone belied his incredulity. He described that
in one case, where "[t]he tribe ... asserted that development would impair their ability to pray, to
conduct ceremonies, and to gather sacred objects such as fir boughs," the court (properly in
Beezer's view) dismissed the Indians' Free Exercise Clause claims. Id. at 700.
124. Id. at 704.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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the free exercise issue. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, admitted
the government's road construction would "virtually destroy the Indians'
ability to practice their religion" but held there was no Free Exercise Clause
violation because the government was not coercing Indians into religious
beliefs. 28 O'Connor allowed that "indirect coercion or penalties on the free
exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny
under the First Amendment." '29 But, O'Connor explained: "[T]his does not
and cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs, which may
make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency
to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require
government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise
lawful actions."'30  Under this standard, activities of the government that
destroy tribal religions do not trigger the compelling interest test, so long as
they do not coerce belief.
Many have noted that by requiring a showing of government "coercion"
irrespective of the extent to which the government action impaired the reli-
gious practice, the Lyng majority substantially narrowed the Court's previous
free exercise standards.'3' Writing in dissent, Justice Brennan stridently criti-
cized this constricted application of the First Amendment.'32
"[Tihe Free Exercise Clause," the Court explains today, "is written in
terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms
of what the individual can exact from the government." Pledging
fidelity to this unremarkable constitutional principle, the Court never-
theless concludes that even where the Government uses federal land
in a manner that threatens the very existence of a Native American
religion, the Government is simply not "doing" anything to the
practitioners of that faith.'33
In Brennan's view, the majority's error stemmed, in part, from its senseless
imposition of Western norms on Indian religions.'34 The Court's approach to
free exercise jurisprudence might protect practitioners of Judeo-Christian
religions, based on individual belief in God, but it offered no protection for
practitioners of Indian traditions wherein belief is often inseparable from
practice, and community engagement with specific sacred places keeps the
128. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1988).
129. Id. at 450.
130. Id. at 450-51.
131. See sources cited supra note 7.
132. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (quoting Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring))
(emphasis added).
134. Id. at 459-60.
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culture and religion alive.135 As Brennan pointed out, the Indians lost in Lyng
neither because the religious practices at issue were not central, nor because
the government's interest in its project was so compelling. The Indians lost
in Lyng because the majority effectively held that the Free Exercise Clause
did not apply to their religion.'36
In addition, the Indians lost in Lyng because the Court used the federal
government's ownership as a basis for denying their claim.' 37  In the second
prong of Lyng, Justice O'Connor was particularly concerned that the Yurok,
Karok, and Tolowa Indians' religion required "undisturbed naturalness" in the
sacred High Country, located within the National Forest.18 In the Court's view,
this claim challenged the federal government's right to use the land according
to its own plans. Justice O'Connor explained: "No disrespect for these prac-
tices is implied when one notes that such beliefs could easily require de facto
beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property. '
The dissent pointed out that the Indians were not claiming ownership
rights; for example, the Indians had not asked the Forest Service to exclude
other people from the area.'" Nor had the Indians even come close to
demanding that the government return the property to the tribes-this was not
a land claims suit. Instead, the Indians requested that the government manage
its lands in a way that would provide the "privacy and solitude" necessary for
135. Justice Brennan's impassioned dissent noted:
In marked contrast to traditional Western religions, the belief systems of Native Americans
do not rely on doctrines, creeds, or dogmas. Established or universal truths---the mainstay
of Western religions--play no part in Indian faith. Ceremonies are communal efforts
undertaken for specific purposes in accordance with instructions handed down from genera-
tion to generation. Commentaries on or interpretations of the rituals themselves are deemed
absolute violations of the ceremonies, whose value lies not in their ability to explain the
natural world or to enlighten individual believers but in their efficacy as protectors and
enhancers of tribal existence. Where dogma lies at the heart of Western religions, Native
American faith is inextricably bound to the use of land. The site-specific nature of Indian
religious practice derives from the Native American perception that land is itself a sacred,
living being.
Id. at 460-61.
136. Id. at 476. As Justice Brennan lamented:
Today, the Court holds that a federal land-use decision that promises to destroy an entire
religion does not burden the practice of that faith in a manner recognized by the Free
Exercise Clause. [The Court has] thus stripped respondents and all other Native Americans
of any constitutional protection against perhaps the most serious threat to their age-old
religious practices, and indeed to their entire way of life.
Id. For scholarly commentary on the free exercise prong of Lyng, see sources cited supra note 7.
137. See Dussias, supra note 10, at 823-30.
138. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Indian religious practices."' But, in Justice O'Connor's view, finding for the
Indians would cause an inappropriate "diminution of the Government's
property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian religion.' 42
O'Connor based her conclusion on the fact that the district court's order
permanently enjoined road construction or timber harvesting on 17,000 acres
of public land. She did not, however, consider whether the government still
had available to it any other uses for the land or what the value of such
activities might be.'43 Further, O'Connor noted that while the Indians did
not presently object to recreational users in the area, they might "seek to
exclude all human activity but their own from sacred areas of the public
lands" at some point in the future.'"
However incomplete and speculative O'Connor's concerns, they were
sufficient to raise the specter of interference with the government's rights as
an owner. The upshot was that, "[wihatever rights the Indians may have to
the use of the area .... those rights do not divest the Government of its right
to use what is, after all, its land.' 45 The Court placed virtually no limit on
what the government could do on its property-save for the possibility of a
constitutional problem (presumably equal protection) if the government
excluded only the Indians from sacred sites.'"
The Supreme Court's decision in Lyng has cleared up the role of ownership
in these cases. While the lower courts had struggled to reconcile federal owner-
ship with Indian religious interests, Lyng explained that the government's
ownership could be dispositive. Whereas Judge Beezer had been concerned that
Indians were trying to use the Free Exercise Clause to stop the development of
public lands, Justice O'Connor made clear that the federal government's owner-
ship rights justified the destruction of Indian religious practices.
Justice Brennan pointed out, again in dissent, that the majority thus
adopted the government's position that "its prerogative as landowner should
always take precedence over a claim that a particular use of federal property
infringes religious practices."'47 Since Lyng, the courts have allowed the fed-
eral government to use its ownership as a shield against Indian free exercise
141. Id.
142. Id. at 453.
143. Notably, for Takings Clause claims, the U.S. Supreme Court requires private owners to
show to what extent they are deprived of "all economically viable use of their land." See, e.g.,
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
144. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452-53.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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claims in a number of cases."' The federal government's status as "the owner"
currently stands as a potential bar to Indian free exercise claims involving sacred
sites located on federal land.1
49
III. UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO OWNERSHIP
While the decision in Lyng was devastating for American Indians and other
religious adherents, it was not unusual in its focus on the rights of the property
owner.5 Our society maintains a deeply held belief that "[piroperty is about
rights over things and the people who have those rights are called owners.""
Therefore, this part first identifies and then deconstructs the "ownership model."
A. Identifying the Ownership Model
The ownership model appears throughout the development of Anglo
American property law.5 In the eighteenth century, Blackstone's Commentaries
on the Laws of England glorified property as "that domination which one man
claims and excludes over the external things of the world, to the exclusion
148. E.g., Dussias, supra note 10, at 831-33 (citing United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404
(8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting, on basis of government's ownership, Lakotas' claim that Forest Service's
denial of a permit for the use of an area in the Black Hills National Forest as a religious, cultural, and
educational community violated their free exercise rights)); Havasupai Tribe v. United States,
752 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Ariz. 1990), aff d sub nom. Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cit.
1991) (rejecting, on the basis of the government's ownership, a Havasupai claim of free exercise
violation involving the Forest Service's plan for a uranium mine in an Arizona national forest);
Manybeads v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Ariz. 1989) (rejecting, on the basis of the
government's ownership, a Navajo claim that relocation from the Hopi Reservation under the
provisions of the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act violated their free exercise rights).
149. Indian free exercise claims are further limited by Employment Division v. Smidt, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), which declined to apply the compelling governmental interest test in a case where members of
the Native American Church challenged a state statute denying unemployment benefits for dismissal
based on religious peyote use. See also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1152-53 (1990) ("The Smith decision is undoubtedly the most
important development in the law of religious freedom in decades."). Some scholars argue that the
Supreme Court's ever-narrowing approach to the Free Exercise Clause reduces the religious freedom not
only of American Indians but also of other minorities. E.g., McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 7,
at 139; cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (finding that city
ordinance prohibiting animal sacrifice was motivated by animosity toward the Santeria religion and
therefore violated the Free Exercise Clause).
150. See SINGER, supra note 15, at 28 ("The traditional concept of property is ownership.").
151. See id. at 2; see also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS ON
THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP (2000).
152. Anglo Americans were not the first to articulate an ownership approach to property law.
See, e.g., RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 11 (1999) ("Roman jurists were the first to
formulate the concept of absolute private ownership, which they called dominum .... The rights
implicit in dominum were so absolute that ancient Rome knew nothing of eminent domain.").
of every other individual." '53  While this strident rhetoric may not have
reflected reality even in Blackstone's time, 154 the concept of property as
confirming absolute rights in owners has influenced the development of
property law.
155
Today's scholars often describe ownership as a "bundle of rights" including
the rights to use, transfer, and exclude others from one's property."6 Cases like
Lyng highlight the power of the owner to deploy that bundle of property rights,
in the aggregate or individually, for economic development. As Richard Pipes
surmises: "[Piroperty refers to the right of the owner or owners, formally
acknowledged by public authority, both to exploit assets to the exclusion of
everyone else and to dispose of them by sale or otherwise."' These rights seem
to allow the owner even to destroy his property or "us[e] it all up."'58
Contemporary politics also invoke the ownership model, particularly in
debates over governmental regulation of private property. Organizations
advocating "wise use" and "property rights,"'59 for example, contend that
"landowners possess inherent rights" to use their property "intensively, free of
restraint, so long as they avoid visibly harming anyone else.""6 In their view,
owners have "always" had such extensive rights, and they resist what they
153. Robert P. Bums, Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REV.
67 (1985).
154. See generally Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE
L.J. 601 (2000) (arguing that Blackstone himself seems to have had some awareness of the limited
nature of ownership rights); see also David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting
Depictions of Property in the American Political Founding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464, 466 (1993)
("[Gin the rhetorical level property rights were described in 'absolutist' terms (circa 1776-1800)
while during this time the legal treatment of property in case law and legislation suggested much
less than an absolutist treatment of property.").
155. See generally Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 281 (1998)
(discussing "absolutism" as the "intuitive" view of property in Anglo American law and politics).
156. See CAROL M. ROSE, Seeing Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 267, 278-85
(1994) (discussing the "bundle of sticks" metaphor of property).
157. PIPES, supra note 152, at xv.
158. Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 76, 76 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
159. Some of the organizations that are often associated with the "wise use" movement include
the Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise, Alliance for America, American Land Rights
Association, Cato Institute, Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise, the Heartland Institute, and
Property and Environment Research Center. See generally LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE (John D.
Echeverria & Raymond Booth Eby eds., 1995). A notable entity is the Mountain States Legal
Foundation, a legal advocacy organization that generally pursues property rights and wise use in
litigation. See Mountain States Legal Found., Homepage, at http://www.mountainstateslegal.org.
Mountain States Legal Foundation has specifically challenged federal agencies' decisions to accommodate
Indian sacred site usage in several cases. See, e.g., Wyo. Sawmills Inc. v. United States Forest
Service, 383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cit. 2004); Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814
(10th Cir. 1999); Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002).
160. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE 2 (2003).
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characterize as the recent tendency of regulatory agencies to curtail such
rights in the name of environmental protection or other societal goals. 6 '
The concerns of these scholars, political organizations, and individual
owners are reaching the courts.'62 The Supreme Court seems to be particularly
sympathetic to the ownership model, and Lyng is not the only example.
The Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence on takings law, for example, reveals
a substantial number of cases expanding constitutional protection for owners'
rights,'" perhaps beyond what the framers intended in the Fifth Amendment.'6
5
Professor Joseph Singer points particularly to the Court's treatment of
ownership in the recent case of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.6 In 1971, the
Commonwealth of Rhode Island had enacted a regulatory system for limiting
the development of coastal wetlands.'67 Seven years later, Mr. Palazzolo
became the owner of property in Rhode Island, and still some years after that,
he applied for a permit to fill eighteen acres of coastal wetlands for the con-
struction of a beach club. The state regulatory commission denied the
application, and Palazzolo sued for compensation under the Takings Clause.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, in light of the state law, Palazzolo
had no reasonable expectation of developing the land when he took title to
the property, and therefore no taking had occurred.'68 The U.S. Supreme
161. See John D. Echeverria, The Politics of Property Rights, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 351, 351-52
(1997) ("The property rights position also represents a new normative argument against the assertion
of regulatory power to protect the environment: the preservation of individual dignity and autonomy
depends upon reining in regulations that protect the environment.").
162. See FREYFOGLE, supra note 160, at 9.
163. See Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest, the Supreme Court's Attack on Tribal Sovereignty,
37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 641, 661 (2003) ("In recent years, the Supreme Court has been increasing
constitutional protection for property rights."); cf. GLENDON, supra note 15, at 31 ("Although the heyday
of the absolutist property paradigm came and went more than fifty years ago, the paradigm persists in
popular discourse and still occasionally receives lip service from the Supreme Court.").
164. See, e.g., Babbit v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704
(1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
165. See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 15, at 25. Glendon states:
The framers' efforts to directly and indirectly protect the interests of property owners
were never meant to preclude considerable public regulation of property. The Fifth
Amendment expressly recognized the federal eminent domain or "takings" power.... In
the nineteenth century, the takings authority was liberally invoked ... to promote
economic development, and notably to aid railroads in acquiring land.
Id.
166. 533 U.S. 606 (2001); see also Singer, supra note 163, at 661.
167. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 614.
168. Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000).
Court reversed, holding that Palazzolo could assert his takings claim even
though he had purchased the property after the regulation's effective date.
6
1
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision was grounded, in part, on the prin-
ciple that as an owner, Palazzolo was justified in the expectation that he could
develop the property even though state law was clearly to the contrary.'
Palazzolo, like Lyng, is a case of the ownership model taken to an extreme.' In
Palazzolo, one owner's beach club project trumps society's interest in balancing
real estate development with environmental protection, an interest expressed
through state law.' In Lyng, the owner's logging project destroys religious
freedom, a value expressed in our First Amendment. In a legal world based on
the ownership model, the owner always wins, no matter what else is at stake.
B. Deconstructing the Ownership Model
Despite the pervasiveness of the ownership model, it is only one
approach to property law and perhaps not the best one. As scholars have
argued, property is not just about the absolute dominion of people over
things.' It is not only about the rights of titleholders or owners. In the Legal
Realists' view, for example, property is more correctly viewed as a set of
"social relations" among persons with respect to things.'74 Advancing the
work of the Realists, contemporary critics suggest that a narrow focus on the
169. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616. The U.S. Supreme Court did not allow Palazzolo's claim that he
faced a complete taking because of evidence he could build residences on property even under regulation.
170. See Singer, supra note 163, at 661-62 (arguing that Palazzolo seems to indicate that
some property rights are above the law).
171. Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court seems
unwilling to take the ownership model to its extreme. See Palazzolo v. State, 785 A.2d 561 (R.I.
2001) (remanding to the superior court for findings on the economic value of Palazzolo's "lost"
property and also to consider whether the public trust doctrine affected his reasonable investment
backed expectations about the property).
172. Even the U.S. Supreme Court could not escape noticing that "[tihe details [of the
proposed beach club project] do not tend to inspire the reader with an idyllic coastal image, for
the proposal was to fill 11 acres of the property with gravel to accommodate 50 cars with boat
trailers, a dumpster, port-a-johns, picnic tables, barbecue pits of concrete, and other trash
receptacles." Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 615. Contrast this project with citizens' interests in the
undeveloped wetlands and beachfront property for purposes including military defense, boating,
fishing, shellfishing, and recreation. Id. at 612-15.
173. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). Beyond the property context, see GLENDON, supra
note 15, at 13, stating that "from the very beginning, the United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged implicit limits on our constitutional rights and has imposed obligations on citizens
to respect each other's rights. Jurists are also well aware that ordinary private law-contracts,
torts, domestic relations-is replete with reciprocal duties."
174. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 361 (1954).
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owner obscures the full panoply of interests and obligations of other individu-
als and communities with regard to land and valuable assets.'
If we take into account these other property law concerns, an "ownership
model" becomes neither a descriptively accurate, nor a normatively desirable,
approach to property law. At the descriptive level, it is difficult to ignore that
property law has long protected the rights of nonowners." Thus, a narrow
focus on the identity and interests of the owners tells only part of the legal
story. Property law actually allocates property rights and obligations among
various parties-owners and nonowners. A more comprehensive approach
would recognize property as a "system" that distributes resources and structures
relations among members of society.'77
From a normative perspective, this "social relations" view of property
reframes legal issues and dictates new standards for decisionmaking. Property
law problems should address not only the owner's rights, but also "the con-
flicting interests of everyone with legitimate claims" to the land or other
resources at issue. 7 8 Moreover, when it comes time to choose legal rules, we
should consider how they express societal and human values.
79
Some scholars would argue that a social relations approach to property
law is, at best, representative of an unrealized "ideal."' 80 And, indeed, the
previous subpart of this Article highlighted the resilience of the ownership
model. On the other hand, the law is replete with challenges to the owner-
ship model-instances in which property law protects the rights of nonowners
and imposes obligations on owners. In these instances, the law's allocation of
rights and obligations structures social relations and expresses human values.
In landlord tenant law, for example, the landlord owns the property while
the tenant has rights to enjoy a habitable apartment, to receive visitors, and to be
secure from eviction during the term of his lease. The landlord retains her right
175. See generally Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY, supra note 158, at 36, 36-37 (surveying the works of social
relations theorists Felix S. Cohen, Robert L. Hale, Joseph William Singer, Duncan Kennedy, C.B.
Macpherson, and Jennifer Nedelsky).
176. Munzer puts it a different way, saying that "mTlhe full bundle of rights called ownership may be
split up into smaller bundles held by different entities such that no single 'owner' exists." Id. at 62.
177. See generally SINGER, supra note 15; Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights:
Reconsidering Entitlement Under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L REV. 49 (2002); Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native
Sovereignty and Property in America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1291, 1301 (2001).
178. SINGER, supra note 15, at 91 (calling this approach to property an "entitlement model").
179. See id. at 37.
180. E.g., Munzer, supra note 175, at 65 ("The suggestion is to see Singer's 'social relations
approach' as an ideal type. It is not so much that current property law is in accordance with this
approach. Rather, it is that it could become so.").
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to take possession of the property at the end of the lease.' Both parties have
duties-the landlord must keep the premises in good repair and refrain from
interfering with the tenant, and the tenant has to pay the rent and avoid damag-
ing the premises. Our landlord tenant law thus balances owners' interests in
using their property profitably with nonowners' interests in shelter and privacy.
182
In copyright law, the owner has exclusive rights to use certain property,
but only for a limited time period and with exceptions for fair use.' In this
way, the law attempts to accommodate competing values-it fosters invention
and authors' creativity on the one hand, while promoting the free exchange of
ideas and marketability of intellectual property on the other.'
In the area of public accommodations, statutes prevent owners of property
open to the public from excluding on the basis of race, color, religion, or national
origin-but this law does not apply to purely private property.85 Moreover, the
law still recognizes the common law right to exclude, as long as the exclusion
does not violate a statutory protection.'86 Our public accommodations law thus
balances, perhaps imperfectly, owners' security against nonowners' interests in
access, in furtherance of equality and more harmonious relations among majority
and minority groups."'
Even when we go to the very root of common law property, we see that
the feudal system itself disaggregated and distributed various sticks in the
property law bundle among different actors in the feudal hierarchy. As Joan
Williams writes: "[There were] many persons [in the feudal system] who could
say each with as much justification as the other, That is my field."'88
Williams's analysis of the feudal system perhaps exposes how Anglo American
property has always been as much about social relations as ownership:
Hierarchical and (in theory) unchanging social roles were designed
around interdependent and mutual responsibilities between unequal
181. See generally DAVID S. HILL, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW 1-8 (2004).
182. See SINGER, supra note 15, at 79-80.
183. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107,302 (2000).
184. See MELVILLE B. NiMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2004). But
cf. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283, 285 (1996)
(discussing the "precarious balance" between "public access and private ownership" in copyright law).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000a-6 (2000).
186. See Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 72 N.E.2d 697 (N.Y. 1947) (upholding an
absolute right to exclude an individual, mistakenly believed to be a bookmaker, from a racetrack because
the racetrack had not discriminated on statutorily prohibited grounds of race, religion, color, or natural
origin); cf. Uston v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1982) (rejecting the absolute right of
exclusion in favor of the public's reasonable right of access under the common law).
187. See generally Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996).
188. Williams, supra note 155, at 291 (quoting MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 113-16
(L.A. Manyon trans., 1970)).
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social actors: from vassal to lord, to intermediate lord, to higher lords,
to the king, and ultimately, to God. Each inferior was entitled to pro-
tection or other benefits from his superiors; in return, he owed them
services as well as deference. These social relationships were expressed
through property. A limited number of approved estates in land
cemented a limited number of "estates," i.e., social positions. The
formalism of the system of estates represented feudal society's resis-
tance to social change, its vision of virtue as fulfilling one's place in the
Chain. Because these relationships were envisioned as permanent
interdependencies, the key estates in land awarded simultaneous rights
in a tenant, his lord, and on up the Chain. Exclusive ownership was
virtually unknown; instead, the estates carved up property rights into
various interlocking bundles of sticks. 9
This look at the feudal system through modem eyes reminds us that property
has the power to ingrain values and relationships that are unappealing by
today's standards-such as the concentration of wealth and power in ruling
classes. Our current system of estates and future interests has somewhat
reformed the feudal version, in part to reflect a modem preference for mar-
ketability of property."
The theorists' contention that property has always been about more than
protecting owners' rights seems well-grounded in the reality of property law.
And this seems to be true whether we are talking about property law defined
primarily by statute (as in copyright and public accommodations), contract (as
in leaseholds), or common law (as in the feudal system's present estates and
future interests). In historical and contemporary times, nonowners have had
rights and owners have had obligations. Legal decisions about the allocation of
property interests have shaped social relationships and expressed human values.
Even if cases like Palazzolo and Lyng suggest continued adherence to the
ownership model, the competing strength of the social relations model offers a
platform for rethinking property law cases.
189. Id. at 290 (footnote omitted). Williams sees the feudal system as an illustration of how
Anglo American property differs from the Roman version:
The word "ownership," as applied to landed property, would have been almost meaningless
(in feudal society), for nearly all land and a great many human beings were burdened at this
time with a multiplicity of obligations differing in their nature, but all apparently of equal
importance. None implied that fixed proprietary exclusiveness which belonged to the
conception of ownership in Roman law.
Id. at 290-91 (quoting BLOCH, supra note 188); cf. PIPES, supra note 152, at 11 (discussing Roman
notions of absolute ownership).
190. An example might include most American states' abolition of the "fee tail," an estate
designed to keep property in a single family for generations. See John F. Hart, "A Less Proportion of
Idle Proprietors": Madison, Property Rights, and the Abolition of the Fee Tail, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
167 (2001).
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IV. THE RIGHTS OF NONOWNERS
What sort of property rights might nonowners have in cases like Lyng?
Following Professor Singer's pathbreaking work in social relations theory, this
part considers this question by examining Lyng through the lens of relation-
ships at issue in the case. 1 ' The goal of situating the case in the context of
the relationships between the parties is to better understand the legal rights
and obligations between them.192
Justice O'Connor seems to have treated Lyng as a case about the
relationship between an owner and a nonowner. Starting with O'Connor's
conceptualization, this section argues that even in the nonowner to owner
context, Indians may have common law property rights at sacred sites owned
by the government. But this part next suggests that O'Connor overlooked
other relationships at issue in the case. Lyng also implicates the relationship
between the federal government and Indian nations, the relationship between
the federal government and individual citizens, and the relationship between a
conquering nation-state and the indigenous peoples within its borders. This
portion of the Article identifies and analyzes potential property law argu-
ments growing out of each of these relationships. It does not try to reargue
Lyng, where few property arguments were raised or briefed. Instead, it raises
property arguments that may apply in future cases in which Indians try to
protect their access to, and the physical integrity of, sacred sites located on
federal public lands.
A. The Common Law Context
Justice O'Connor appears to have viewed Lyng as a case about an owner's
desire to use his property free from limitation.193 Asserting the government's
right to "use what is, after all, its land,"' 94 O'Connor evokes an individual who
faces the unwelcome intrusion of interlopers onto his property. The reader of
the Lyng opinion may think sympathetically: Well, I wouldn't want a bunch of
Indians coming into my backyard and telling me what to do with it, either. That
reader might be somewhat relieved when O'Connor expansively protects the
191. SINGER, supra note 15, at 209 ("We cannot define obligations without having some
sense of what people owe each other, and we cannot think sensibly about what people owe each
other without understanding their relationship with one another." (emphasis added)).
192. See Munzer, supra note 175, at 65 (arguing that we can "encourage judges to be
sensitive to [the variety of fully situated social] relationships in rendering decisions").
193. This approach may be somewhat consistent with the "proprietorship" model of federal
land ownership described below. See infra notes 361-366 and accompanying text.
194. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
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owner from "whatever rights""19 those pesky intruders might be claiming. The
opinion confirms that within the confines of his' 96 property, 197 the owner has
the near absolute and sole "right to do whatever he wants."' 98
To a certain extent, O'Connor's model requires us to suspend the knowl-
edge that the government's ownership is more complicated than that of an
individual person. But even if we treat the federal government like any other
owner, the possibility still remains that the Indians as nonowners might have
property rights. Common law easements, profits, and other doctrines quite
often establish the right of a nonowner to use property owned by someone else.
Thus, establishing a common law "use" right may greatly strengthen Indians'
claims to use sacred sites on public lands. It may also help to challenge the
notion that the Indians' claim in Lyng amounts to an attempt "to exact from
the Government de facto beneficial ownership of federal property."'" In the
normal course of property law, the assertion of use rights does not typically
require, or even involve, a claim of ownership.
Perhaps the most common legal right to use property owned by another
is the "easement."2°° An "express easement" is an interest in land, granted in
writing, signed by the grantor, that delineates the purposes and conditions
under which a nonowner may use an owner's property."' If the easement
benefits the grantee in the enjoyment of its own land, it will be binding on
successive owners of the burdened parcel-even decades or centuries later.
Moreover, the owner of the burdened property cannot terminate the easement
or change its scope, unilaterally." 2 An easement holder may enforce his ease-
ment against third party interference, with available remedies including
declaratory judgment, compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages, injunc-
tions, restitution, and the imposition of liens. 3
195. Id.
196. See GLENDON, supra note 15, at 27 (discussing legal rhetoric that "tended to reinforce
beliefs of most white male Americans that they were entirely free to contract for, hold, and devise
property as they saw fit" (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
197. See id. at 52 ("The common law has always recognized a man's house as his castle,
impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands." (quoting
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890))).
198. Id. at 8 (describing a common American view that "the flag stands for the fact that this is
a country where we have the right to do what we want").
199. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court believes that Native
Americans who request that the Government refrain from destroying their religion effectively seek to
exact from the Government de facto beneficial ownership of federal property.").
200. See generally EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS
AND SERVITUDES (2003).
201. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 210-12 (2d ed. 2005).
202. See id.
203. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 8.3 (2000).
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Like any other individual or entity, an Indian person or nation may
negotiate an express easement reserving or granting it permission to use
another's property. There are many such agreements between the United
States and Indian nations expressly reserving to the Indians rights to use their
ceded aboriginal territory for activities like hunting-these agreements are
called "treaties" and are discussed in the next section." Even outside of the
treaty context, however, Indian people may negotiate an affirmative right
to use property owned by someone else. In contemporary property transac-
tions, Indian nations quite often negotiate easements, sometimes to use lands
in their traditional territories that have been lost in some stage of conquest
and colonization.05 In one recent example, the Eastern Band of Cherokees
secured an easement to use lands owned by the Tennessee Valley Authority
for an economic development project." Similarly, tribes might consider
seeking affirmative easements to use sacred sites today."7
Throughout much of history, however, Indian nations often lacked the
knowledge and negotiating power to bargain expressly for easements. Thus,
when they lost possession of traditional lands, they did not necessarily
reserve an express right to continue using sacred sites located on them. But
the common law recognizes that, in some instances, easements may be
created nonexpressly-through the intent and conduct of the parties.
Examples of such easements include easement implied by prior use, easement
by necessity, easement by estoppel, and easement by prescription.ss Once
established, these implied easements are enforceable property interests.2"
In at least one instance, as Dean Kevin Worthen has demonstrated, an
Indian tribe has successfully established a common law right to use lands for
204. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 19, at 6 (describing reserved treaty rights as "easement-like"
rights of access to lands now owned by the federal government).
205. See, e.g., Lenore Rutherford, District, Tribe Make Land Deal, UNION DEMOCRAT.COM,
Sept. 9, 2004, at http://www.uniondemocrat.com/news/story.cfm?story no=15147 (reporting that
Tuolumne Band of Me-Wuk Indians acquired 6.2 mile former railroad easement in land swap deal
with local government).
206. See indianz.com, Eastern Cherokee Band's $49M Resort Plan Approved, at
http://www.indianz.com/News/2004/003504.asp (July 22, 2004) (explaining that the Cherokees
have been granted a forty-year commercial recreation easement on forty acres of Tennessee Valley
Authority land for the purpose of developing a resort). This example may challenge the notion
that recognizing tribal rights will always result in economically unproductive use of those lands.
But see Yablon, supra note 12, at 1631.
207. See, e.g., Koerner v. Bock, 100 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1958) (upholding devise of land for use
as a county park where the devise carried with it a perpetual easement to use the land and the lake
adjacent thereto for Christian baptismal purposes).
208. See SINGER, supra note 201, at 186-210.
209. See, e.g., Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 211-12
(D.R.I. 2002).
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religious purposes through a nonexpress easement claim.
'° In United States v.
Platt,"' the Zuni Tribe sought legal protection for its access to a path stretching
hundreds of miles from New Mexico to Arizona. Every four years since at least
1540, forty to sixty religious leaders had used this path to make a pilgrimage to
Zuni Heaven."' The path was within the Zunis' aboriginal territory, but the
tribe had lost the property through an 1877 Executive Order. Although
subsequent legislation allowed the Zunis to acquire certain property rights for
religious purposes, the reacquired rights did not provide access to Zuni Heaven
in the traditional manner.213
At the time of the suit, rancher Earl Platt owned the lands and had
declared his intention to prevent the Zunis from crossing his land. Because
Lyng had just been decided and seemed to foreclose First Amendment relief,
the tribe decided to try a property argument instead.
21'4 The Zuni Tribe argued
that, by its longtime usage of the path, it had established a limited right to use
property in the form of a prescriptive easement. Arizona law requires a
claimant seeking a prescriptive easement to show its "actual, open and
notorious, continuous and uninterrupted" possession of the property for a
period of at least ten years.1 The court found that the Zunis demonstrated
actual possession" 6 by using the route for religious pilgrimages for several days
every four years and by not recognizing any other claim to the land. Even
"'man made obstacles will not cause the Zuni pilgrims to deviate from their
customary path. This was evidenced by the fact the pilgrims cut or take down
fences in their way."2 7 The Zunis established continuous possession for the
statutory period of ten years by "continually us[ing] ... the defendant's land for
a short period of time every four years at least since -1924 and very probably for
a period of time spanning many hundreds of years prior to that year.
21 s Their
use was open and notorious in that they made no attempt to hide it, and the
surrounding community had common knowledge of the pilgrimage, including• 1219
the route and lands that it crossed. Thus, the court granted the Zuni Tribe a
210. See Worthen, supra note 14, at 248 (discussing the Platt case).
211. 730 F. Supp. 318 (D. Ariz. 1990).
212. Id. at 319- 2 0.
213. Id. at 319 n.1
214. See Hank Meshorer, The Sacred Trail to Zuni Heaven: A Study in the Law of Prescriptive
Easements, in READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 318,319-20 (Jo Carillo ed., 1998).
215. Platt, 730 F. Supp. at 321-23.
216. Id. at 322. Although we usually think of easements in terms of parties' "use" of the
property, the Platt court spoke in terms of the Zunis' "possession" because of the similarity of adverse
possession and easement by prescription in Arizona law.
217. Id. at 320.
218. Id. at 322.
219. Id.
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prescriptive easement to use a fifty-foot wide path on lands owned by Earl
Platt for the pilgrimage to Zuni Heaven once every four years."'
The Platt case is helpful in several regards. It underscores the theoretical
point, missed by Justice O'Connor in Lyng, that Indian nations can claim a right
to use sacred lands without claiming to own the property. In doctrinal terms,
Platt suggests that when Indian nations seek to establish a legal right to use a
sacred site, they might look to the common law of property as a basis for their
claims. In addition to the easement by prescription, there exist other potentially
helpful and related "use" rights that may arise from the parties' intent and
conduct, such as the easement implied by prior use and the easement by
necessity." All of these easements establish an affirmative right to use property
owned by someone else. An Indian tribe that establishes such an affirmative
easement will have a claim if the servient owner interferes with the tribe's use,
such as by developing the property.222 In other words, the owner will have an
enforceable duty to accommodate the tribe's use right.22 This duty is not without
limits.224 In particular, the servient owner has no obligation to permit access
beyond the scope of the original easement225 and may not be required to allow
access that unreasonably burdens his land.226
220. Id. at 323-24.
221. See generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES (2002) (describing additional common law doctrines recognizing property interests
in nonowners including various types of express and implied easements, the constructive trust
doctrine, and other forms of court ordered equitable relief). In a very interesting series of cases,
successors to original settlers of a Mexican land grant sued a landowner who had fenced adjoining
mountain property, seeking rights of access for grazing, hunting, fishing, timbering, firewood, and
recreation. The Colorado Supreme Court found in favor of the claimants, granting access rights to the
"Taylor Ranch" for reasonable use of pasture, firewood, and timber through implied easements by
prescription, prior use, and estoppel. Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152 (Colo. 2003). The case was
heavily tied to a written agreement among the original parties--and may be especially helpful in cases
where tribes consider the interplay between treaties and the common law.
222. By contrast, attempts to secure a negative prescriptive easement preventing a property
owner from developing his own property, in the absence of any affirmative easement, are likely to
fail. See, e.g., Fontainbleau Hotel v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) (no negative prescriptive easement for light and air). While this Article is not focused
on statutory relief, having a sacred site designated for protection under the National Historic
Preservation Act may work as the functional equivalent of a negative easement-limiting the
owner's ability to develop the site.
223. See, e.g., Granite Properties Ltd. P'ship v. Manns, 512 N.E.2d 1230 (Ill. 1987) (enjoining
servient owner from interfering with easement implied by prior use); Finn v. Williams, 33 N.E.2d
226 (I11. 1941) (preventing servient owner from denying existence of easement by necessity); Cmty.
Feed Store, Inc. v. Ne. Culvert Corp., 559 A.2d 1068 (Vt. 1989) (declaring existence of easement by
prescription where servient owner attempted to bar access).
224. See SINGER, supra note 201, at 217-23.
225. See Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 371 P.2d 647 (Nev. 1962).
226. See Green v. Lupo, 647 P.2d 51 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
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The limits on the enforceability of easements illuminate some of the chal-
lenges associated with using common law property doctrines in Indian sacred
sites cases. Recently, for example, some courts have allowed the owner of the
servient parcel to relocate the easement without the consent of the easement
holder, although the traditional common law rule did not permit unilateral
relocation."' If the easement is for the use of a particular place that is sacred to
Indians, providing access to another location of the owner's choosing may not
meet the Indians' religious needs. An additional limitation is that typically only
individuals can obtain prescriptive easements, which may be problematic in
many cases where the tribe itself, as opposed to individual Indian religious prac-
titioners, seeks to establish a right to use the sacred site. 8 As Dean Worthen has
argued, "sacred sites claims of Native Americans do not always fit neatly into the
categories recognized by traditional U.S. property law."229 Professor Joseph Singer
goes further arguing that common law property doctrines are not "neutral" but
were "explicitly intended to exclude American Indian claims to land and to
justify settlement of the New World and dispossession of its inhabitants. 230 Still,
some courts have recognized common law entitlements in cases involving
indigenous patterns of land use." Thus, the advocate has a delicate role. She
should consider raising common law property claims in the narrow set of cases
where they are available. But must be careful to present any such argument in a
way that does not allow Anglo American categories to diminish further or
change the character of indigenous land use patterns.232
227. See SINGER, supra note 201, at 222-23 (and cases cited therein).
228. See, e.g., Dep't of Natural Resources v. Mayor & City Council, 332 A.2d 630 (Md. Ct.
App. 1975) (rejecting the argument that the public could acquire an easement by prescription).
229. See Worthen, supra note 14, at 249.
230. Joseph William Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1821, 1836 (1990) (critiquing the notion that property rights are "neutral").
231. See id.; cf. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990) (establishing Alaska
Native possessory rights to seasonal subsistence site through the doctrine of adverse possession);
see also Grantland M. Clapacs, Note, "When in Nome. ..": Custom, Culture and the Objective
Standard in Alaskan Adverse Possession Law, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 301 (1994).
232. One scholar suggests a specialized approach, combining the common law doctrine of
estoppel with First Amendment law, in a way that reflects American Indian historical experience.
See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1466--67 n.90. Gordon states:
The free exercise clause provides constitutional relief from development, the argument rnms,
where native worship predates European settlement or extinguishment of aboriginal title. Even
where Indian religious practices at sacred sites began after installation on reservations, the
government should be estopped from denying the application of the free exercise clause where
the tribal presence is the result of unwilling migration or treaty compliance.
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In addition, the common law property arguments raised above are usu-
ally applied by state courts in private lands disputes."' If Indian nations try
to use them in federal public lands cases, they will need to research the
applicability of the particular doctrine in a federal forum. For example, pre-
scriptive easement and adverse possession claims typically are not actionable
against governments, but there is a narrow statutory exception to this rule,
allowing certain claims against the federal government.234 Further, courts
have recognized the possibility of establishing implied easements on federal
public lands. " '
If an easement is deemed enforceable, various remedies may be avail-
able. Indian nations might seek a declaratory judgment of their ongoing
right to use the property. They may also be able to seek monetary damages,
even though, as Professor John P. LaVelle has persuasively shown, monetary
compensation is not an adequate remedy for discontinued access to a
unique sacred site.236 The spiritual and cultural relationships, community
vitality, and religious experience associated with sacred sites cannot be
bought. But the law of easements also affords various equitable remedies
that may help to prevent interference with access to scared sites.232 In cases
233. See Lake Pleasant Group v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 429 (1994) (considering an
easement by necessity argument with respect to state trust lands).
234. 43 U.S.C. § 1068 (2000) (allowing or requiring the Secretary of the Interior to issue a
patent to a tract of public land, up to 160 acres, where claimant proves certain elements); see also
SINGER, supra note 221, at 221 (stating that the law is becoming more amenable to adverse
possession claims against governments (citing Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States:
The Hornbooks Have It Wrong, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939 (1996) and several state statutes)).
235. E.g., Kinscherff v. United States, 586 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1978) (finding that the party
stated a claim regarding the existence of an easement by necessity to cross public lands); United
States v. Dunn, 478 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1973) (reversing summary judgment on the issue of whether
defendants had an easement to cross public lands).
236. See John P. LaVelle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice by Restoring the
Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux Nation, 5 GREAT PLAINS NAT.
RESOuRCES J. 40, 64-69 (2001) (amassing powerful testimony in support of the contention that an
award of monetary compensation for the taking of the Black Hills "failed to deliver justice to the Great
Sioux Nation"); see also Richard Pemberton, 'I Saw That It Was Holy': The Black Hills and the Concept
of Sacred Land, 3 LAw & INEQ. 287 (1985). In some rare instances, perhaps, tribes can use monetary
awards to reacquire sacred sites or invest in cultural revitalization programs. Vine Deloria perhaps
implies that monetary awards should be used carefully when he says, about the Black Hills case, that
"The purpose of the suit was to regain as much of the sacred land as possible and a money award,
while distasteful, is still a means to that goal. Per capita distribution and the subsequent expenditure
of over $100 million on consumer goods, however, would be a clear signal that the Sioux people have
adopted the white man's wasteful ways." Id. at 304 (citing Vine Deloria, Jr., L.A. TIMES, June 25,
1980, in PETER MATTHIESSEN, IN THE SPIRIT OF CRAZY HORSE 606 (1983)).
237. See, e.g., Page v. Bloom, 584 N.E.2d 813 (II1. App. Ct. 1991) (enjoining servient
landowner's interference with prescriptive easement); see also supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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where interference with Indian rights will case "irreparable harm," courts
may grant injunctive relief against harmful practices at sacred sites."'
When the federal government interferes with a property interest, as
opposed to a private owner like Platt, Indians may also have a takings claim.
The oft-stated rule is that "when the government physically takes possession
of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty
under the Takings Clause to compensate the former owner, regardless of
whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part
thereof."'239 As a general matter, easements are real property interests cogniza-
ble under the Constitution and therefore compensable under the Takings
Clause." Beyond the Indian law context, there is political and scholarly
interest in the question of what, if any, private property interests held in fed-
eral public lands will be held compensable under the Takings Clause. Parties
have been successful in Takings Claims for specialized property interests in
public lands like grazing permits, mining claims, and water rights.24'
238. See Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1988)
(granting church's request for a preliminary injunction where school board had denied permit to use
public school facilities during nonschool hours for religious services); cf. Steven Sutton, Greater
Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers: Clearing the Irreparable Harm Hurdle in the Tenth Circuit to Protect
Yellowstone Bald Eagles, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 435, 445-58 (2004) (irreparable harm in a species
protection case).
239. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322
(2002) ("The Court's jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings involves the
straightforward application of per se rules .... while its regulatory takings jurisprudence... is char-
acterized by essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries designed to allow careful examination and weighing
of all relevant circumstances.").
240. See First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that government condemnations of easements are takings under the Fifth Amendment and
entitle the holder to compensation); United States v. 10.0 Acres, 533 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1976)
(stating that exclusive easement was a property right subject to a takings claim when government
purchased servient property); Donnell v. United States, 834 F. Supp. 19 (D. Me. 1993) (holding that
easements are property interests subject to strictures of the Fifth Amendment). Other servitudes may
also be compensable. See Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n, 306 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that
under Indiana law, a restrictive covenant constitutes a constitutionally protected property interest
and may only be taken for a public purpose).
241. See United States v. N. Am. Trans. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920) (holding an
unpatented mining claim is property compensable under the Fifth Amendment); see also Turntable
Fishery & Moorage Corp. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 256 (2002) (holding that a boat club had a
compensable property interest under the Fifth Amendment in structures and improvements it con-
structed on federal land pursuant to a special use permit expressly providing for compensation "in the
event public interest requires public ownership thereof"). But see Hage v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570
(2002) (holding that ranch owners did not hold a valid property interest in grazing permits which could
be the basis of a takings claim); Holden v. United States, 38 Fed. CI. 732 (1997) (holding that absent
determination as to validity, mining claims did not constitute compensable property interest so holders
did not state a takings claim with respect to mining claims that were located within a closed area of
public land); White Sands Ranchers v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 13 (1988) (considering takings claims
of ranchers whose grazing privileges were taken for purpose of establishing a missile range).
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By asserting a compensable property interest such as an easement, an
Indian nation should have the opportunity to seek judicial review of the gov-
ernment's taking. The Fifth Amendment imposes two conditions on the
exercise of the government's eminent domain powers: (1) the taking must be for
a public purpose, and (2) just compensation must be paid to the owner.242 The
question of whether a specific project developing federal public lands would
constitute a "public purpose" is an inquiry for another day, but at least Indian
nations would have the opportunity to raise such questions in a legal forum.
243
This is a different scenario than the one in Lyng, where the government
had no need to recognize any specific Indian interest in using a sacred site (aside
from the barest allusion to equal protection). The government will have to
appear in court, justify its condemnation of the property interest, and perhaps
pay the Indian nation just compensation.2" Although damages cannot
meaningfully compensate for the loss of a sacred site, such awards may deter the
government from future actions. Perhaps the government will decide that a
future project does not merit paying compensation to the Indian nation and
decide against disturbing the sacred site. It may decide to negotiate an amended
land use plan that accommodates the Indian property interest. In some cases, it
will probably still go ahead with the project, and pay just compensation; this will
usually be an unsatisfactory result, and rarely "just" in any indigenous sense of
the word, given that sacred sites cannot be valued in monetary terms.245
The particular result will of course depend heavily on the facts of the
case. But, if an Indian nation can establish a common law property right such
as an easement, it will generally be in a more powerful position to litigate or
negotiate usage of sacred sites on federal lands than were the plaintiffs in Lyng.
B. The Federal Indian Law Context
The above subpart analyzed sacred sites cases in terms of common law
property claims that any nonowner might consider when he or she wants to
242. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003).
243. Admittedly, the threshold for determining a "public purpose" is so low that it may not
prove much of a barrier for the federal government, see Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 241 (1984), but the U.S. Supreme Court may revisit this standard in several cases this term,
see, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc. v. Bronster, 363 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct.
314 (2004); see also Micah Elazar, "Public Use" and the Justification of Takings, 7 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 249 (2004).
244. See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. 229 (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not
prohibit the State of Hawaii from taking, with just compensation, title in real property from
native Hawaiian lessors and transferring it to lessees in program to reduce concentration of fee
simple ownership).
245. See LaVelle, supra note 236 and sources cited therein.
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establish a right to use property owned by someone else. However, the sacred
sites cases implicate rights and responsibilities beyond such generic common
law property doctrine. Because the nonowners in these cases are members of
federally recognized Indian nations and the owner is the federal government,
sacred sites cases must also be examined in the context of federal Indian law. 46
This body of law governs the centuries-old relationship between Indian nations
and the United States, and it gives rise to particularized property rights and
responsibilities beyond the common law doctrines described above. In particular,
treaties, the federal Indian trust doctrine, and tribal law may all be sources of
Indian rights and federal responsibilities at sacred sites on public lands.47
1. Treaties
Between 1789 and 1871, the United States and Indian nations negoti-
ated and executed hundreds of treaties. In most instances, tribes agreed to
cede huge tracts of land in exchange for the federal government's promise that
it would protect tribal government, culture, and lifestyles on the smaller tracts
of retained lands.248 In addition to setting aside these "reservations," treaties
reserved other tribal property rights, including rights to use lands outside of
reservations. While these off-reservation "use" rights have been thoroughly
analyzed and litigated in the hunting and fishing context,"' they may also be
helpful in some sacred sites cases."' More specifically, Indian nations might
argue that, when they ceded possession of traditional lands to the government,
they reserved the right to use these lands for religious and cultural purposes.
246. See generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982).
247. Another line of argument might be that Indians retain use rights based on aboriginal title.
See, e.g., Ragsdale, supra note 14, at 363-64 (regarding individual aboriginal title claims in sacred
sites cases). The viability of aboriginal title claims will be considered in a subsequent article on
recovering ownership of (versus use rights to) sacred sites.
248. See generally VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES (1974);
ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN TREATY VISIONS OF
LAW & PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997).
249. See JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW 490 (2002) (describing off-reservation usufructuary rights as property rights).
250. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 246, at 456-70.
251. Robert Charles Ward, The Spirits Will Leave: Preventing the Desecration and Destruction
of Native American Sacred Sites on Federal Land, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 822-23 (1992) (discussing
treaty arguments in sacred sites cases); Worthen, supra note 14, at 250-51; cf. Tom I. Romero,
Uncertain Waters and Contested Lands: Excavating the Layers of Colorado's Legal Past, 73 U. COLO.
L. REv. 521, 570 (2002) (describing Mexican American rights of property, language, religion, and
culture in Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo).
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Following a long line of precedents,252 the Supreme Court has recently
confirmed the ongoing vitality of off-reservation reserved treaty rights in con-
temporary circumstances. In Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians,253 the Court upheld contemporary Indian rights to use aboriginal
lands in Wisconsin and Minnesota even though the Indian nation had
transferred title to these lands to the United States through an 1837 treaty.
This treaty had reserved to the Chippewa "the privilege of hunting, fishing,
and gathering the wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included
in the territory ceded." '54
Over the next 145 years, Chippewas continued to use the ceded lands
according to the terms of the 1837 Treaty--despite an 1850 Executive Order
purporting to revoke those rights, an 1855 Treaty ceding further lands in
Minnesota, and an 1858 Act admitting Minnesota to the Union. The litigation
arose in the 1990s when the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewas sought a declaratory
judgment of their usufructuary rights under the 1837 treaty and an injunction
preventing the State of Minnesota from interfering with those rights.255
The Supreme Court held that the Mille Lacs Band retained its treaty rights
to use its aboriginal lands.256 Despite all of the historical events that, in the
state's view, had terminated these use rights, the Court held that they had never
been terminated explicitly by Congress. Thus, Mille Lacs stands for the
proposition that reserved treaty rights to use off-reservation lands remain unim-
paired until Congress explicitly abrogates them. Such rights are not terminated
by ambiguous or unauthorized federal actions.
An analogous argument is applicable in cases in which tribes want to use
ceded aboriginal lands for ceremonial purposes. Where a treaty conveyed to
the government fee simple title to lands encompassing Indian sacred sites, but
reserved tribal rights to use the lands, the treaty should be interpreted as pre-
serving a tribal religious use.
To make a successful treaty-based argument in sacred sites cases, however,
tribes often will have to go one step further than the Chippewas did in Mille
Lacs. It is a rare treaty that will mention specifically tribes' rights to use ceded
territory for religious or ceremonial purposes. Treaties more often reserve the
252. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (upholding the right of Yakima
fishermen to take salmon at off-reservation locations along the Columbia River pursuant to an
express reservation of fishing rights in the Yakima Treaty); see also Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (holding that treaty-guaranteed hunting and fishing rights
survived the Termination Act's extension of state law to former reservation lands).
253. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
254. Id. at 177 (citing Treaty with the Chippewa, July 29, 1837, art. 5, 7 Stat. 536, 537).
255. Id. at 172.
256. Id. at 195-97.
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right to use land for hunting, fishing, gathering, or subsistence purposes. Even
though the treaty may not use the words "religion" or "ceremony," however,
tribes may still have legitimate reserved rights claims.257 As Justice O'Connor
explained in Mi/e Lacs, the Court's reading of treaties is guided by certain
canons of construction. Under these "Indian canons," courts are to interpret
treaties as the Indians would have understood them, liberally in favor of the
Indians, and as preserving Indian rights."'
The judicial development of the Indian canons supports their application
to sacred sites cases. In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall held that
treaty language reserving land to the Cherokee Nation for a "hunting ground"
should not be construed literally or narrowly. Rather, "the term 'hunting
ground' should be construed as the Indians would have understood it-
complete land possession and control-rather than as non-Indians would
have-at most an exclusive license to hunt."'259  Marshall seems to have
understood that, to the Cherokees, treaty language describing a "hunting
ground" may have meant more than place to shoot deer. It may have meant a
homeland where the Cherokee people could continue to live and govern
themselves, a place apart where they could maintain their own culture. Given
the circumstances of the treaty negotiations, Marshall interpreted the treaty
liberally in favor of the Indians' reserved property and sovereignty rights.
2'6
Admittedly, off-reservation rights are construed more narrowly than the
on-reservation rights described in Worcester."' But, in cases where tribes
have explicitly reserved off-reservation use rights, courts are still called on to
257. See H. Scott Althouse, Idaho Nibbles at Montana: Carving out a Third Exception for Tribal
Jurisdiction Over Environmental and Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 721, 745 (2001)
("lElven for those tribes that did not bargain for off-reservation usufructuary rights, the Court applies
the liberal canons of Indian treaty construction to create the implied reservation-of-rights doctrine
set forth in United States v. Winters[, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)].").
258. See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time is That?,
63 CAL. L. REv. 601,623-34 (1975) (describing the Indian canons of construction).
259. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 400 (1993).
260. See id. at 396-402 (describing that the United States had the upper hand in
negotiations which were conducted in English (not Cherokee) and, as the owners and proprietors
of the land, the Indians would have no reason to understand the treaty as a grant of rights from the
United States. Rather, the Cherokee Nation would understand that they were making a limited
grant of its own property and governance rights to the United States).
261. See Jana L. Walker & Susan M. Williams, Indian Reserved Water Rights, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1991, at 6, 6 ("With respect to off-reservation areas, a treaty effects a
total cession unless the treaty explicitly reserves rights in the ceded area, such as hunting and
fishing. Conversely, for on-reservation areas, tribes reserve all original rights except those
expressly ceded by the treaty.").
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determine the ongoing existence and scope of these rights,262 and the Indian
canons guide such decisions.263 The federal promise that a tribe would have a
continued right to use its traditional lands was often a key factor inducing
tribes to convey title to the United States. As Michael Blumm has argued in
the context of Northwestern tribes, the right to fish was so important that
tribes relinquished most of their traditional territories in exchange for small
homelands and the right to fish."M To tribal peoples, these off-reservation
activities were inextricably linked to certain lands. For example, while
Northwestern tribes "agreed to share access to the fish resource, they wanted
to retain their property rights to their traditional fishing places regardless of
land ownership.
'2 65
Moreover, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, tribal negotiators
would probably have expected that a right to hunt, fish, and gather on tradi-
tional lands would include a right to use the property for activities that often
went hand in hand with subsistence activities-even if they were unstated in
the treaty. These might include the right to be on the land, to move across it,
to set up lodging, to sleep at night, to drink from water sources, to clean and
prepare the fish and game they caught, to be with their relatives, and to give
thanks for the food. Many tribes might also have understood that they had
the right to conduct the ceremonies that were interwoven with hunting, fish-
ing, and gathering.2" As a Hoopa woman testified before Congress in 1954:
To most people, hunting and fishing is [sic] a sport. To the American
Indian it is part of a religious custom.... [Elven the taking of food was a
religious sacrament in a way, particular [sic] in regard to the hunting of
deer. We had a set custom that we followed in the conserving of it and
the way we used the meat and our sharing it with others and so forth.267
262. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (determining
that the treaty phrase "the right to take fish.., in common with all citizens of the Territory," meant
that tribal fisherman had the treaty right to take up to 50 percent of the harvestable amount of fish at
off-reservation locations).
263. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 193-200 (1999).
264. Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat
Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 407, 429 (1998).
265. Id. at 432-33 (emphasis added).
266. See Shelley D. Turner, The Native American's Right to Hunt and Fish: An Overview of the
Aboriginal Spiritual and Mystical Belief System, the Effect of European Contact, and the Continuing
Fight to Observe a Way of Life, 19 N.M. L. REV. 377, 393-422 (1989) (cultural significance of
hunting and fishing for Indian peoples); see also Nicole Adams, The Wenatchapam Fishery: The
Lost Reservation of the Wenatchi Indians, WINDS OF CHANGE, Summer 2004, at 24, 24 (providing a
contemporary story of the interrelationship between land, fishing, tribal members, and
ceremony-where tribal property rights have been lost).
267. Hearing on H.R. 7322 and S. 2749 Before the Joint Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, 83d
Cong. 453 (1954) (cited in Dorothea Theodoratus, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock Section,
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It may be helpful to examine such claims in the context of actual treaty
language. For example, an 1803 treaty with the Kaskaskia provided: "As long
as the lands which have been ceded by this treaty shall continue to be the
property of the United States, the said tribe shall have the privilege of living
and hunting upon them in the same manner that they have hitherto done." '268
An 1831 treaty with the Menominee Nation provided:
The Menomonee [sic] tribe of Indians shall be at liberty to hunt and fish
on the lands they have now ceded to the United States, on the east side
of Fox river and Green bay, with the same privileges they at present enjoy,
until it be surveyed and offered for sale by the President; they conducting
themselves peaceably and orderly.269
Both articulations of tribal rights to use ceded lands are relatively broad. They
could be fairly understood by tribal people to include rights to use their tradi-
tional lands as they always had, including for religious or cultural purposes. On
the other side of the negotiations, the federal government was, in some instances,
aware of broad tribal uses of off-reservation lands. When it became displeased
with such uses, the government was fully capable of terminating such rights.27
While every treaty's terms were different, Indians often reserved rights to
use land off the reservation, and the government promised to protect these use
rights.271 The off-reservation rights typically persisted so long as the United States
Gasquet-Orleans in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, in READINGS IN
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW, supra note 214, at 302, 302).
268. Treaty with the Kaskaskia, Aug. 13, 1803, art. 6, 7 Stat. 78.
269. Treaty with the Menomonies, Feb. 8,1831, art. 6, 7 Stat. 342,345 (emphasis added).
270. See, e.g., Treaty with the Middle Oregons, Nov. 15, 1865, art. 1, 14 Stat. 751. The
treaty states:
It having become evident from experience that the provision of [a previous treaty] which
permits said confederated tribes to fish, hunt, gather berries and roots, pasture stock, and
erect houses on lands outside the reservation, and which have been ceded to the United
States, is often abused by the Indians to the extent of continuously residing away from
the reservation, and is detrimental to the interests of both Indians and whites; therefore
it is hereby stipulated and agreed that... the right to take fish, erect houses, hunt game,
gather roots and berries, and pasture animals upon lands without the reservation set apart
by the treaty aforesaid are hereby relinquished by the confederated Indian tribes and
bands of Middle Oregon, parties to this treaty.
Id.
271. See, e.g., Conference Between the United States of America and the Sioux Nation of
Indians, Sept. 23, 1805, art. 3, reprinted in LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES RELATING TO INDIAN
AFFAIRS, 1883, at 316 (never proclaimed by the President) ("The United States promise[s] ... to
permit the Sioux to pass, repass, hunt or make other uses of the said [ceded] districts, as they have
formerly done, without any other exception, but those specified in article first."); see also Treaty with
the Osages, Nov. 10, 1808, art. 8, 7 Star. 107 ("And the United States agree that such of the Great
and Little Osage Indians... shall be permitted to live and to hunt, without molestation, on all that
tract of country, west of the north and south boundary line, on which they.., have usually hunted
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maintained ownership of the ceded lands, the tribes maintained peaceful
relations with the United States, or game remained available.7 2 Indians there-
fore may have understood that they retained an enduring and broad right to use
ceded lands. Particularly in cultures in which ceremonies are linked to hunting
or resided."); Treaty with the Chippewas, Sept. 24, 1819, art. 5, 7 Stat. 203-06. The Chippewa
treaty provides:
The stipulation contained in [an earlier treaty], relative to the right of the Indians to
hunt upon the land ceded, while it continues the property of the United States, shall
apply to this treaty; and the Indians shall, for the same term, enjoy the privilege of
making sugar upon the same land, committing no unnecessary waste upon the trees.
Id. at 204; Treaty with the Chippewas, Etc., July 29, 1829, art. 7, 7 Stat. 320, 322 ("The right to hunt
on the lands herein ceded, so long as the same shall remain the property of the United States, is
hereby secured to the nations who are parties to this treaty."); Treaty with the Chippewas, Sept. 30,
1854, art. 11, 10 Stat. 219, 221 ("mhe Indians shall not be required to remove from the homes
hereby set apart for them. And such of them as reside in the territory hereby ceded, shall have the
right to hunt and fish therein, until otherwise ordered by the President."); Treaty with the Crow
Indians, May 7, 1868, art. 4, 15 Stat. 649. The Crow Indian treaty provides:
The Indians herein named agree, when the agency house and other buildings shall be
constructed on the reservation named, they will make said reservation their permanent
home, and they will make no permanent settlement elsewhere, but they shall have the
right to hunt on the unoccupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found
thereon, and as long as peace subsists among the whites and Indians on the borders of the
hunting districts.
Id.; Treaty with the Blackfoot Indians, Oct. 17, 1855, art. 3, 11 Stat. 657, 658. The Blackfoot
treaty provides:
The Blackfoot Nation consent and agree that all that portion of the country recognized
and defined by the treaty of Laramie as Blackfoot territory ... shall be a common
hunting-ground for ninety-nine years, where all the nations, tribes and bands of Indians,
parties to this treaty, may enjoy equal and uninterrupted privileges of hunting, fishing
and gathering fruit, grazing animals, curing meat and dressing robes. They further agree
that they will not establish villages, or in any other way exercise exclusive rights within
ten miles of the northern line of the common hunting-ground, and that the parties to
this treaty may hunt on said northern boundary line and within ten miles thereof.
Id.
272. See, e.g., Treaty with the Ottawas, Aug. 24. 1816, art. 1, 7 Stat. 146, 147 ("[The said
tribes shall be permitted to hunt and to fish within the limits of the land hereby relinquished and
ceded, so long as it may continue to be the property of the United States."); Treaty with the
Northern Cheyenne and Northern Arapahoe, May 10, 1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 655 ("[T]he Northern
Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians do hereby relinquish, release, and surrender to the United States all
right, claim, and interest in and to all territory outside the two reservations above mentioned, except
the right to roam and hunt while game shall be found in sufficient quantities .. "); Treaty with the
Quapaws, Aug. 24, 1818, art. 3, 7 Stat. 176, 177 ("[Ihe individuals of the ... tribe ... shall be at
liberty to hunt within the territory by them ceded to the United States, without hindrance or
molestation, so long as they demean themselves peaceably, and offer no injury or annoyance to any
of the citizens of the United States ...."); Treaty with the Wyandots, Etc., July 4, 1805, art. 6,
7 Stat. 87, 88 ("The said Indian nations, parties to this treaty, shall be at liberty to fish and hunt
within the territory and lands which they have now ceded to the United States, so long as they shall
demean themselves peaceably.").
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and subsistence activities, Indian nations may be able to argue that they retain a
treaty right to use their traditional lands for cultural and religious purposes.273
In actions against states and private parties, treaty rights are enforceable
property interests that give rise to declaratory, injunctive, and monetary
relief.274 As with the enforcement of common law property rights, tribes will
have to examine carefully the availability of specific claims against the federal
government. Tribes may also sue the federal government for the taking of
treaty rights under the Fifth Amendment, although the law departs from clas-
sic takings analysis in that the government may be able to defeat an Indian
claim for just compensation by showing of "good faith" in its treatment of
Indian property."' Even "successful" cases for government takings of Indian
treaty rights typically result only in awards of monetary damages.276 As
described in the discussion of common law remedies, here too, monetary
awards almost always fail to restore the losses that Indian nations and peoples
suffer from the taking of their sacred sites.277 For this reason, some advocates
seek more comprehensive redress of sacred sites violations through legislation,
administrative, and other legal processes.278 Outside of litigation, treaty-based
273. Tribes will have a more difficult argument, perhaps, in instances where the government
used treaties to promote tribes' adoption of Christianity as part of a larger effort to stamp out tribal
religions, suggesting that the federal negotiators did not intend for Indians to maintain their own
religions and cultures. See, e.g., Treaty with the Kaskaskia, Aug. 13, 1803, art. 3, 7 Stat. 78
(allocating federal funds for a Catholic priest and Church).
274. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999)
(awarding declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of Indian off-reservation use rights); see also
Shelby D. Green, Specific Relief for Ancient Deprivations of Property, 36 AKRON L. REV. 245 (2003)
(remedies for treaty violations).
275. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (awarding compensation
for the government's taking of the Black Hills, reserved to the Sioux Nation by treaty); see also
Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United
States, 28 GA. L. REV. 453 (1994) (discussing the Indian Claims Commission Act, authorizing
lawsuits against the United States for the redress of Indian claims, including treaty-based claims);
Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992);
Nell Jessup Newton, The Judicial Role in Fifth Amendment Takings of Indian Land: An Analysis of the
Sioux Nation Rule, 61 OR. L. REV. 245, 250 (1982).
276. See Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 81-82
(1996).
277. See supra note 236.
278. See, e.g., Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 205
(2001) (describing the legislative restoration of Blue Lake to Taos Pueblo and Kaho'olawe to the
Native Hawaiian people); LaVelle, supra note 236 (calling for environmental restoration and land
reform-including a management role for Sioux tribes-in the Black Hills); Yablon, supra note
12, at 1629 (on agency accommodation of sacred site usage); Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining
Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public Lands, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 417 (2002)
(outlining "constitutional principles, statutory requirements, and federal policy governing the use
and preservation of cultural resources").
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claims bolster tribal arguments that federal parties should fulfill their historic
obligations to recognize tribal property rights, including off-reservation use
rights. If tribes do not have a treaty with the United States, it may be
appropriate to examine Congressional legislation or Executive Orders for such
retained usufructuary rights.279
2. The Federal Indian Trust Doctrine
The federal Indian trust doctrine provides another potential source of
Indian property rights and federal obligations at federally owned sacred sites."s
First recognized by the Supreme Court in the 1831 case of Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,81 the federal trust doctrine grows out of the historical relations
between Indian nations and the United States282 and requires special solicitude
toward Indian rights.283 The Supreme Court explained in Seminole Nation v.
United States2  that when the government entered into treaties with Indian
nations to acquire their land, it also "charged itself with moral obligations of
the highest responsibility and trust. '285  The government's trust duty is to
protect Indian peoples, assets, and resources with "the most exacting fiduciary
standards," through "policy decisions and management actions. ''2' Tribes can
argue that ensuring access to off-reservation sacred sites, and protecting the
279. Of potential relevance to the Lyng case, see, for example, Amy C. Brann, Comment,
Karuk Tribe of California v. United States: The Courts Need a History Lesson, 37 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 743 (2003), explaining that although eighteen treaties were negotiated with California
Indian tribes, the Senate refused to ratify them, instead passing the Act of April 8, 1864,
authorizing the creation of four reservations in California to accommodate all of the Indians of the
state. See also ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 249, at 79-80 (stating that after Congress
extinguished Native aboriginal title in Alaska, it enacted the Alaska National Interest
Conservation Act, establishing a federal priority for subsistence activities on public lands,
recognizing that such activities were "essential to Native physical, economic, traditional and
social existence").
280. See Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and
Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355, 358
(2003) (describing the federal Indian trust duty as a "property law concept").
281. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
282. Id. at 17.
283. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
284. 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
285. Id. at 297.
286. DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW 65 (2001).
physical integrity of those sites,287 is essential to fulfilling the government's
trust duty to Indian nations.288
Mary Christina Wood has identified a number of cases in which Indians
have successfully used the trust responsibility to claim that federal land man-
agers must protect Indian off-reservation resources.2 9 In Klamath Tribes v.
United States,29° Klamath Tribes challenged timber sales on U.S. Forest lands
that served as a habitat for mule deer, on which the Klamaths depended for
their "subsistence and way of life."29' The Klamath Tribes argued that, in
deciding to allow logging without consulting the tribes, the Forest Service had
breached its trust responsibility to ensure that the former reservation lands are
managed so as to protect the tribes' treaty rights. The district court agreed,
finding the government had a "substantive duty to protect 'to the fullest
extent possible' the Tribes' treaty rights, and the resources on which those
rights depend." '292
Similarly, in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton,293 a federal district court
held that the Secretary of Interior's decision to divert water away from a tribal
lake and fishery violated the trust responsibility.294 In Northern Cheyenne Tribe
v. Hodel,295 another federal district court rejected a Bureau of Land Management
proposal to lease federal lands for coal development near the Northern
Cheyenne reservation because of the adverse environmental, social, and
economic effects on the tribe.296 The court stated: "[A] federal agency's trust
obligation to a tribe extends to actions it takes off a reservation which uniquely
impact tribal members or property on a reservation."297 Importantly, these cases
provide that the federal trust duty to Indians applies even when the government
is faced with competing interests such as energy development or agriculture.
287. See generally Ward, supra note 251, at 821; Jeri Beth K. Ezra, Comment, The Trust
Doctrine: A Source of Protection for Native American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 705 (1989).
288. See Wood, supra note 280, at 356-57 ("In exchange for receiving Indian lands, the
government would protect tribes on their retained lands, or reservations, and in some cases would
extend protection to traditional uses on off-reservation lands.").
289. Id. at 362-63 (discussing claims of injunctive relief against federal agencies for violating
federal Indian trust responsibility); see also Adele Fine, Comment, Off-Reservation Enforcement of the
Federal-Indian Trust Responsibility, 7 PUB. LAND L. REV. 117 (1986) (assessing enforcement of trust
responsibility, especially concerning "the preservation of Indian culture").
290. No. 96-381-HA, 1996 WL 924509 (D. Or. Oct. 2, 1996).
291. Wood, supra note 280, at 362 (citing Klamath Tribes, 1996 WL 924509, at *7-*10).
292. Id. (quoting Klamath Tribes, 1996 WL 924509, at *8).
293. 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972).
294. Id. at 258.
295. 12 Indian L. Rptr. 3065 (D. Mont. May 28, 1985).
296. Id. at 3071, 3074.
297. Id.
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Like the Klamath deer habitat, waters of the Truckee River, and lands
adjoining the Cheyenne Reservation, sacred sites located off the reservation
are essential to community vitality and the wellbeing of Indian nations.298
For this reason, the federal government's trust responsibility should encom-
pass a duty to protect the physical integrity of sacred sites and American
Indians' meaningful access to them. Fortunately, there is already a process
in place for ensuring that federal agencies meet their trust duties at sacred
sites. The Executive Branch requires agencies to "consult" regularly with
tribes on issues that affect them.299 While this consultation requirement is
primarily procedural in nature, President Clinton's Executive Order 13,007
offers specific content with respect to agency duties at sacred sites, requiring
agencies to "(1) accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred
sites by Indian religious practitioners and (2) avoid adversely affecting the
physical integrity of such sacred sites."3" It is true that the Executive Order
confers no enforceable right, nor cause of action."t But, as the cases
described above suggest, the federal Indian trust doctrine itself requires fed-
eral agencies to protect Indian resources. As the cases demonstrate, it is not
enough for an agency to weigh all of the options equally and make a
reasoned decision.0 2 Rather, the government has the highest duty of care
toward Indian nations and their resources.3" Where, for example, a
government agency faces a decision about whether to grant a mining license
298. Cf. Protection of Native American Sacred Places as They Are Affected by Department of Defense
Undertakings: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. 33 (2002) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Malcolm B. Bowekaty, Governor of the Zuni Tribe) ("Whe US Department of
Interior has failed us in its obligations under existing law and trust responsibility to continue to protect
this sacred lake and associated cultural resources from destruction.").
299. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,875, 3 C.F.R. 669 (1994) (reaffirming the federal government's
responsibility to consult with tribes on a government-to-government basis before taking action on
matters that may affect them); Exec. Order No. 13,084, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1999) (acknowledging
burden on the federal government to initiate consultation with tribes on a government-to-
government basis, and to defer to tribal laws by waiver); Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R. 304
(2001) (requiring each agency to have a consultation process in place, to establish regular and
meaningful consultation with tribes, to respect treaty rights, and to grant wide discretion to tribes in
self-governance).
300. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 3 C.F.R. 196 (1996) (accommodating access to and ceremonial
use of Indian sacred sites by tribes to avoid adverse impacts to sites and maintain confidentiality).
301. Id. § 4.
302. See cases described supra notes 289-297.
303. See, e.g., Secretary of the Interior Order No. 3215 (Apr. 28, 2000) (describing activities
that constitute the proper discharge of the federal government's trust responsibilities to Indian tribes,
including the appropriate management of natural resources within Indian Country; the exercise of a
"high degree of care, skill and loyalty" to "protect and preserve Indian trust assets from loss, damage,
unlawful alienation, waste and depletion"; and the protection of "treaty-based fishing, hunting,
gathering, and similar rights of access and resource use on traditional tribal lands"), available at
http://elips.doi.gov/elips/secorders/html_ orders/3215.htm.
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on a tribal sacred site, the agency administrator cannot ignore its trust duties
to the tribe out of a desire to accommodate other competing users or
interests. Raising the trust argument proactively at the negotiating stage
may effectively urge the federal administrator to weigh appropriately the
tribal interests at stake. If the agency fails to take into account the trust duty
at the decisionmaking phase, the tribe may sue for injunctive relief under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the agency decision
was unlawful in its failure to fulfill the trust responsibility. 
'0
Few judicial decisions have ruled on the merits of sacred sites claims
based on the trust responsibility."5  While certain arguments based on the
trust relationship were raised in Lyng itself, they did not focus on the lands in
question as a sacred site and were dismissed on procedural grounds.
3" At least
one federal court, however, heard and rejected a tribal claim that the federal
government violated its trust responsibility to protect sacred lands. In
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States,"7 the tribe argued that that
federal officials' decision not to attempt to prevent flooding of tribal lands,
including lands where the Tribe grew corn for the Green Corn ceremony,
violated the trust responsibility and other laws." "[Diespite the general trust
obligation of the United States to Native Americans," the court wrote, "the
government assumes no specific duties to Indian tribes beyond those found in
applicable statutes, regulations, treaties or other agreements.""
The Miccosukee holding should not, however, deter tribes from making
trust arguments in sacred sites cases. Miccosukee misunderstands the enforce-
ability problem by conflating requirements for breach of trust claims under
two separate lines of cases. It is true that when tribes seek monetary damages
for breach of trust claims pursuant to the Tucker Act,
310 they must base their
304. See Wood, supra note 280, at 362 (outlining the structure of the claim, and pointing out
that "the tribal lawyer must argue that the agency is bound by the trust responsibility to use its discre-
tion within [a particular] statutory regime to protect tribal interests unless doing so conflicts with the
actual statutory language").
305. Some courts have considered trust responsibility arguments in cases involving other
cultural resources. See N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (rejecting
tribal trust responsibility claim that the Secretary of the Interior's failure to preserve the bowhead
whale in light of the impact of the potential disappearance of the whales on the traditional Inupiat
culture on grounds that any duty the federal government had to protect the subsistence culture of the
Inupiat Eskimos was satisfied by its compliance with the Endangered Species Act).
306. See Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 605 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
307. 980 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
308. Id. at 460-63.
309. Id. at 461 (citing Mitchell II and the Tucker Act).
310. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1505 (2000).
1111Property, Nonowners, and Sacred Sites
claim on a statute or treaty that clearly articulates a trust duty."' But as
Wood has demonstrated, this standard does not apply outside of the Tucker
Act context-as in cases where tribes sue administrative agencies for equitable
relief under the APA on grounds that an agency action unlawfully violated
common law trust duties to tribes. 12 This is an important distinction in sacred
sites cases because tribes typically do not seek damages, but rather want the
government to take action to protect sacred sites.
3. Tribal Law and Custom Regarding Sacred Sites
Tribes' own laws and customs provide another source of Indian interests
in sacred sites on public lands. For several reasons it is appropriate to look to
tribal law and custom as a source of property law on sacred sites. First, if the
aim is to facilitate legal solutions that ensure religious freedoms for American
Indians, such solutions will only be meaningful if they incorporate tribal
values. Tribally enacted legislation serves as a clear expression of those
values, Second, courts 13 and scholars have generally accepted the role of
"custom" in supporting citizens' interests in public lands. Third, preexisting
land and property rights of indigenous peoples often survive the colonial
process."' Although federal courts have not always recognized indigenous
311. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 505 (2003); United States v. Mitchell,
463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
312. See generally Reid Peyton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility
to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975) (arguing that courts should enforce federal trust obligations
to American Indians through traditional common law equitable remedies).
313. See, e.g., Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890) (recognizing custom as a source of
rights to pasture cattle on public lands); Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Planning Comm'n,
903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995) (recognizing traditional and customary rights of native Hawaiians and
that those rights may be practiced on public and private land); Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387
(1851) (recognizing custom as the source of town inhabitants' right to deposit seaweed on a
private owner's close); Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993) (finding the public
had a customary right of access to beachfront lands precluding private owners' takings claim).
314. See Federico M. Cheever, Comment, A New Approach to Spanish and Mexican Land
Grants and the Public Trust Doctrine: Defining the Property Interest Protected by the Treaty of
Guadelupe-Hidalgo, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1364, 1376 (1986) (describing "a basic precept of international
law that upon the succession of sovereigns the law of the former sovereign remains in effect," the author
argues it is "reasonable to draw upon Spanish and Mexican law to define the rights associated with
Spanish and Mexican land grants [even though] in the years ... following... conquest ... United
States courts ignored the rights and limitations the Mexican law imposed on pre-1846 land grants"); see
also Yvette Trahan, Comment, The Richtersveld Community & Others v. Alexkor Ltd.: Declaration of a
"Right in Land" Through a "Customary Law Interest" Sets Stage for Introduction of Aboriginal Title Into South
African Legal System, 12 TuL. J. INT'L & COMP. L 565 (2004) (discussing the "doctrine of continuity" in
the South African property context).
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property systems,315 tribal law and custom remain available as a source of law
on the treatment of sacred sites."'
Tribal law and custom also help to expose the limits of the ownership
model and suggest alternatives to notions of absolute rights."7 Irrespective of
who owns a particular sacred place, indigenous peoples may have undeniable,
ongoing relationships with it. As Rebecca Tsosie has explained: "The mere
fact that the land is not held in Native title does not mean that the people do
not hold these obligations, nor.., that they no longer maintain the rights to
these lands.""1 Even if a place has been desecrated, "a people's custodial
responsibilities remain. No matter how damaged, the land retains its power and
significance." 9 Indigenous customs and laws may challenge Anglo American
property law to be more cognizant of the responsibilities and relationships that
transcend ownership.
Any discussion of tribal law on sacred sites must acknowledge several
challenges."' First, there exist among hundreds of tribes "different notions
about the appropriate relationship and obligations people hold with respect
to the land," and scholars must resist overgeneralization.321 A related problem
concerns the expropriation of tribal religious traditions by non-Indians, leav-
ing many Indian people reluctant to share information with outsiders. More-
over, tribal custom may dictate that religious and cultural traditions be kept
confidential among members, clans, societies, or practitioners within the
315. E.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589-90 (1823). Chief Justice
Marshall stated:
Most usually, [conquered peoples] are incorporated with the victorious nation, and become
subjects or citizens of the government with which they are connected .... Where this
incorporation is practicable, humanity demands, and a wise policy requires, that the rights
of the conquered to property should remain unimpaired.... But the tribes of Indians inhab-
iting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave
the country a wilderness.
Id.
316. See generally Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing": Towards an Indigenous System of
Cultural Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69 (forthcoming 2005). See also Leeds, supra note
21, at 499 n.3 (noting that the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983 called for the application
of tribal law in the probate context).
317. See GLENDON, supra note 15, at 176 ("We have much to learn from [NIative
Americans who have long known that there is a way in which the land owns us, even as we
pretend to own the land, and that we ignore that fact at our own peril.").
318. Tsosie, supra note 177, at 1306.
319. Whitt et al., supra note 31, at 722.
320. See DELORIA, supra note 24, at 66-67. See generally In~s Hernndez-Avila, Mediations
of the Spirit: Native American Religious Traditions and the Ethics of Representation, in NATIVE
AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY 11 (Lee Irwin ed., 2000).
321. Tsosie, supra note 177, at 1306.
tribal community.322 In some instances, however, Indian nations and
practitioners have decided to share certain information about their tradi-
tional religions when it has seemed necessary in a legal struggle.323 Yet, even
when such decisions are made, problems of context and translation can make
it difficult for indigenous peoples to share, and for courts to understand,
information on sacred sites. 24
This subpart aims to contribute to the development of legal strategy
regarding sacred sites cases, while respecting indigenous expectations of pri-
vacy and cultural self-determination.325 It identifies tribal legislative codes,
customary law, and official statements expressing tribal expectations on
sacred sites.326 It further suggests how tribal law and custom on sacred sites
can be used in cases in which tribes assert rights to such sites on federally
owned lands."7
As Angela Riley has demonstrated, tribal councils have enacted legisla-
tion in the area of cultural resources protection. 328 A number of tribal codes
pertain specifically to the protection of sacred sites.329 These typically set forth
tribal standards on the treatment of sacred sites and levy civil and criminal
penalties for desecration. The Yankton Sioux tribal code, for example, pro-
hibits the "desecration of Religious or Sacred Sites" providing that "any person
who shall vandalize, injure, desecrate or destroy any property used for religious
purposes or having religious or traditional importance to the Yankton Sioux
322. See Christopher H. Peters, Postscript: Toward a Sacred Lands Policy Initiative, in SACRED
LANDS OF INDIAN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 131, 133.
323. See, e.g., Theodoratus, supra note 267, at 302-11 (describing tribal participation in
report on sacred sites in Lyng case); Peters, supra note 322, at 133 (describing the decision of
Northwest tribes to survey national forest lands, and identify sacred areas for a confidential report
accessible only by permission of the tribes).
324. See SACRED LANDS OF INDIAN AMERICA, supra note 3, at 18. In one telling example,
Cha-das-ska-dum, a traditional Lummi practitioner giving testimony before the Washington State
legislature, was asked "just what constituted a so-called sacred site." He answered, "Do you have
time to listen to 132 songs?" Id.
325. See WILLIAMS, supra note 248, at 3-13 (advocating the study of indigenous legal
traditions).
326. See Christine Zuni Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality and Separate Consciousness
[RelIncorporating Customs and Traditions Into Tribal Law, 1 TRIBAL L.J. 1 (2000/2001), at
http://tlj.unm.edu/articles/volume_l/zunicruz/index.php.
327. Cf. Jennifer Gingrich, Note, Buenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe: The Power Source of a
Tribe Seeking to Achieve World Renewal and the Protection of Its Natural and Cultural Resources, 33
ENvTL. L. 215, 216-17 (2003) (discussing the Hoopa Valley Tribe's attempt to use tribal law to
"prohibit logging activities [around] its most sacred dance site").
328. Riley, supra note 316.
329. For a searchable database of a number of tribal codes and constitutions, see
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/tribalcourts/codes/default.asp.
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Tribe or its members shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.""33 Other exam-
ples are found in the Pawnee,33 White Mountain Apache, 32 Eastern Band of
Cherokees,"' and Absentee Shawnee334 tribal codes. Some go beyond a narrow
definition of "sacred site" and also protect ceremonial materials, sacred plants,
and their habitats. 35 Few tribal codes expressly distinguish between sacred sites
located on or off the reservation,336 but in some instances tribal people have
expressed their expectation that traditional values should govern treatment of
sacred sites, irrespective of location. 37 Federal courts have already shown a
330. YANKTON Sioux TRIBE CRIM. CODE ch. XLII, § 3-42-1 (1995), at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/yankton tribalcode_3.htm.
331. PAWNEE TRIBE OF OKLA. LAW & ORDER CODE tit. VI, § 516 (1993), at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.orgccfolder/pawnee-lawandordercode6.htm. The code section states:
Desecration. (a) It shall be unlawful to purposely desecrate any public monument or structure;
or to purposely desecrate a place of worship or burial, or other sacred place. (b) Desecrate
means to deface, damage, pollute, destroy, take or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that
the actor knows, or believes will outrage, the sensibilities of persons likely to observe or
discover his action. (c) Desecration shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed Two Hundred
Fifty Dollars ($250.00), or by a term of imprisonment in the tribal jail not to exceed three
months, or both.
Id.
332. WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE GOV'T CODE ch. 8 (1991) (designating religious sites within
the White Mountain Apache Reservation for the use of practitioners of the traditional religion and
providing civil and criminal penalties for desecration, including traditional Apache punishment), at
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/wht-mtn.apache-tribalcde-govemment.htnl.
333. CODE OF THE E. BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS ch. 70, art. I, §70-1(a)-(b) (2001)
("The graves of Cherokee people and their ancestors are sacred and shall not be disturbed or exca-
vated .... In the event skeletal remains of a Cherokee are excavated, such remains shall be
reburied, together with all associated grave artifacts as soon as shall be reasonable [sic] possible."),
at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/eccodech7Opreservation.htm.
334. ABSENTEE SHAWNEE TRIBE OF OKLA. TRIBAL CRIM. CODE § 516 (1994) ("It shall be
unlawful to purposely desecrate any public monument or structure; or to purposely desecrate a place
of worship or burial, or other sacred place"), at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
absenteeshawneetribalcode-crimoff.html.
335. See Riley, supra note 316.
336. But see CODE OF THE E. BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS ch. 70, art. 1, § 70-1(c) (requiring
that Cherokee human remains discovered outside of Cherokee trust lands must be reburied consistent
with the Native American Graves and Repatriation Act), at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder/eccodech7Opreservation.htm.
337. For instance, the White Mountain Apache Code does not reference specifically sacred
sites located outside of the reservation, but leaders have expressed their view that tribal values pertain
to those sites as well. In a well-known dispute, several universities are trying to put a huge telescope
facility on a sacred Apache site, located on Mount Graham, on national forest lands in Arizona.
Tribal Chairman Dallas Massey explained:
Mount Graham (the mountains we refer to as Dzil Nchaa Si'An), is one of our holiest and
most sacred mountains. Apache elders and cultural specialists have clearly and
consistently advised all who have listened that this mountain should not be disturbed for
research or commercial purposes .... If you are willing to understand the lessons from our
culture and history then the University .. • will avoid any and all association with the
telescope project, thus avoiding additional damages to Apache people, and Apache
culture, and our sacred mountain.
willingness to apply tribal codes in cultural patrimony cases... and in sacred
sites cases arising on the reservation. 39
In addition to these examples of legislation, tribal leaders have also
articulated tribal custom on the, appropriate treatment of sacred sites. In one
example, the sacred Zuni Salt Lake was threatened by the federal govern-
ment's approval of a major power-development project that would put an
18,000 acre coal strip mine ten miles from the lake.34° Zuni Governor Malcolm
Bowekaty described the Lake in testimony to the Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs:
The Zuni Salt Lake is a sacred place. Located southeast of our Reservation
in west central New Mexico, this saline lake is a unique geological feature
and home to our Ma'lokyattsik'i, Salt Mother. For centuries, indigenous
tribes from the Southwest have made pilgrimages to the Zuni Salt Lake to
request spiritual guidance and rain, make offerings, and collect salt for
ceremonial, ritual and domestic use."'
Here tribal custom and values provide standards for human behavior at this
sacred place. The Zunis have a responsibility to care for the Lake, partly on
behalf of other tribal peoples who also gather there to collect salt and conduct
ceremonies. Governor Bowekaty explained the historical and contemporary
manifestations of these values:
The surrounding land has always been respected as a sanctuary zone, where
warring tribes put weapons down and shared in the sanctity of the Salt
Mother. Just this past weekend, our brothers and sisters from the Hopi,
Yaqui, Pueblo, Xicano, Navajo and others joined us in a 260 mile run from
Hopi and Phoenix to Zuni to pay homage to her, as well as to spiritually
prepare us for this testimony today.342
Despite the fact that "[glovemment intervention and the inequities of history
have prevented this great salt shrine from being included in the boundaries of
Letter of Dallas Massey, Sr., White Mountain Apache Tribal Chairman to Mark Yudof, President,
University of Minnesota (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://www.mountgraham.org/MN/letters/
masseytoyudof.htm.
338. See Chilkat Indian Viii. v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying a
Chilkat Village Ordinance that "[n]o traditional Indian artifacts, clan crests, or other Indian art
works of any kind may be removed from the Chilkat Indian Village without the prior notification of
and approval by the Chilkat Indian Village Council").
339. See Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 266 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding tribal
authority to enact regulation preventing logging near protected sacred sites as against challenge by a
non-Indian property owner within reservation); see also Gingrich, supra note 327.
340. See Hearing, supra note 298, at 33.
341. Id.
342. Id.
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[the Zuni] reservation," ' Zuni Salt Lake remains important to the Zuni peo-
ple for contemporary religious and cultural activities. Therefore, the
Governor recommended special federal legislation to protect the Lake and
other sacred sites. Although this legislation has not been enacted, the min-
ing company decided to move its project elsewhere, largely as a result of
indigenous advocacy."
It may seem that tribal law, whether codified or customary, is unlikely to
prevail in disputes over federally owned sacred sites or in any Indian law
cases."' Non-Indians may be unfamiliar, or even "uneasy," with tribal law.3"
Some courts, however, have recognized the role of tribal customary law in
sacred sites cases. In a particularly notable example, Navajo custom prevailed
as the standard for management of a federal sacred site in Natural Arch and
Bridge Society v. Alston,347 a recent federal case from Utah. The legal sequel to
the Badoni case described earlier, 48 Natural Arch reviewed a National Park
Service (NPS) Management Plan closing certain portions of the Monument
for revegetation and requesting through signs and brochures that the public
respect cultural differences by voluntarily not walking underneath Rainbow
Bridge. The district court upheld the accommodation against various chal-
lenges, first noting the importance of Rainbow Bridge in Navajo culture:
The Navajo have a tradition that long, long ago one of their hero gods,
hunting in the canyon, was suddenly entrapped by a rush of flood
waters. In this predicament, with escape cut off, death for the hunter
seemed certain. But just then the great Sky Father cast a rainbow
before the torrent, the hero god climbed to safety across the arch, and
the latter turned to stone and has so remained until this very day.349
343. Id.
344. See Hillary Rosner, Saving a Sacred Lake: Zuni Activist Pablo PadiUa, HIGH COUNTRY
NEwS, Feb. 2, 2004, http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article-id=145 27.
345. See Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1777 (1997) (discussing the difficulty of identifying
and incorporating "the [Indian] side of the story"); cf. J.R. Mueller, Restoring Harmony Through
Nalyeeh: Can the Navajo Common Law of Torts be Applied in State and Federal Forums?, 2 TRIBAL
L.J. 3 (2001/2002), at http://tlj.unm.edu/articles/volume_2/mueller/index.php (exploring whether
tribal customary law can be applied in state and federal courts).
346. See Chief Justice Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 225, 230 (1989).
347. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002); id. at 1210 (quoting Judd Neil, The Discovery of
Rainbow Bridge, NAT'L PARKS BULLETIN, Nov. 1927).
348. The National Park Service provides a detailed history of its management of Rainbow Bridge
National Monument, including the legal struggles described in this Article, at http://www.nps.gov/
rabr/adhi/adhi.htm.
349. Natural Arch, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1210 (quoting Neil, supra note 347).
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In more recent historical times, the court noted, Rainbow Bridge was "impor-
tant to [Navajo] spiritual beliefs and identity as a people.""35 Some Navajos
expressed these beliefs by abiding by certain rules and observances at
Rainbow Bridge. The court recounted:
In 1909, for example, it was noted that the Navajo guide, Dogeye-
begay, rode around the end of the bridge because he did not know the
prayer to insure [sic] his safe return should he pass beneath it. Similar
observations were noted by other parties [of non-Indian explorers] who
utilized Navajo guides to reach the bridge. To many Navajos, Rainbow
Bridge is a sacred place. As such they believe that it should be respected
by all humans. 5'
According to the court, it was perfectly appropriate for NPS to adopt this
standard of treatment, deriving from Navajo custom, in its management plan
for the Monument. In fact, under previous NPS management standards, the
physical well-being of the Monument had been suffering the severe ill-effects
of "unlimited visitor access." Cultural sites were being damaged by tourists
touching, climbing, and defacing petroglyphs, along with vandalism and lit-
ter. NPS was falling short of its Congressional mandate to "conserve" the
National Monument, scenery, and historic objects, and "provide for the
enjoyment of [them] in such manner.., as will leave them unimpaired
for... future generations."" 2 Implementing Navajo custom by asking visitors
to go around, rather than under, the Bridge-as part of a multifactor man-
agement program including education, environmental, and cultural awareness
components-offered a new approach to fulfilling Congress's directive.
Moreover, the court agreed with NPS that implementing Navajo cus-
tom did not effect an establishment of religion. Rather:
This concept simply invites visitors to assume a receptive state of
awareness, much as one might in any meeting hall, cathedral, or temple
of the mind. It encourages respect for cultural beliefs and strengthens
the identity and heritage of the Navajo Indian. It suggests that an
honest appraisal of the historic example set by Dogeye-begay and other
Indian guides may offer a new awareness and appreciation for both
natural and cultural values, irregardless of the life style from which they
353may originate.
Similarly, the Plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because it
applied to a// visitors to the Monument. It asked everyone, including Native
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 1212.
353. Id. at 1213 n.6.
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Americans, to consider the example of Dogeye-begay and voluntarily refrain
from walking under the Bridge. The tribal custom, according to the court,
offered to everyone a better way of relating to the property in question.
Natural Arch was admittedly not framed as the assertion of Navajo prop-
erty rights, but rather as a test of a federal agency's power to implement a
management plan. Nevertheless, the Natural Arch case provides an example
of a federal decision that applies tribal customary law to legal questions on
sacred sites.354 The court relied on the story of Dogeye-begay and the other
Navajo guides who all went around the Bridge as setting forth a substantive
standard for management of a sacred site located on federally owned prop-
erty.35 Additionally, Indian nations may look to several examples, outside
the sacred sites context, where tribal law and customs have been the basis for
recognition of property rights by domestic. 6 and international courts.
" 7
C. The Public Lands Context
This Article has considered Lyng as a problem between owners and
nonowners in the common law context and between the federal
government and Indian nations in the federal Indian law context.
Additionally, there is a third dimension of the Lyng paradigm to consider.
To the extent that Lyng involves Forest Service lands, Lyng is also a case
about rights and obligations of the federal government and citizens with
respect to public lands.356 This subpart argues that the public trust doctrine
may support the right of citizens (including American Indian citizens) to
354. See Tso, supra note 346, at 230 ("Navajo custom and tradition is law.").
355. Natural Arch, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 ("Traditional Navajo ceremonies and rites are
private and passed on from generation to generation.").
356. See Worthen, supra note 14, at 249-50 (describing cases in Hawaii and Australia where
indigenous peoples "have gained the right to use lands for which they did not have fee title,
relying on their customary use of the lands for traditional purposes, and demonstrating that
common law principles may, in some situations, be flexible enough to accommodate Native
American beliefs and practices"); see also Ian H. Hlawati, Comment, Loko I'a: A Legal Guide to the
Restoration of Native Hawaiian Fishponds Within the Western Paradigm, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 657
(2002) (using state law recognition of the native property rights regime, predating the overthrow
of Hawaii, as a basis for limited contemporary rights to fishponds).
357. See, e.g., S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua:
A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2002)
(describing the Inter-American Court's recognition of contemporary indigenous rights based on
both indigenous property law and international law).
358. Cf. Maria E. Mansfield, On the Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons From Public Land Law,
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 43, 44 (1991) ("Lessons from public land law may alter more general
perceptions of property rights.").
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use public lands for religious and cultural purposes, and it explores the
accompanying federal duty to facilitate such uses."'
1. Federal Authority Over Public Lands
The federal government's authority over public lands derives from the
Constitution's Property Clause: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States."3" The Property Clause has given rise
to several interpretations of the relative rights of the federal government, states,
and individual citizens.
In the early history of the nation, many viewed the federal government
as a "proprietor" of public lands-a title holder, just like any other private
individual or entity, of lands deemed to exist within a particular state. Under
this view, which continues to have adherents today, the Property Clause gave
Congress the right (and power) to protect public lands from harm61 until it
exercised its duty to transfer public lands to states and individuals. 62
Eventually, the Property Clause became a source of federal power and
authority justifying the creation of federal agencies to manage public lands. The
trend increasingly was for the federal government to retain its lands,363 and
359. Focusing on the "public" nature of federally owned lands, some scholars have suggested
a "public forum" analysis to sacred sites cases. Analogizing to the government's obligation to
accommodate citizens who desire to use public parks and streets for speech purposes, the argument
is that Indian religious practitioners could claim rights to access public lands for religious
activities. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1466 (arguing that the public forum argument may be
particularly strong where Indian use of sacred sites has taken place "from time immemorial"); see
also Samuel D. Brooks, Native American Indians' Fruitless Search for First Amendment Protections of
Their Sacred Religious Sites, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 521, 549 (1990) (advocating a sliding scale of
protection for American Indian sacred sites, roughly corresponding with the categories of public
forum analysis); cf. Lance J. Schuster, State v. Lilburn and State v. Casey: Harassing Hunters With
the First Amendment, 32 IDAHO L. REv. 469, 489-90 (1996) (arguing that some uses of the public
lands for expressive purposes may not qualify under the public forum analysis). While the public
forum argument resounds with this Article's focus on the obligations of the government to its
citizens, it also relies heavily on the First Amendment, which has been unhelpful for Indians in
sacred sites cases.
360. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
361. See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524 (1897) (stating that "no legisla-
tion... was necessary to vindicate the rights of the Government as a landed proprietor" in cases
where the government sought to remove privately erected fences around public lands).
362. See James L. Huffman, The Inevitability of Private Rights in Public Lands, 65 U. CoLO. L.
REV. 241, 247-50 (writing on the disposal of federal public lands from 1785 to 1934).
363. Cf. Zachary Smith, Interior Encourages BLM Land Sales, HIGH COUNTRY NEWs, Aug. 30,
2004, http://www.hch.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article id=14956 (describing the Department of the
Interior's 2004 request for amendments to the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act that would
"encourage the BLM to sell off more land" by extending, indefinitely, the statutory period for the
identification of saleable lands).
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Congress's power under the Property Clause was construed broadly and
deemed to preempt state law.36
Under the proprietorship model, the federal government's powers as an
owner of public lands were clearly limited. Even as the government has
assumed a greater and more permanent role in the management of public lands,
its powers are not deemed absolute. Rather, these powers are qualified by the
idea that the government owns the public lands on behalf of citizens to whom
it owes duties-a concept embodied
3 65 in the "public trust doctrine. 3 6
2. Citizens' Rights in Public Lands: The Public Trust
The Anglo American public trust doctrine is traceable to Roman law
recognizing property rights in rivers, oceans, and coastlines 6 ' and to later
English law prohibiting the monarch from denying commoners' rights to
natural resources. Growing out of the Magna Carta, the English public
trust doctrine held that the monarch owned common lands for the benefit
of the public, thus giving rise to the concept of "sovereign property" and the
364. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (sustaining the Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act against challenge by the State of New Mexico on grounds that "power over the
public land... entrusted [by the Property Clause] to Congress is without limitations").
365. This Article focuses on common law formulations of the public trust doctrine.
Nevertheless, it acknowledges that the public trust doctrine may be expressed more forcefully in other
places. See generally CHRISTINE KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAw 32-90 (2005) (discussing
federal authority and ownership of lands, with various examples of the federal public trust doctrine).
The notion of a public trust appears, for example, in state cessions of land to the federal government.
See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. 212 (1845) (finding that the Virginia and Alabama cession deeds
stated that "all lands within the territory ceded ... should be considered as a common fund for the
use and benefit of all the United States"); cf. United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that the federal government is not required to hold, in trust for establishment of
future states, public lands which it acquired in Nevada, and the equal footing doctrine did not
give Nevada title to the public fast dry lands within its boundaries). In addition, the public trust
doctrine manifests in various statutes. See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000) (stating that the federal government is to retain public lands unless
disposal will serve the "national interest"); National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1
(2000) (stating that the Park Service is obligated to manage lands in light of "public value"); see
also Jan Laitos & Rachael B. Reiss, Recreation Wars for Our Natural Resources, 34 ENVTL. L. 1091,
1116 (2004) (explaining that some courts have limited federal duties to those specifically set forth
in statutes).
366. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Lands § 7 (2004). Explaining further:
Congress enjoys the powers of a proprietor of public lands and may deal with such lands as a
private individual would deal with his or her property. It has also been observed, however, that
the public lands of the United States are held by the federal government not as an ordinary
individual or proprietor, but in trust for the people of all the states. Under this "public trust"
doctrine, the government has a duty to protect and preserve the land for the public.
Id. (citation omitted).
367. See Joseph L. Sax, Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970).
"inescapable duty of state stewardship."3'6 African, Muslim, Spanish, Mexican,
French, and American Indian legal traditions also historically protected certain
natural resources for public, instead of private, welfare. 69
The American public trust doctrine has evolved over time, with both
state and federal versions. 70 The underlying idea is that citizens have
protectable interests-usually economic or environmental-in certain lands.
For example, in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,371 the U.S. Supreme
Court invalidated a state legislature's decision to sell submerged lands on the
Chicago waterfront to a railroad, on grounds that the sale would transgress
citizens' interests in navigable waters. 72 As in Illinois Central, the public trust
often manifests as a state law doctrine-securing citizens' interests in state
parklands and forests, beachfronts, and water sources."' But some scholars,.
led by Joseph Sax, have argued that the public trust doctrine also applies to
the federal government, requiring the government to act as a trustee and
174administer the public lands for the beneficial interest of American citizens.
Even those who accept the theoretical notion that the public has an
interest in public lands question whether the public trust doctrine provides an
enforceable source of citizens' rights. At the outer limits of the doctrine, some
argue that citizens actually own the public lands, but this is probably an
overstatement of citizens' property interests.375 In certain specific contexts,
368. See generally Mark Dowie, In Law We Trust: Can Environmental Legislation Protect the
Commons Now?, ORION, July/Aug. 2003, at 19 (detailing the fifteen hundred year history of the
public trust doctrine).
369. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source
and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENvTL. L. 425,428-30 (1989).
370. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-41 (1986) (reviewing the
origins of the public trust doctrine in American law). See generally CAROL M. ROSE, The Comedy of
the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION,
supra note 156, at 105.
371. 146 U.S. 387 (1992).
372. But see Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 269, 278-93 (1980).
373. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES
LAW 382-83 (2002); see also ROSE, supra note 370, at 106 (articulating theories of public rights in
private lands, especially waterfront and lands under navigable waters, including (1) public trust,
(2) prescription or dedication, and (3) custom).
374. Sax, supra note 367, at 477. Recently, and far beyond the public lands context, the
doctrine has been used to articulate a public right of access to technology. See, e.g., Horwitz, supra
note 23, at 116 & n.42.
375. In one well-known debate, some citizens have challenged fees to use the U.S. Forests on
grounds that "they, as American citizens, own the public lands." However, there is actually "no
legally cognizable right to free access for recreation." Kira Dale Pfisterer, Foes of Forest Fees: Criticism
of the Recreation Fee Demonstration Project at the Forest Service, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
309, 352 (2002). Both the Constitution and federal statutes support the requirement of a permit for
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such as mining, ranching, and mineral extraction, citizens clearly hold
enforceable property interests.376 But, in the absence of something as discrete
as a mining patent or statutory entitlement, the question is whether citizens
can use the public trust doctrine to assert that the government must manage
its property in a way that reflects citizens' interests.
Perhaps the high watermark of the public trust doctrine manifested in
Sierra Club v. Department of Interior,377 where the Sierra Club claimed that
the Secretary of the Interior and Park Service were required to protect
Redwoods National Park from damage caused by logging. Rejecting
the government's motion to dismiss, the court relied on the government's
trust duty:
The [S]ecretary [of the Interior] is the guardian of the people of the United
States over the public lands .... In view of the... trust responsibility of
the Secretary of the Interior with respect to public lands and the [special]
legislative history ... of the Redwood National Park Act ... a case for
judicial relief has been made out by plaintiff.37
Somewhat similar to the structure of a claim under the federal Indian trust
doctrine, the theory in Sierra Club was that the agencies abused their discre-
tion by failing to take account of the public trust doctrine in their administration
of the national park.
The district court, in a later state of the case, held the Park Service
abused its discretion by failing to acquire adequate buffer areas to protect the
park from logging operations.379 While the court spoke of a "general trust
duty," the court traced this duty to a specific statute, the National Park
citizens' access to the forests, and citizens have only an implied license to use public lands. As
Pfisterer points out, "such an implied license does not convey a very strong property right. Rather, it
simply allows the recreating public access unless expressly prohibited." Id.
376. See generally Huffman, supra note 362 (discussing grazing permits, mining patents, and
mineral leases). See also Sally K. Fairfax et al., The Federal Forests Are Not What They Seem, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 630, 634-38 (1999). Fairfax states that citizens' property interests in federal lands are
found in: (1) "intermixed ownership" such as the checkerboard land patterns associated with railroad
grants; (2) "leases and access rights" for:
private cabins in national forests and parks; oil, gas, and coal leases on national forest and wildlife
refuge lands; timber sale contracts on BLM and national forest lands; concessions to run gas
stations, hotels, bars, souvenir shops, grocery stores, marinas and similar facilities in national
parks; timber sale contracts; rights to provide guide services on major rivers; and grazing leases;
and (3) "informal claims" such as contemporary recreation claims by off-road vehicle users and historical
claims by dispossessed minority groups such as Hispanics and Native Americans. Id.
377. 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (mem.); 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975), modified,
424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
378. 376 F. Supp at 93-95.
379. 398 F. Supp. at 292-93.
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System Act, and not a common law source."' Because even Sierra Club relied
on both the Redwood National Park Act and the National Park System Act,
3 85
scholars debate about the practical utility of common law public trust arguments.
Many assert that only a statutory expression of a public trust duty will be enforced
by the courts.382  Still, others insist that, "The case for public trust review of
administrative decisions in public natural resources law is not negligible. In some
cases, courts seem to have adopted the idea without the label., 383 If the public
trust doctrine remains alive as a tool of administrative review, the question is how
to use it, in theory and in practice, in sacred sites cases.
3. Applying the Public Trust to Sacred Sites Cases
The public trust doctrine has been used to protect citizens' commercial,
subsistence, and environmental interests in public lands. Or, to put it another
way, the public trust doctrine allows citizens to express their values-in favor
of economic growth, living off the land, and natural resources protection.
Because individual citizens may not be able to devote their own private land
to these uses for economic or other reasons, the doctrine enables citizens to
effectuate their values through use of the public lands.3s
The public trust doctrine similarly could be used to express collective
values in favor of religious freedoms on public lands. The freedom of religion is
a clearly entrenched American value. It serves, along with freedom of speech
380. Id. at 287. Congress later amended the Act to codify Secretarial duties to the public. See also
Amendments to the National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The Amendments state:
Congress further reaffirms. .. that the protection, management and administration of [the
National Park System] shall be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of
the National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes
for which these areas have been established, except as may have been or shall be directly and
specifically provided by Congress.
Id.
381. 424 F. Supp. at 172-73; see also Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C.
1980), affd on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.D.C. 1981) ("To the
extent that plaintiffs argument advances the proposition that defendants [National Park Service and
Bureau of Land Management] are changed with 'trust' duties, distinguishable from their statutory
duties, the Court disagrees. Rather, the Court views the statutory duties as comprising all the
responsibilities which defendants must faithfully discharge.").
382. Cf. 487 F. Supp. at 449 (discussing statutory duties).
383. COGGINS ET AL.,supra note 373, at 388.
384. Justifying the public trust doctrine on economic groups, for example, Joseph Sax imagined
that while a church might retain a rose garden for senior citizen use, an individual would choose to
sell it for profit, even if he valued and wanted to please the elderly. Maria E. Mansfield, On the
Cusp of Property Rights: Lessons From Public Land Law, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 43, 83 n.231 (1991).
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and other fundamental rights, as a marker of a free society."' In a pluralistic
society, people generally agree that all citizens deserve the freedom of religion.
Despite a history of suppressing Indian religions, most Americans would, if
asked today, probably agree that Indians should enjoy the right to practice
their religions. 86 But the average citizen may not be in a position to express
his support for religious freedoms in a way that extends meaningfully to
American Indians. Even if they are educated about the issues (and many are
not), many citizens may lack the economic power or sense of personal duty to
accommodate Indian religions. When a sacred site is found on private land,
the individual owner may not be able or willing to donate it to the
appropriate tribe or provide special access--even if that individual believes in
the right of everyone, including Indians, to worship freely.
By contrast, when a sacred site is located on public lands, the burden of
accommodating Indian religions falls, for the most part, on the federal gov-
ernment instead of on any individual citizen. With greater access to information
and economic power, the government can effectuate citizens' values in favor
of religious freedoms in ways that individuals cannot (or will not). Today,
when American citizens and political leaders (including the President), avow
their respect for religious minorities, with emphasis on tolerance for Muslims
in the wake of September 11, it seems clearer than ever before that religious
freedom for every individual and group is a collective American value."
7 The
public trust doctrine allows the government to effectuate our common
interest in religious freedom by accommodating spiritual practices, including
Indian spiritual practices, on public lands.
38
1
If we can agree that the public trust doctrine in theory should be used to
effectuate the value of religious freedom, the next question is how. Under a
385. Cf. Peter Manus, To a Candidate in Search of an Environmental Theme: Promote the Public
Trust, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 356-62 (2000) (exploring constitutional justifications for the public
trust doctrine).
386. See, e.g., Zellmer, supra note 278, at 437-38 ("Congress has explicitly recognized that
religious practices are an integral part of tribal culture and identity and has agreed to protect tribal
interests in their own distinctive culture and religion as a matter of national policy and international
law."); see also Peters, supra note 322, at 135 ("Clearly, the desecration of sacred sites is intolerable
not just for Native Americans, but for non-natives too.").
387. See, e.g., Wendy S. Ross, Bush at Islamic Center Urges Tolerance Towards Arab-
Americans (U.S. Dep't of State, International Information Programs, Sept. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.usinfo.org/usia/usinfo.state.gov/usa/islama0
9l701.htm; White House Press Release,
President Commemorates Eid al-Adha (Feb. 11, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/02/ 200302 11-12.html; White House Press Release, President's Greeting for Ramadan
(Nov. 5, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/11/20021105-3.html.
388. Cf. Manus, supra note 385, at 320 ("The idea that the citizens and government of the
United States are bound to one another by some form of trust appears to be one of the foundations of our
faith in the benevolence of American society.").
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robust view of the doctrine, advocates could seek federal judicial review of agency
action, claiming that an administrative agency has an affirmative public trust
duty to accommodate religious uses of public land. In sacred sites cases, this
might include a duty to provide access to practitioners and to maintain the
physical integrity of the land in question. This approach would mirror the
strategy in the Sierra Club case described above seeking relief on grounds that
the agency abuses its discretion by failing to accommodate Indian religious or
public lands. Realistically, though, advocates must recognize that most
federal courts will require a separate statutory basis for such governmental
duties,389 as the court ultimately did in Sierra Club.
Although the American Indian Religious Freedom Act is generally con-
sidered to be an unenforceable policy statement, it may be worth considering
whether it might suffice to express a federal public trust duty. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1996 states:
[l]t shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for
American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut,
and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and
possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through
ceremonials and traditional rites.3 O
Perhaps an even stronger public trust duty in favor of accommodating Indian
sacred site usage could be found in the Archaeological Resources Protection
Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act.
Alternatively, sacred sites litigants could take the "interpretive technique"
approach. 9' When ambiguities or silences exist in federal legislation or
regulation affecting public lands, such legislation or regulation should be construed
in a way that effectuates societal values. Accordingly, litigants in sacred sites
cases could argue that public lands law should be construed in a manner that
389. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that, even under the APA, a
plaintiff must assert that an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.
This so-called "discrete-action limitation" precludes a broad programmatic attack for an agency's
failure to act, including in federal public lands cases. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,
124 S. Ct. 2373, 2379-80 (2004) (rejecting claim of environmental organization that brought action
against the Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, State of Utah, and others, seeking
to compel, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), agency action in light of the alleged
failure to manage off-road vehicle use in federal lands classified as wilderness study areas).
390. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000).
391. See Sax, supra note 367, at 556 (arguing that public trust doctrine provides a technique for
judicial review); cf. Mansfield, supra note 358, at 87 (stating that the public trust doctrine "can
supply content to the congressional command to 'take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or
undue degradation of [BLM] lands.').
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protects the physical integrity of, and Indian access to, sacred sites. Such an
interpretation would fulfill the public interest in religious freedom for all citizens.
Finally, Indian religious practitioners and advocates could evoke the
public trust doctrine at the earlier stage of land management by administra-
tive agencies. When an agency manages public lands containing sacred sites,
and the Indian trust doctrine and other sources of law have not yet provided
a clear course of action, the public trust doctrine can be used to mitigate in favor
of a decision that accommodates religious practices.3
92 Instead of mere .'accom-
modation' between collective values and private projects," such an approach
could lead to substantive preference for land management decisions that accom-
modate the widely shared collective value of religious freedom.
93 The agency
can be explicit in its management plan that its action is guided by the public trust
doctrine (and Indian trust doctrine) and the public interest in religious freedom.
Such agency actions should be entitled to the deference that courts accord
administrative decisions, and perhaps even to increased deference.
394
Some might point out that this application of the public trust doctrine is
rather novel. The doctrine has more often been used to protect non-Indian
citizens' economic and environmental interests. But the doctrine is broad
and flexible. As Carol Rose has argued, "Given the possibility of historical
change in our attitudes about what are and what are not valuable socializing
institutions, we might expect that our views of inherently public property
should change over time." '395 Respect for freedom of religion is a form of
"social glue" that holds our society together. Our common interest in free-
dom of religion applies to Indians, and it can be expressed through the public
trust doctrine. 396
Today, the public trust approach calls for the accommodation of all religions
that require use or access to federal public lands. This is consistent with "the
principle of nonestablishment as barring governmental preferences for particular
religious faiths." 97 In addition to the historical instances cited above, there are
dozens, if not hundreds, of contemporary examples of Mormon, Quaker, and
Catholic services that take place at churches and other religious facilities on public
392. See Mansfield, supra note 358, at 87.
393. Id. at 88.
394. See id. at 91.
395. ROSE, supra note 370, at 148.
396. Carol Rose notes that "the Romans had a category of public property for religious structures
and places." Id. (opining that the freedom of speech is "perhaps a more important social glue of our own
society" than is the freedom of religion).
397. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 856 (1995).
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lands."' Whether it is because they personally practice such a religion on public
lands, or because they want to live in a country where all citizens enjoy the freedom
of religion, or because the survival of indigenous cultures is important to them, all
citizens may be able to support this application of the public trust doctrine."
The availability of public trust arguments to a!l Americans is precisely
what concerns some scholars. Rebecca Tsosie argues that, when it comes to
sacred sites, Indians should not be reduced to mere stakeholders in public
lands, forced to compete with rock climbers, timber companies, and even
other religious users," for use rights."4  Tsosie raises an important question
about the public trust doctrine: how should the law accommodate and bal-
ance competing public interests? In one respect, this Article aims only to
establish a baseline of Indian rights at sacred sites, ensuring that Indians will
have some place at the litigating or negotiating table, but reserving specific
questions about priorities of rights for a subsequent piece.4"2
There are, however, a number of readily apparent reasons why it makes
sense to offer a heightened level of protection for Indian interests in sacred sites
on public lands. Some scholars advocate carefully considering the costs and
benefits associated with harming or destroying Indian sacred sites. As Professors
398. See, e.g., O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that the decision of
the National Park Service to allow the Pope to perform Catholic Mass on the Mall, including the
erection of a fence around the Mass area, did not violate the Establishment Clause).
399. Cf. SINGER, supra note 15, at 210 ("[We cannot reasonably expect individuals to honor
the claims of others unless they are claims to which all could or should assent.").
400. Indian peoples who find the religious practices of "New Agers," for example, to be
offensive and disruptive would likely agree with this critique. See Denise Ross, Religious Groups Clash
Over Bear Butte, RAPID CITY J., July 15, 2004, http://www.rapidcityjoumal.com/articles/2004/
07/16/news/locaVtop/news0l.txt ("Some of these New Agers, they're really far out in doing their
ceremonies. Sometimes, it's a direct insult to what I practice every day for our rituals." (quoting
Sonny Richards, a traditional American Indian religious practitioner)). On the other hand, some
indigenous peoples reject the idea that they should or could have absolute rights at sacred sites-
speaking instead in terms of responsibility, relationship, and respect. Cf. IN THE LIGHT OF REVERENCE
(Bullfrog Films 2002) (interview of Vine Deloria). Deloria explained:
It's not that Indians should have exclusive rights [at sacred sites], it's that that location is sacred
enough that it should have time of its own and that once it has time of its own then the people
who know how to do ceremonies should come and minister to it .... [T]he idea is not to pretend
to own [a sacred site] or exploit it but to respect it.
Id.
401. See Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the "Public Trust" and the "Indian Trust" Doctrines:
Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271, 292, 300 (2003); cf. Erin Ryan,
Comment, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural
Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 493 (2001) (reviewing critiques of the public trust doctrine,
including that "the understanding of natural resources in private property terms that is reified by the
public trust may render more vulnerable to degradation the very resources impressed with the trust").
402. As I describe supra note 13, a future Article will look at the role of property law in
developing federal policy in favor of sacred site accommodation, and this future piece will have as one of
its primary concerns the ordering of competing claims on public lands.
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McConnell and Posner have suggested, we could revisit Lyng by weighing the
benefits to the lumber companies (who have an interest in logging) and other
citizens (who can use the logging road for other purposes) against the harm to
the Indians (complete destruction of their religion). Under this analysis,
McConnell and Posner observe, "the injury to the Indians religious interest
appears unusually severe... while the secular interests seem 
relatively slight. 40 3
On the one hand, a cost-benefit analysis would seem to leave Indians, as
a small minority, particularly vulnerable to other groups' and individuals'
interests in the public lands. Thus, a cost-benefit approach must be undertaken
cautiously. But if we take seriously, as McConnell and Posner seem to
suggest, the harm to Indian religions caused by competing uses, like the log-
ging in Lyng, the cost-benefit analysis should favor Indian claims.' The idea
is not to measure the monetary costs for Indians against the monetary gains for
the logging industry, federal government, or citizenry, but to give real consid-
eration to the value of the Indians' religious claims from their own perspec-
tive." The very nature of Indian religions, place specific and ritual oriented
as they often are, means that the harm posed by competing users will often be
extremely grave. There is nothing fungible about Indian sacred site practices.
On the other hand, the government or timber company's interests in logging
or citizen's interests in rock climbing may often be realized at other locations.
Moreover, under the public trust theory, we should consider that destroying
Indian religions may have costs for non-Indians. In a society founded on a
collective value in favor of religious freedom, everyone suffers when certain
individuals, groups, or classes are denied that freedom. This factor should be
considered as a "cost" of public land use that harms Indian sacred sites.
Finally, we could look at the costs and benefits over a broader historical
period and set of substantive concerns. When Indians have lost most of the
continent to non-Indian settlers and their descendants who have benefited
directly and indirectly from the "availability" of former Indian lands, recog-
nizing Indian priorities at federally owned sacred sites seems like a small step
toward justice that many citizens may be willing to take.'
403. Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious
Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 48 (1989). This author would disagree with McConnell and Posner's
conclusion that "the proper result in Lyng is not obvious."
404. Cf. McConnell & Posner, supra note 403, at 33-54 (advancing a framework for weighing
costs of government regulation against benefits of religious freedom).
405. See Singer, supra note 230, at 1830 (critiquing Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lyng for its
failure "to recognize the nonneutrality of the perpetrator perspective she adopted because she relied on her
commonsense intuitions to tell her what is and is not a governmental interference with religion").
406. See William Bradford, "With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation,
and an American Indian Plea for Peace With Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2002-2003).
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In many cases, therefore, agencies and courts should determine that, on the
balance, it is more appropriate to accommodate the Indian interest in a sacred
site than the interests of the government or other citizens. Admittedly, some
cases will be difficult: non-Indians may have religious needs on public lands
or claim other uses that also express collective values. In some instances, it
may be possible to reconcile competing uses, but this should only occur where
the harm to Indian religions will not be significant.
Relying on a cost-benefit analysis is clearly an imperfect solution to the
problem of competing uses under a public trust theory. Many agency officials,
judges, and other decision makers may not understand how Indians "value" their
sacred sites. Calling for the recognition of non-economic values of property
implicates a major reconceptualization of property law. Indeed, even invoking a
cost-benefit analysis seems to implicate the discipline of law and economics,
which is often critiqued for its failure to protect disempowered peoples and its
presumption that those who really value property will simply bargain for it on the
open market. 7 Indians, as a vulnerable minority group, may not be in a position
to bargain or present their claims effectively against well-financed opposition
by governments, corporations, and citizens' groups. But the intriguing aspect of
applying McConnell and Posner's analysis to the public trust context is that
it suggests a starting point for considering that the government's regulation of
public lands has great costs for Indian religious practitioners. This line of
argument has potential application to sacred site cases, but only if we are careful
to weigh costs and benefits in terms and contexts that are meaningful to Indian
peoples, and not limit them to monetary considerations.
In addition, some scholars, including Tsosie, would argue that Indians
should not have to make such arguments. Instead, in Tsosie's view, principles
of cultural sovereignty should operate to ensure Indian access to sacred
sites.4° Here, this Article agrees with Tsosie that, in the final analysis, the
fact that tribes are sovereigns engaged in nation-to-nation relationships with
the United States should be sufficient to protect Indian interests in sacred
sites. The trust duty of the government to tribes should already require that
agencies and courts offer the highest duty of care toward Indian resources,
including sacred sites. But because cases like Lyng suggest that courts are not
living up to these foundational principles of Indian law, a public trust
407. For some of the classic critiques applicable to the discussion in this Article, see RONALD
DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237 (1985); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing
Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 23, 23 (1989), summarizing the rational choice model; and Duncan Kennedy, Cost-benefit
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
408. Tsosie, supra note 401, at 301.
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argument (along with the other property claims), may be helpful in improving
Indians' positions in sacred sites matters. These property arguments should
only be used in combination with claims insisting on the federal government's
obligation to Indian nations under the Indian trust responsibility, cultural
sovereignty, and other foundational principles of federal Indian law.
D. The Human Rights Context
Finally, cases like Lyng concern the relationship between indigenous
peoples and a conquering nation-state, a relationship that implicates interna-
tional law. As individual sovereigns, Indian nations dealt with Europeans
on a nation-to-nation basis at the time of contact, and these dealings were, in
significant part, governed by principles of international law.'
° While the
United States inherited the rights and obligations of its European successors,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided to treat Indians not as "foreign" but rather
as "domestic dependent" nations."' Nevertheless, international law treats
American Indians and other indigenous peoples as "groups of human beings
with fundamental human rights concerns that deserve attention.""
Today, a discrete and growing body of international human rights law
pertains specifically to indigenous peoples.412 Although the U.S. Supreme Court
remains generally reluctant to apply international law,4 .3 American Indians
nevertheless increasingly are turning to this body of law as a basis for their
rights, in claims before both domestic courts and international tribunals.
414 Inter-
national covenants and agreements, as well as emerging norms of customary inter-
national law, protect indigenous peoples' rights to use their traditional property
and may serve as sources of rights to use sacred sites located on federal public lands.
409. See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996).
See also Philip Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 75-80 (1996) (arguing
that because Chief Justice Marshall originally decided the status of Indian nations in the context of
international law, norms of international human rights law should continue to "provide an interpre-
tive backdrop" in contemporary Indian law matters).
410. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
411. ANAYA, supra note 409, at 4
3 .
412. See S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights
Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 33, 33 (2001); see also Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, 116
HARV. L REv. 1751, 1756 (2003) (stating that although international law respects the rights of nation-
states to govern themselves, "certain violations of international human rights law justify intervention by
another state or by the international community [and iun recent decades, international human rights law
has evolved in several ways favorable to the claims of indigenous peoples.").
413. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the
Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 43 (2003).
414. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 412, at 34.
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1. Indigenous "Use" Rights
International human rights law offers expansive recognition of indigenous
property rights. As S. James Anaya has written: "Property has been affirmed
as an international human right." 5  Today, "modem notions of cultural
integrity and self-determination join property as precepts in the affirmation of
sui generis indigenous land and resource rights.416 Several instruments offer
explicit recognition of indigenous property rights, including rights to use land
outside of reservations."7
Conventions 107 and 169 of the International Labour Organization rec-
ognize indigenous property rights to lands they traditionally have occupied."8
In a provision of particular relevance to off-reservation sacred sites, Convention
169 furthermore recognizes "the right of the [indigenous] peoples to use lands
not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had
access for their subsistence and traditional activities. ' 419
The Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples sets forth:
Indigenous peoples have the right to own, develop, control and use the lands
and territories, including the total environment of the lands... which they
have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. This includes the
right to the full recognition of their laws, traditions and customs, land-
tenure systems and institutions for the development and management of
resources, and the right to effective measures by States to prevent any
interference with, alienation of or encroachment upon these rights.420
415. ANAYA, supra note 409, at 105.
416. Id.
417. International human rights law also offers expansive protection for indigenous peoples'
ownership rights. For example, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, to which
the United States is a signatory, provides for the "right to own such private property as meets the
essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home."
AMERICAN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF MAN art. XXII. For the most part, this
Article focuses on "use" rights under international law, except when ownership and use rights
overlap in the same legal instrument.
418. Convention 107: Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and
Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, International Labour
Organisation, 40th Sess., June 26, 1957, art. II, 328 U.N.T.S. 247, 256; Convention 169: Convention
Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries, International Labour Organisation, 76th Sess., June 27, 1989,
art. 14.1, 28 I.L.M. 1382, 1387 [hereinafter ILO 169].
419. ILO 169 art. 14.2.
420. DRAFT UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES art. 26
(1994), available at http://www.indianlaw.org/UN-DraftDeclarationl994.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT
U.N. DECLARATION].
Moreover, "indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands"
and shall be entitled to compensation and a right of return where possible.421
Similarly, Article 18 of the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples provides:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the legal recognition of their
varied and specific forms and modalities of their control, ownership,
use and enjoyment of territories and property.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition of their property
and ownership rights with respect to lands, territories and resources
they have historically occupied, as well as to the use of those to which
they have historically had access for their traditional activities
and livelihood. 22
Consistent with the earlier discussion on the relevance of tribal law and custom,
the Proposed American Declaration also explains: "Nothing ... shall be con-
strued as limiting the right of indigenous peoples to attribute ownership within
the community in accordance with their customs, traditions, uses and traditional
practices, nor shall it affect any collective community rights over them."
23
Several provisions of international law may have particular relevance to
cases in which sacred sites are threatened. The Draft U.N. Declaration
importantly recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to "maintain and
strengthen their distinctive spiritual and material relationships with the
lands.., they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and to
uphold their responsibilities to future generations." 24 It also provides for the
"right to the conservation, restoration and protection" of indigenous lands, and
prohibits use of those lands for military projects without indigenous consent.
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Other provisions protecting indigenous rights also may be relevant in sacred
sites cases, including: protections for the right to practice cultural traditions;
to maintain their cultural property; to pursue cultural and spiritual
development; and providing for "restitution of spiritual property taken with-
out their free and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions,
and customs.""
421. Id. art. 10.
422. PROPOSED AMERICAN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES art.
XVIII (1997), available at http://www.dialoguebetweennations.com/OASdeclaration/english/
ProposedAmerDeclar.htm.
423. Id. art. XVIII, T 3, § iii.
424. DRAFT U.N. DECLARATION, supra note 420, art. 25.
425. Id. art. 28.
426. Id. arts. 12, 29, 37.
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2. Indigenous Property Cases
Two recent indigenous property law cases demonstrate these interna-
tional human rights norms in action. In January 2004, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights issued a report finding that Belize, by granting
logging and oil concessions on lands used and occupied by the Maya people
in the Toledo District, violated the property rights of the Maya people.427
The Maya based their claims on the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, Draft U.N. Declaration, and ILO 169, alleging violations
of the rights to property, religious freedom, and family, as well as the right to
take part in the cultural life of the community, the right to a healthy envi-
ronment, and the right to participate in government.428 The Maya further
claimed that because Belize is as a former British colony and a common law
jurisdiction, the common law "should be deemed to incorporate the common
law doctrine that upholds the property rights of indigenous peoples on the
basis of customary land tenure, referred to by common law courts as 'aborigi-
nal rights' or 'title,"' unless there was decisional law to the contrary. 29
The Commission ultimately found that the Maya have collective prop-
erty rights to the lands they use and occupy, not only the lands within reserve
or village boundaries.430 Protection of Maya property rights is critical because
of indigenous peoples' relationship with land and the role of land in indige-
nous communities' economic, social, and cultural survival.431 Moreover, these
rights are cognizable under international law, even if Belize does not formally
acknowledge them, and they include the right to participate in governing
decisions about Maya land. The government of Belize specifically failed to
protect these property rights by failing to establish legal mechanisms to pro-
tect Maya property, by granting the oil and logging concession without Maya
consent, and by damaging the Maya environment.
The Commission ordered Belize to demarcate Maya lands in accordance
with Maya custom and in consultation with Maya people, to recognize officially
the collective property rights of Maya communities and undertake measures to
protect them, and to obtain informed Maya consent before undertaking any
activity, including oil or timber extraction, that affects Maya lands.432 The
427. Report No. 96/03, Case 12.053, Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District, Belize,
October 24, 2003 (the report was issued in 2003 but not announced formally until 2004) [hereinafter Maya
Indigenous Communities], available at http://www.indianlaw.org/BZL2003-10-24_lACHRPrelimRpt.pdf.
428. See id. at 44-56.
429. Id. at 13.
430. Id. at 3 7-38.
431. Id. at 33.
432. Id.
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Maya decision is particularly relevant because the Commission based its
holding on the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, which
is considered binding on all members of the Organization of American States,
although the United States has not agreed necessarily to be bound."'
The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua was
an earlier groundbreaking international decision.434 There, the Inter-American
Court on Human Rights ruled that the State of Nicaragua had violated the
right to property as expressed in Article 21 of the American Convention on
Human Rights by granting logging concessions on the traditional lands of the
Mayagna (Sumo) community of Awas Tingni.435 As one scholar has remarked,
the Court importantly "engaged the perspective of the indigenous communities
in its analysis of what the right to property means emphasizing.., their spiri-
tual connection with the land over the 'mere question' of possession and pro-
duction.'"36 The Inter-American Court thus required Nicaragua to adopt
measures to create an effective mechanism for official recognition, demarcation,
and titling of the indigenous community's properties. Although the United
States has not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, Awas Tingni
nevertheless contributes to a body of international law recognizing the property
rights of indigenous peoples.
3. Indian Sacred Sites Cases
Like the Maya in Belize and the Awas Tingni in Nicaragua, American
Indians may have claims based on international human rights law when the
United States interferes with their traditional uses of property, including sacred
sites. These cases resound with sacred site disputes in that they, too, involve
property outside of reservations (or their equivalent) and nation-states' decisions
to use such property for natural resource extraction. American Indians might
apply the principles of these cases to assert rights to use sacred sites and federal
obligations to accommodate such uses. The question is how and where to bring
such claims.
433. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 412, at 42 & n.34.
434. The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua,
Judgment of Aug. 31, 2001, Inter-Am. C.H.R., No. 79, available at http://www.indianlaw.org/
AT_2001-08-3 1_InterAmericanCourtjudgmentOfficiaEnglish.pdf.
435. See Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement Under the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L REV. 49, 81-83 (2002).
436. Kirsten M. Hetzel, Comment, Reaching Regional Consensus: Examining United States Native
American Property Rights in Light of Recent International Developments, 10 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
307,321 (2002).
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Indian nations should first consider raising such arguments in domestic
settings. Some federal courts, albeit a minority, have recognized interna-
tional legal arguments in Indian religious freedoms cases.437 Scholars increas-
ingly are urging the federal courts to recognize international human rights
norms, at least as an interpretive technique mitigating in favor of Indian self-
determination and reflecting Indian conceptions of culture and identity.438
After having exhausted domestic remedies, tribes can consider bringing property
claims in international tribunals.
In one recent property case, American Indians have availed themselves
of the Inter-American Commission's investigation and reporting process.
The United States has rejected the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Commission even though it is compulsory for members of the Organization of
American States, of which the United States is a member. Nevertheless, in The
Case of Mary and Carrie Dann v. The United States,43 9 two Western Shoshone
women have asserted aboriginal title to ancestral lands in response to United
States' efforts to interfere with their ongoing use of those lands for subsistence
and other purposes. After exhausting domestic remedies (in a complicated
litigation process spanning decades), the Danns brought the case to the Inter-
American system, where the Commission accepted jurisdiction. The
Commission ultimately held the United States must: (1) provide a fair legal
process to determine the Western Shoshones' land rights, including
legislation or other mechanisms to ensure the Danns' right to property; and
(2) review domestic laws, procedures, and practices to ensure that the United
States is governing the property rights of indigenous people consistent with
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man."1 The United
States has thus far refused to comply with the recommendations of the
report.442 The Commission indicates that it will continue to monitor the
situation until the United States takes remedial measures.
437. See, e.g., United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (D. N.M. 1986) (relying on
the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo between the United States and Mexico, along with the First
Amendment, as a basis for dismissing a criminal proceeding against a Pueblo Indian who had killed
an eagle for religious purposes without a federal permit). But see Manybeads v. United States, 70 F.
Supp. 1515, 1520-21 (D. Ariz. 1989) (stating that international legal claims are "frivolous," and the
Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act did not violate plaintiffs' rights under customary international law or the
U.N. Charter). See also Hetzel, supra note 436, at 327.
438. See, e.g., International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, supra note 412.
439. Case 11.140, Inter-Am. C.H.R 860, Report No. 75/02, doc. 5 rev. 1, available at
http://www.indianlaw.org/wsDann_caseIACHRfinal.pdf.
440. Id. 76, at 18.
441. Id. 173, at 48.
442. Id. 9[T 175-79, at 49.
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Despite the United States' response to the Dann case and its general
refusal to submit to international jurisdiction, scholars argue that such decisions
contribute to a body of customary international law important in indigenous
struggles. As one scholar has argued:
[T]he United States... stand[s] alone in its decision to consciously
reject the principles promulgated by the various recent international
instruments and the customary international law concerning indigenous
peoples' rights. Two Native American women have brought the United
States' Native American land policy into the spotlight, illuminating its
direct conflict with the generally accepted international norms. In light
of that heightened attention, and as a world power, the United States
needs to set an example by fully incorporating its human rights
obligations into its domestic policies, especially with regard to Native
American property rights. 443
This description of the effect of international human rights law contains an
aspirational element, but American Indians and their advocates can use these
decisions to try to bring the United States into compliance with the expecta-
tions of the world community.
The United States' refusal "to respect the relationship between... indigenous
peoples' land and culture" in sacred sites cases highlights the contrast
between the United States and many other international actors." Thus,
sacred sites cases may offer a good platform from which to encourage the
United States to comply with international norms and expectations. Recall
the Afghan-Taliban government's March 2001 decision to destroy ancient
Buddha statues; the Taliban's destruction of the sacred outraged the
international community-including the United States-and served as
a precursor for other violent acts to come. 45  Recognizing the rights of
443. Hetzel, supra note 436, at 327-28.
444. See International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal Indian Law, supra note 412, at
1763-64 (contrasting the United States approach in Lyng with Canadian and Nicaraguan cases
recognizing indigenous interests in land and culture).
445. See Vasuki Nesiah, From Berlin to Bonn to Baghad: A Space for Infinite Justice, 17 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 75, 91 (2004). Nesiah states:
Even before September 11, 2001 there was considerable pressure for a strong response
against religious intolerance in Afghanistan. A year earlier, the U.S. government listed the
Taliban as a particularly severe violator of religious freedom, as it undoubtedly was. In
March 2001, the Taliban implemented its edict against worshipping idols by destroying the
famous Buddha statues in Bamian. The Washington Post noted that despite widespread con-
demnation of this act, the international community "found no leverage" to dissuade the Taliban.
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minorities to protect their sacred places and structures would seem, in
hindsight, to be a mark of a civilized nation."
V. RESPONDING TO CRITIQUES OF A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH
There are a number of possible critiques to a property rights approach in
sacred sites cases. This Article has already discussed such critiques in specific
contexts, but it may be helpful to bring them together here. First, some
might question the appropriateness of using property law to describe indige-
nous experiences with the sacred. In the Anglo American sense, "property"
often connotes individuals' dominion over things and evokes a sense of absolute
ownership rights. Black's Law Dictionary, for example, defines "property" as:
That which is peculiar or property to any person, that which belongs
exclusively to one.... The term is said to extend to every species of
valuable right and interest. More specifically, ownership; the unrestricted
and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of a thing in every
legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude everyone else from
interfering with it. 447
Although, as this Article suggests, this definition has been eroded substan-
tially in practice, it continues to influence conceptions of property. And in
some cases, the idea of land as property-in its most conventional Anglo
American sense-may reflect indigenous experiences." However, American
Indians quite often depart from notions of absolute individual dominion and
of land as a commodity, speaking instead of the relational and sacred nature
of land in tribal communities. As Jimmie Durham, a Cherokee litigant in
Sequoyah, explained:
In the language of my people.., there is a word for land: Eloheh. This
same word also means history, culture and religion. We cannot separate
our place on earth from our lives on the earth nor from our vision nor
our meaning as people. We are taught from childhood that the animals
and even the trees and plants that we share a place with are [sic] our
446. I use the term "civilized" somewhat ironically and in light of centuries of United States
policy designed to "civilize" the "savage" American Indians "through such methods as dividing their
land in severalty and forcing them to become farmers, denying them rations if their children failed to attend
school, and punishing them for practicing their traditional religions." Bethany R. Berger, "Power
Over This Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1957, 2017 (2004).
447. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary further defines
"land" as "ground, soil, or earth whatsoever... [and] in its more limited sense .... the quantity and
character of the interest or estate which a person may own in land." Id. at 877.
448. See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common
Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559 (2001).
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brothers and sisters. So when we speak of land, we are not speaking of
property, territory, or even a piece of ground upon which our houses sit
and our crops are grown. We are speaking of something truly sacred. 44'
Particularly when the subject is a sacred site, indigenous peoples may not use
the vocabulary of property or ownership. For example, Jicarilla Apache
scholar Carey Vicenti describes "that beautiful and radiant sense of belonging
to the country from which we come."45
Given the apparent semantic and cultural disconnect, it is not surprising
that Indian nations and practitioners of tribal religions have not typically made
detailed property law claims in sacred sites cases to date. Anglo American
property law, with its focus on individual owners' rights and the use of land for
exploitive purposes, sometimes may seem antithetical to indigenous relation-
ships and values regarding land. Moreover, property law has been used to
"legitimate" the conquest of Indian lands.4"' Even when Indians have retained
property rights, U.S. courts have failed to accord them the legal protection
routinely accorded to non-Indian property."'
Indian litigants and their attorneys thus justifiably are wary and critical
of property law. But there may be reasons to reconsider property law as a
source of Indian rights in the sacred sites context and beyond. Some of
these reasons are pragmatic. If federal ownership trumps Indian religious
claims, Indian attempts to bring any Free Exercise Clause claims regarding
federally owned land are doomed from the start.453 Advocates must try to
develop creative and effective legal arguments that restore the availability
of First Amendment review for their tribal clients. Establishing that an
Indian nation, even as a nonowner, has a legally protected property right is
one way to get courts to pay serious attention to Indians' claims at sacred
sites. Asserting that the federal government, as an owner, has a legally
enforceable property obligation at sacred sites is another.
449. PETER MATrHIESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 119 (1984) (quoting Jimmie Durham, Eastern
Band of Cherokees).
450. Rebecca Tsosie, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act's 25th Anniversary: Past
Accomplishments and Future Challenges, INDIAN LEGAL PROGRAM (College of Law, Arizona State
University), Dec. 2003, at 5, available at http://www.law.asu.edu/files/News/December ILP.pdf.
451. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 19, at 313-17 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall's use of
the European "Doctrine of Discovery" to deny Indians recognizable legal title to their homelands in
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)).
452. See generally Singer, supra note 19.
453. See Dussias, supra note 10, at 832-33 (citing cases).
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To state it most powerfully (and optimistically), property law may
accomplish what the First Amendment seemed unable to do in Lyng 4 4-that
is, create affirmative Indian rights and enforceable federal duties at sacred
sites owned by the government.4"' At the very least, property law can chal-
lenge the notion that the government's ownership always gives it absolute
rights to destroy Indian sacred places and religions.
More generally, thinking about property law may contribute to nation-
wide discussions about strategy in Indian law cases.456 This effort stems from
the fact that Indian nations are losing cases at a very high rate in the
Rehnquist-era Supreme Court.457  As advocates consider various strategies,
some have suggested formulating arguments grounded more broadly in "the
law" than in the narrower doctrines of "federal Indian law." The jury still is out
on this strategy,458 but it may be worth noting that in non-Indian cases,
today's Court appears very responsive to property rights arguments.
459
Although history suggests that the Court has not offered Indian property the
same level of protection as non-Indian property," perhaps the time is right to
attempt property law arguments in some Indian cases.46'
A related reason to reconsider property law has to do with claiming a
meaningful place for indigenous peoples in the U.S. legal regime. The
government guarantees and protects interests in land that are classified as
454. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) ("[The
Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in
terms of what the individual can exact from the government.").
455. See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 106 ("[T]he prevailing view of the U.S. Constitution is that
its pronouncements are largely negative and meant only to prevent government from overstepping its
bounds, not positive, thereby creating constitutional duties in the government to maximize the
welfare of the citizenry." (citations omitted)).
456. See, e.g., Tracy Labin, We Stand United Before the Court: The Tribal Supreme Court Project,
37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 695, 696 (2003) (describing a national project "to coordinate and strengthen
the advocacy of Indian issues before the Supreme Court").
457. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 280-81 (2001).
458. See Skibine, supra note 413, at 7 (citing leading Indian law scholars who believe federal
"Indian law should remain sui generis, just like Indian tribes").
459. See Singer, supra note 163, at 660-61 ("In recent years, the Supreme Court has been
increasing constitutional protection for property rights."); cf. Echeverria, supra note 161, at 354
(writing on the limitations of litigation as a tool in pursuing a property rights agenda).
460. See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (holding that
Alaska Native takings claims based on "aboriginal title" are not entitled to compensation under the
Fifth Amendment); see also Skibine, supra note 413, at 25 n.153 (citing U.S. Supreme Court cases
finding against tribal property rights).
461. See Skibine, suprra note 413, at 24-25 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court cases that reflect
"concern not only for property rights, in this case tribal property rights, but also a judicial willingness
to analyze historical contexts surrounding Acts of Congress interfering with such rights").
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"property.""62 As the peoples with the longest and deepest relationships to the
lands that now comprise the United States, American Indians should enjoy
this legitimating and protective function of the government. The present mar-
ginalization of indigenous peoples in legal discussions about property is not
acceptable. Indeed, some scholars' acceptance of the "limited ability of west-
ern property law to protect American Indian land rights" convinces them that
"Lyng was right." 3  Based on faulty premises about the nature and extent of
Indian property rights, such statements let courts off the hook' and deny Indian
peoples the kind of legal protection that should be available to them."
A very significant risk associated with a property rights approach has
to do with the commodification of Indian sacred sites. If Indian
interests in sacred sites become "property," they can be quantified and
reduced to monetary damages.' In practical terms, the government will
continue to engage in development projects on sacred lands, but will pay off
the Indians first, leaving many with the impression that justice-in the
Anglo American sense-has been served. In the indigenous sense,
monetary compensation for the loss of sacred sites rarely, if ever, represents
a just result.4 67 But even this worst case scenario offers an improvement
over the status quo under which the government has the absolute right to
destroy Indian sacred sites. Damages awards may serve to deter the
government from destroying sacred sites in the future. And, in some cases,
Indians will be able to secure injunctive relief for "irreparable harm" to
their religious or other interests.468
462. BLAcK'S LAW DIcTIONARY, supra note 447, at 1216 (defining "property" as "in the strict
legal sense, an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the government"); see also
GLENDON, supra note 15, at 21 (paraphrasing John Locke, "the essential reason human beings submit
to government is to safeguard their 'property,'... [and] the preservation of property.. . 'is the great and
chief end' for which men come together into commonwealths").
463. Yablon, supra note 12, at 1630, 1634.
464. See id. at 1636 ("[It is unlikely that even the most sympathetic court would consider it appro-
priate to discard precedent and incorporate Indian conceptions of property into its sacred sites decisions.").
465. See Leeds, supra note 21, at 493.
466. See supra note 244 (discussing the compensation of traditional Native Hawaiian land
interests under the Fifth Amendment); see also Western Australia v. Ward (2002) 191 A.L.R. 1, 173
(decision of the High Court of Australia that native title rights and interests are not underlying
property rights, but instead consist of a "bundle of rights" that must be individually proven and can
be extinguished individually).
467. The classic example is United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), where the
Sioux Nation sued for the unlawful taking of the Black Hills, was awarded a huge monetary judgment
and has subsequently refused to accept the money.
468. See also supra note 238 and accompanying text (irreparable harm).
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On a broader scale, Indian nations will insist that the law recognize the
way they value land.469 A property term like "easement" is never going to
express the complex and spiritual nature of Indians' relationships with sacred
places and litigating such claims can be painful in many ways to tribal com-
munities. As Hank Meshorer has written about the Platt case, "To the Zunis,
an interruption of their sacred trek was simply incomprehensible, a thought
so foreign to their psyches that the possibility of it even occurring was beyond
verbalization. Nor were the Zunis particularly comfortable with asking the
federal government for its assistance [in litigation]. 4 70 But extreme circum-
stances sometimes require extreme responses, and the Zunis sued for a prop-
erty right and won. When the Zuni people use their judicially recognized
prescriptive easement to reach Zuni Heaven, they start to enlarge American
concepts about what it means to use land. Other Indian nations may do the
same.' The larger project of "indigenizing" property law is a daunting one
and beyond the scope of the present Article, but Indian people can push
property law to make more room for indigenous rights, interests, and values."
The second major critique might concern this argument's focus on rights.
Many have argued that rights-based arguments are overly rigid, stark, and
litigious ways of dealing with complex problems among people.47 As Mary
Ann Glendon has put it, "Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes
unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that
might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of
common ground.4 74 These criticisms may seem particularly apt when talking
about interests in the federal public lands that, by nature, require some degree
of accommodation and compromise.
While acknowledging the validity of these criticisms, this Article con-
tends that a rights-based approach is nonetheless crucial in sacred sites cases.
469. In the Black Hills example, Lakota peoples continue to resist the Anglo American
commodification of the sacred. A quarter century after the decision in Sioux Nation, they still refuse
to accept the money judgment, and tribal people are suggesting alternative remedies. See, e.g.,
LaVelle, supra note 236 (calling for the restoration of the Black Hills to the Sioux people, with
management of adjacent plans according to conservation and indigenous values, with opportunities for
tribal control).
470. Meshorer, supra note 214, at 318.
471. See, e.g., ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 249, at 8-14 (recognizing "traditional
indigenous environmental ethics").
472. See IN THE LIGHT OF REVERENCE, supra note 400 (interview of Vine Deloria) ("Indians
don't believe [the earth] is an object and they base that on thousands of years of experience.").
473. A full consideration of "rights" critiques is beyond the scope of this Article. For some
examples, see GLENDON, supra note 15; Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L REV. 393
(1988); and Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984).
474. GLENDON, supra note 15, at 14.
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A stronger articulation of Indian rights may help to ensure that the parties even
engage in dialogue and work toward accommodation.47 Presently, the gov-
ernment has little need to come to the bargaining table. This is because, under
Lyng's absolute ownership model, the government has an awesome power to
destroy and Indians have only the hope that the government will be merciful
with its power. O'Connor said as much in her conclusion to Lyng, writing
that although the government had the power to destroy sacred sites,
"[niothing in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity
to the religious needs of any citizen. The Government's rights to the use of
its own land, for example, need not and should not discourage it from
accommodating religious practices like those engaged in by the Indian
respondents." '476 The government may choose to negotiate sacred sites protec-
tion and usage, but this decision is discretionary in many cases.
From a tribal perspective, the mere hope that the government will act
mercifully is not enough when this same government has a long history of
suppressing Indian religions,"' and in contemporary times, is engaged in devel-
opment projects that continue to threaten sacred sites. 78 The First Amendment
offers no real protection in these cases,479 and the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act "has no teeth in it."80 While cultural resources protection
statutes have begun to offer some relief, they typically offer protection only for a
narrow subset of sacred places, such as burial grounds or archaeological sites.
48
'
Tribes need something more to secure their religious freedoms.
475. Cf. HUSSEIN ABU HUSSEIN & FIONA MCKAY, ACCESS DENIED: PALESTINIAN LAND
RIGHTS IN ISRAEL 34 (2003). Hussein and McKay write:
[Tihe language of rights can be used as part of popular pressure to bring about change.
Sometimes, it can help secure gains through the courts; more often, it can be used as part
of a wider campaign for the introduction of new legislation or changes in government policy.
Ultimately the essence of a "rights approach" is that it empowers people to participate in the
struggle to achieve their rights.
Id.
476. Id. at 453-54.
477. See Dussias, supra note 10, at 776-805 (describing the U.S. Government's historical
attempts to "Christianize" Native Americans and suppress their ceremonial dances).
478. See infra notes 486-489.
479. See Zellmer, supra note 278, at 415.
480. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988) (recounting
that AIRFA sponsor Representative Udall "emphasized that the bill would not 'confer special
religious rights on Indians,' would 'not change any existing State or Federal law,' and in fact 'has no
teeth in it'); see also Tsosie, supra note 401, at 289 (discussing whether the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act will apply in sacred sites disputes on federal public lands).
481. See Zellmer, supra note 278, at 439-54 (discussing the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act, the National Historic Preservation Act, and the Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act).
Many would respond that, in the years following Lyng, the federal
administrative process has become a forum for substantial and meaningful
accommodations of Indian religions. Under President Clinton's
administration, federal agencies made notable changes in policy and practice in
favor of accommodating tribal religions.482 Of particular note was President
Clinton's Executive Order requiring federal agencies to "accommodate access
to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners
and avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred
sites... [w]here appropriate, maintain[ing] the confidentiality of [the] sacred
sites." '3 The policy changes led to the adoption of federal land management
plans with varying degrees of protection for sacred sites and religious practices.
These were upheld in the federal courts,484 convincing many scholars and
415advocates that they could entrust Indian religious freedom to the agencies.
The reality, however, is that administrative policy depends on who
occupies the White House. President Clinton's policy on Indian sacred sites
often coincided with his administration's concern for environmental protection.
President Bush's energy plan takes an opposite approach. For example,
President Bush's Executive Order No. 13,212 directs agencies to "expedite
their review of permits or take other actions as necessary to accelerate the com-
pletion of [energy-related] projects.'s Similarly, the Bush Administration
has proposed lifting Clinton-era bans on logging in roadless areas of the
482. Of particular note is President Clinton's Exec. Order No. 13,007, 3 C.F.R 196 (1996),
requiring federal agencies to "accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian
religious practitioners and avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites," where
possible, "maintaining the confidentiality" of ther. But even this Order, which remains in place under the
Bush Administration, stops short of providing any enforceable right, explaining:
This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and
is not intended to, nor does it, create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, substantive or
procedural, enforceable at law or equity by any party against the United States, its agencies,
officers, or any person.
Id.
483. Id.
484. Several of these accommodations are discussed in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt,
175 F.2d 814 (10th Cir. 1999), rejecting challenges to accommodation of Indian religions at Devils
Tower National Monument. See also Natural Arch & Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.
Utah 2002) (upholding accommodations of Indian religions at Rainbow Bridge National Monument).
485. See, e.g., Yablon, supra note 12, at 1653-58 (arguing that agency accommodation
represents "permanent change" in sacred sites cases); see also BROWN, supra note 20, at 151-72
(discussing the National Park Service accommodation at Devils Tower National Monument). See
generally Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural
Conflict Over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757 (2001)
(advocating a narrative approach that would stimulate new ways of resolving sacred sites disputes).
486. Exec. Order No. 13,212, 3 C.F.R. 769 (2002); see also Ted Williams, For a Week's
Worth of Gas, MOTHER JONES, Oct. 2004, at 66.
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national forests." 7 While Clinton's Executive Order in favor of sacred site
protection remains in place, it creates no affirmative or enforceable right
supporting a cause of action in cases in which new energy extraction projects
threaten sacred sites.488 In some instances, the Bush Administration has reversed
Clinton-era decisions and has opened up sacred sites for mining, gas drilling,
and other extractive projects.489
Thus, a stronger source of legal rights may be necessary to protect
sacred sites from contemporary threats.4' Rights arguments can apply in a
variety of different legal settings. Despite the limitations described above,
tribes should absolutely continue to work through the administrative
process on sacred sites problems. In many instances, the law requires them
to exhaust administrative remedies before filing litigation.
49" ' Within the
administrative process, tribes that are able to establish property rights to
sacred sites may be better able to negotiate a satisfactory accommodation of
their religious practices in the administrative process. In future Free
Exercise Clause litigation, the existence of a property right may help tribal
religious practitioners survive a summary judgment motion based on the
487. See Special Areas, State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management, 69 Fed.
Reg. 42, 636 (proposed July 16, 2004) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294) (proposing to replace
logging bans in roadless areas of national forests with the opportunity for state governors to
petition for management protocols); see also Paula Dobbyn, Forest Service OKs Logging 1,800
Formerly Roadless Acres on Gravina Island, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 18, 2004, at Ft.
488. See Exec. Order No. 13,007, 3 C.F.R. 196 (1996). The Order states:
This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch
and is not intended to, nor does it, create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by any party against the United
States, its agencies, officers, or any person.
Id.
489. For instance, President Clinton's Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, denied the
Glamis Corporation a mining permit on lands sacred to Quechan Indians in California because of
concerns over potential cultural impacts. Ten months later, President Bush's Secretary of the
Interior, Gale Norton, reversed the decision and reinstated the permitting process. See Tom
Kenworthy, New Mining Rules Reverse Provisions, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2001, at 8A. In another
example, the Clinton Administration denied the Anschutz Exploration Corporation a permit to
drill an exploratory well in Weatherman Draw, Montana, a sacred area for a number of tribes.
Twelve days after President Bush took office, the Bureau of Land Management reversed the
decision and granted the permit. See Exploratory Well in Weatherman Draw, BLM NEWS, Feb. 6,
2001, at http://www.mt.blm.gov/ea/news
200 l/anschutz.2-6-Ol.htm. In this instance, the Anschutz
Corporation itself ultimately decided to refrain from drilling and donate the property to the
National Trust for Historic Preservation. See National Trust for Historic Preservation, Agreement
to Protect Weatherman Draw, at http://www.nationaltrust.org/law/weatherman.html.
490. Even critics of rights-based advocacy note that "legally enforceable rights ... have
given minorities a way to articulate claims that majorities often respect, and have assisted the
weakest members of society in making their voices heard." GLENDON, supra note 15, at 15.
491. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
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ownership prong of Lyng. Alternatively, a rights argument could support
federal legislative programs in favor of religious and cultural freedoms.492
In none of these settings-administrative process, legislation, or litigation-
should lawmakers merely replace an absolutist vision of government rights with
an absolutist vision of Indian rights (a vision which would conflict with indige-
nous values).493 Rather, the Article calls for the recognition of Indian rights in
the context of Indian relationships with the government, other citizens, and the
land itself, as well as in the context of widely shared values like religious
freedom and cultural diversity.494 The recognition of rights in a vulnerable
minority does not require reverting to the winner-take-all property law approach
of Lyng. Rights have a place in negotiated approaches to legal problems.
Some might argue that a property rights approach sets Indians up for a
big loss-if Indians fail to establish a property interest in a sacred site (as they
often will), courts will affirm the federal government's right to destroy sacred
sites. In this case, Lyng will have been right after all. But property law does
not operate in isolation, and Indians should also make arguments rooted in
the Constitution, statutes, and federal Indian law. Most importantly, even if
Indian nations fail to establish an enforceable right at sacred sites, they
should not face the destruction of such sites. In the most difficult cases, in
which fundamental values like the freedom of religion and cultural survival
are at issue, the parties should not fixate on who has the highest rights to
property but should work together to effectuate mutually agreeable legal solu-
tions. We can use property law to create the society we want to inhabit, rather
than using it to justify destructive legal decisions like Lyng.4 9'
492. Glendon points out that the recognition of "rights" can occur in ways other than via
direct enforcement. In European countries, for example, the constitutional "proclamations of social
and economic rights... are. .. what European lawyers call 'programmatic rights' that are fulfilled
by implementing economic and social programs through legislation. GLENDON, supra note 15, at
99-100; see also Tsosie, supra note 401, at 303-04 (discussing legislative proposals for addressing the
sacred sites issue).
493. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR., FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN AMERICA 131
(1999) ("The essence of the Indian attitude toward peoples, lands, and other life forms is one of
kinship relations in which no element of life can go unattached from human society.").
494. See GLENDON, supra note 15, at 15 (suggesting that a "refined rhetoric of rights would
promote public conversation about the ends towards which our political life is directed.... Let us
freely grant that legally enforceable rights can assist citizens in a large heterogeneous country to live
together in a reasonably peaceful way.").
495. See SINGER, supra note 15, at 210 (suggesting "we focus our attention on choosing
property institutions and rles... that accord with our considered judgments about the appropriate
and defensible forms of social life" (emphasis added)).
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Finally, any recognition of Indian rights and federal duties at sacred sites
might trigger Establishment Clause challenges.49 As a general proposition,
religious accommodations survive the Establishment Clause when they are
made available to all similarly situated religious and secular people in need of
similar treatment, and they advance secular goals. 97 Accommodations of Indian
practices on federal public lands have survived the Establishment Clause
because they avoid advancing religion and do not entangle the government
in religion.49 As scholars have pointed out, accommodating the religious
practices of Indian nations almost always advances numerous secular goals,
such as the protection of the environment, the protection of cultural
resources, and the fulfillment of the government's political obligations to tribes.
99
Moreover, history reveals many instances in which the federal govern-
ment's use of public lands for religious purposes survived Establishment
Clause challenges." Ironically, of course, many of the historical examples
involve the government's attempts to force Christianity on Indian nations"
(corresponding with an aggressive, sometimes violent practice of eradicating
496. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (finding that governmental action
does not offend the Establishment Clause if it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) does not have the
principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) does not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion).
497. See Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor Relations Act, 17
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 185, 275 (1996) (discussing the Establishment Clause as applied to
"broad and neutral exemption[s]").
498. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1454 (D. Wyo. 1998),
affd on other grounds, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a Establishment Clause claim against
the National Park Service accommodation of Native American religions at Devils Tower National
Monument grounds).
499. See Zellmer, supra note 278, at 416. Zellmer states:
Decisions that support American Indian cultural interests do not establish or endorse
religion. Many governmental decisions that protect cultural resources or provide access
to them have cultural, historical, or political, rather than religious, objectives and effects.
These decisions satisfy traditional Establishment Clause analysis, even if they result in
incidental benefits to religious interests.... Protecting cultural resources and allowing
tribal access to them advance numerous secular objectives, including the political and
legal obligations inherent in the federal trust responsibility toward tribes, as expressed in
treaties and statutes.
Id. This point is borne out by the fact that many indigenous peoples would probably even not use
the word "religion" to describe their practices and experiences at sacred sites.
500. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 862-63 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (citing historical examples of public support of religion, including the First
Congress' ratification of the Northwest Ordinance setting aside federal lands for the use of church-
affiliated schools).
501. See Dussias, supra note 10, at 776-805 (discussing federal Indian Christianization efforts
including the assignment of missionaries to Indian reservations, outlawing of Indian ceremonial
dances, the removal of Indian children to boarding schools where they were instructed in
Christianity, and other measures).
Indian religions)."0 2 Thus, some contemporary accommodations of Indian
traditional religions on public lands may be necessary to alleviate burdens on
religious freedom and disentangle the government from its previous suppres-
sion of Indian religions.0 3
CONCLUSION
Federal courts have used the fact of federal ownership to deny Indian
religious freedoms at sacred sites located on public lands. This Article has
argued that these cases reflect an "ownership model" of property law that is
neither descriptively accurate nor normatively desirable. To the extent that
property law often protects the rights of nonowners, Indian nations and their
advocates should examine carefully the facts of future sacred sites cases to
ascertain whether they may be able to claim an enforceable right or duty sup-
porting the need to use, or to maintain the physical integrity of, the sacred
place. Whether in litigation or in negotiated settings like the federal admin-
istrative process, property rights ultimately may enhance legal recognition of
Indian interest at sacred sites.
Of course, property arguments alone will not suffice to guarantee
Indians' religious freedoms at sacred sites-nor should they have to do so.
Indian nations are more than mere property claimants; they are political and
cultural sovereigns engaged in a government-to-government relationship
with the United States, and they are entitled to the full body of legal protections
growing out of that relationship. Individual Indians, in turn, should be
eligible for the protections of the First Amendment, like any other citizen.
The present argument is only that, in light of Lyng, tribes should consider
property rights arguments as part of a multipronged legal strategy in sacred
sites cases. Recognizing the rights of Indians as nonowners of sacred sites
located on federal public lands may help to effectuate the values of religious
and cultural freedom that we all cherish.
502. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n, 175 F.3d at 817 ("By the late 19th Century federal
attempts to replace traditional Indian religions with Christianity grew violent. In 1890 for example,
the United States Calvary shot and killed 300 unarmed Sioux men, women and children en route to
an Indian religious ceremony called the Ghost Dance.").
503. See Corrada, supra note 497, at 276 (discussing the Establishment Clause as applied to
accommodations that "lift a grave, serious or significant burden on religion"); see also Zellmer, supra
note 278, at 416 ("[Djecisions that provide preferences or exemptions for tribal spiritual needs by
alleviating burdens to ceremonial practices or otherwise dispelling the lingering effects of religious
suppression are an appropriate form of accommodation.").
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